

Universidades Lusíada

Pedro, Doriana Patrícia de Aragão Nunes, 1992-

Angola no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas : 2015-2016

<http://hdl.handle.net/11067/3831>

Metadados

Data de Publicação 2018-05-21

Resumo A presente exposição vem relatar aquilo que foi o contributo de Angola no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas no biénio 2015-2016. Numa primeira abordagem, iremos, de forma resumida, retratar aquilo que foi a trajetória interna de Angola até se afirmar como uma potência regional e o seu envolvimento nas questões africanas e, posteriormente, nas questões extracontinentais. Iremos também abordar resumidamente as duas principais organizações internacionais que Angola integra – a União Africana...

The present presentation reports on Angola's contribution to its participation in the United Nations Security Council in the biennium 2015-2016. In a first approach, we will briefly portray what has been Angola's internal trajectory until it asserts itself as a regional power and its involvement in African issues and later on extra continental issues. We will also briefly discuss the two main international organizations where Angola is involved - the African Union and the United Nations - as wel...

Palavras Chave Segurança internacional - Grandes Lagos Africanos, Organização das Nações Unidas. Conselho de Segurança, União Africana, Angola - Relações externas

Tipo masterThesis

Revisão de Pares Não

Coleções [ULL-FCHS] Dissertações

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UNIVERSIDADE LUSÍADA DE LISBOA

Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais

Mestrado em Relações Internacionais

Angola no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas: 2015-2016

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Dissertação aprovada em: 15 de Maio de 2018

Lisboa
2018



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Dissertação apresentada à Faculdade de Ciências
Humanas e Sociais da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa
para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Relações
Internacionais.

Orientador: Prof. Doutor José Francisco Lynce Zagalo
Pavia

Lisboa

Abril 2018

Ficha Técnica

Autora Doriana Patrícia de Aragão Nunes Pedro
Orientador Prof. Doutor José Francisco Lynce Zagalo Pavia
Título Angola no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas: 2015-2016
Local Lisboa
Ano 2018

Mediateca da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa - Catalogação na Publicação

PEDRO, Doriana Patrícia de Aragão Nunes, 1992-

Angola no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas : 2015-2016 / Doriana Patrícia de Aragão Nunes Pedro ; orientado por José Francisco Lynce Zagalo Pavia. - Lisboa : [s.n.], 2018. - Dissertação de mestrado em Relações Internacionais, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa.

I - PAVIA, José Francisco Lynce Zagallo, 1967-

LCSH

1. Segurança internacional - Grandes Lagos Africanos
2. Angola - Relações externas
3. Organização das Nações Unidas. Conselho de Segurança
4. União Africana
5. Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa. Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais - Teses
6. Teses - Portugal - Lisboa

1. Security, international - Great Lakes (Africa)

2. Angola - Foreign relations

3. United Nations. Security Council

4. African Union

5. Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa. Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais - Dissertations

6. Dissertations, Academic - Portugal - Lisbon

LCC

1. DT1353.P43 2018

A ti mãe, por tudo!

Obrigada.

AGRADECIMENTOS

Agradeço a Deus, por tudo e por todos os que colocou no meu caminho para enfrentar esta caminhada.

“A Paz e a Segurança, são condições essenciais para o Desenvolvimento da Democracia, do Estado de Direito e para a promoção dos Direitos Humanos.”

José Eduardo dos Santos In ANGOLA. Governo (2014) – Angola Candidato a membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas no período 2015-2016. Luanda : Ministério das Relações Exteriores.

APRESENTAÇÃO

Angola no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas 2015-2016

Doriana Patrícia de Aragão Nunes Pedro

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Iremos também abordar resumidamente as duas principais organizações internacionais que Angola integra – a União Africana e a Organização das Nações Unidas - bem como o seu contributo para cada uma delas e a forma como elas se interligam entre si, no que concerne à participação de Angola no maior palco de resolução dos problemas mundiais, em questões de segurança e manutenção da paz: o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.

Palavras-chave: Angola, Conselho de Segurança, manutenção da paz em África.

PRESENTATION

Angola at the United Nations Security Council 2015-2016

Doriana Patrícia de Aragão Nunes Pedro

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Keywords: Angola, Security Council, peacekeeping in Africa.

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LISTA DE ABREVIATURAS, SIGLAS E ACRÓNIMOS

APSA	-	Arquitetura para a Paz e Segurança para África
AQMI	-	Al-Qaeda no Magrebe Islâmico
ASF	-	African Standby Forces
CEDEAO	-	Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental
CEEAC	-	Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central
CER's	-	Comunidades Económicas Regionais
CIRGL	-	Conferência Internacional sobre a Região dos Grandes Lagos
CMA	-	Coordenação do Movimento Azawad
COPAX	-	Conselho de Paz e Segurança da África Central
CPLP	-	Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa
CPS	-	Conselho de Paz e Segurança
CSNU	-	Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas
EASBRIG	-	África Oriental Brigada em Espera
ECOBIG	-	Brigada de Espera da ECOWAS
ELNA	-	Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola
FAA	-	Forças Armadas Angolanas
FALA	-	Forças de Armadas de Libertação de Angola
FAPLA	-	Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola
FNLA	-	Frente Nacional para Libertação de Angola
FOMAC	-	Força Multinacional para a África Central
FOMAC	-	Força Multinacional da África Central
JMPLA	-	Juventude do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MARAC	-	Comissão de Defesa e Segurança e Mecanismo de Alerta Rápido da África Central
MINUSCA	-	Missão Integrada Multidimensional das Nações Unidas para a República Centro Africana
MINUSMA	-	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	-	Movimento Nacional para a Libertação de Azawad
MONUC	-	Missão da Organização das Nações Unidas para o Congo
MONUSCO	-	Missão de Estabilização das Organização das Nações Unidas na RDC
MPLA	-	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MUJAO	-	Movimento para a singularidade e a Jihad na África Ocidental
NASBRIG	-	Brigada Regional de Espera Norte Africana

ONU	-	Organização das Nações Unidas
OSES	-	Gabinete do Enviado Especial do Secretário-Geral do Sahel
OUA	-	Organização de Unidade para a Unidade Africana
PIAGC	-	Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde
PRS	-	Partido da Renovação Social
RDA	-	República Democrática de Angola
RPA	-	República Popular de Angola
SADC	-	Comunidade Para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral
SADCBRIG	-	Brigada de Espera da África Austral
SADCC	-	Conferência de Coordenação do Desenvolvimento da África Austral
SWAPO	-	South West Africa People's Organization
UA	-	União Africana
UNAMA	-	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afeghanistan
UNAMID	-	União Africana - Missão das Nações Unidas em Darfur
UNAVEM	-	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNIOGBIS	-	Escritório Integrado das Nações Unidas para a Consolidação da Paz na Guiné – Bissau das Nações Unidas
UNITA	-	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNMISS	-	Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul
UNOWA	-	Escritório das Nações Unidas para a África Ocidental
UNOWAS	-	Escritório das Nações Unidas para a África Ocidental e o Sahel
UNSMIL	-	Missão de Apoio das Nações Unidas na Líbia
UNSOM	-	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

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1. INTRODUÇÃO

Tal como a maioria dos Estados no mundo, Angola traçou e tem vindo a traçar um longo trajeto naquilo que concerne ao seu envolvimento nas relações internacionais, afirmando-se a nível interno e externo, ou seja, a nível continental, onde é considerada (para os seus parceiros africanos) como um exemplo a seguir, no que diz respeito à resolução de conflitos e tensões pela via pacífica e do diálogo e à sua capacidade de se reerguer após 20 anos de conflitos internos. Por outro lado, a nível extracontinental e pelas razões acima citadas, Angola tem vindo a conquistar cada vez mais a confiança de todos os outros Estados fora do continente africano. Essa confiança está patente na eleição de Angola como membro não-permanente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações-Unidas para o biénio 2003-2004, apesar do fim recente do conflito interno ocorrido no país.

Antes de nos debruçarmos sobre aquele que é o objeto de estudo desta apresentação, abordaremos primeiramente aquilo que é o país em si, relatando em breves linhas a situação interna do país, para, de forma contínua, dar a entender claramente o longo trajeto seguido por Angola. Como mencionaremos no subcapítulo seguinte, Angola, tanto antes como depois da independência, sofreu várias crises internas que culminaram no seu atraso em vingar rumo ao desenvolvimento e crescimento, bem como no seio da comunidade internacional.

Apesar deste atraso, e como iremos observar de seguida, Angola não deixou de conquistar o seu lugar, somando esforços para alcançar aquele que é o objetivo principal de qualquer estado no sistema internacional. Dito isto, vamos então analisar o modo e os mecanismos que Angola usou a seu favor para alcançar tão desejado objetivo e, com isso, contribuir para a resolução dos conflitos (não só em África, mas também em todo o mundo).

O papel ativo de Angola no que diz respeito à concertação e à manutenção da paz é facilmente compreensível e pode ser enquadrado na estratégia do país para se afirmar como uma potência no continente, em vários aspetos, começando por se assumir como potência na sua sub-região Central e Austral do continente africano. A atuação de Angola tem sempre tido grande impacto, não só nos países ajudados como na comunidade internacional, que vê no país um parceiro a levar muito a sério para se fazer e manter a paz - país que se pauta por intervenções sempre ponderadas, moderadas e nunca com o objetivo de causar conflitos. (Carvalho, 2014, p. 73).

1.1. CARACTERIZAÇÃO HISTÓRICA DE ANGOLA

O estado angolano está situado na margem sul do continente africano, ocupando uma extensão territorial de 1.246.700 km², fazendo fronteira a norte e a nordeste com a República Democrática do Congo, a leste com a República da Zâmbia, a sul com a República da Namíbia e a oeste com o oceano Atlântico.

[...] A República de Angola ocupa uma posição geopolítica, estando localizada na zona subequatorial e tropical do hemisfério sul e ocupando uma parte sudoeste do continente Africano, localizado entre os paralelos 4° 22 de latitude sul, o que determina uma amplitude latitudinal de 13° 40 e entre os meridianos de 11° 41 longitude este a ocidente e de 24° 04 longitude este a oriente, com uma amplitude longitudinal de 12° 23. Assim, a configuração do território de Angola mostra-nos a aproximação de um quadrilátero, não considerando as saliências e concavidades que perturbam a regularidade geométrica das suas fronteiras, nomeadamente a parte norte onde se situa um pedaço de terra, pertença do território nacional Angolano, o enclave de Cabinda, que está separado do resto do país por uma faixa estreita menor de 50 km de largura pertencente à República Democrática do Congo. (Bernardino, 2013, p. 429-430).

Angola é dotada de um clima tropical, com duas estações climáticas durante o ano. Entre elas, a das chuvas (verão), que ocorre entre Setembro a Abril, e o Cacimbo, um período mais seco e com temperaturas mais baixas, que ocorre de Maio a Agosto. (Zau, 2002, p. 32).

As características climáticas originaram uma diversidade na cobertura vegetal, proporcionando *habitats* muito próprios e uma grande variedade de animais. Em Cabinda, a norte, encontramos a floresta densa e húmida do Maiombe, rica em madeira, onde é possível avistar gorilas. A sul do Zaire e nas bacias do Kwanza, Cuango e Cuíto, afluentes do rio Cassai, predominam a floresta e a savana. Na zona de planalto encontra-se a floresta aberta, com vegetação e fauna características. Mais a sul, situa-se o deserto do Namibe, onde se pode encontrar a espécie vegetal *Welwitschia Mirabilis* (Angola. Consulado Geral, 2015).

O país é atravessado por importantes rios oriundos das zonas do planalto central, desaguardo no oceano Atlântico. Na parte norte do país, devido à bacia do rio Zaire, correm afluentes de grandes rios como o Cuango, o Cuílo, o Caluango, o Chicapa, o Luachimo, Chiúme e o Cassai (Angola. Consulado Geral, 2015).

A estrutura geológica de Angola caracteriza-se por uma orla sedimentar litoral, que acompanha a costa; várias formações de cobertura, que abrangem as regiões do

nordeste, leste, sudeste e parte sul; um maciço antigo, que cobre quase toda a metade oeste (Angola. Consulado Geral, 2015).

A partir da costa, encontram-se, do ponto de vista geomorfológico, a faixa litoral, a zona de transição, a cadeia marginal de montanhas, o planalto antigo, a bacia do Zaire, a bacia do Zambeze e a bacia do Lubango. Vantajosamente rica em belezas naturais, Angola é privilegiada por variadíssimas paisagens espetaculares, das quais se destacam as formações rochosas, várias quedas de água - principalmente as Quedas de Kalandula (Malanje) - lagoas e rios. Minerais como ferro, cobre, ouro, chumbo, zinco, manganês, volfrâmio, estanho, petróleo e diamantes fazem de Angola um país extremamente rico, no que diz respeito a recursos minerais (Zau 2002, p. 34).

É importante salientar que o petróleo e os diamantes são os recursos mais importantes ou, por assim dizer, os mais explorados, uma vez que representam a principal fonte de rendimentos do país.

1.2. GRUPOS ÉTNICOS DE ANGOLA

Por etnia, pode entender-se “grupo de indivíduos que partilham historicamente uma unidade cultural e linguística comum e nela estão fortemente vinculados entre si” (Porto Editora, 2017).

O povo angolano surge com uma enorme variedade étnica. A etnia Bantu representa a maioria da população angolana e congrega os grupos etnolinguísticos Bakongo, Ambundo, Lunda (ou Cokwe), Ovibundo, Ganguela, Nhaneca-Humbe, Ovambo, Herero e Okavambo, sendo que cada um destes se divide também em subgrupos. Representando uma minoria populacional, existe ainda também o grupo étnico Khoisan (também subdividido em vários grupos etnolinguísticos), que se localiza nas zonas leste e sul do país (Zau 2002, p. 38-39).




Ilustração 1 - Mapa representativo da divisão étnica na Angola de 1970. (Mateus, 2013).

A população angolana e os povos que a compõem foram sofrendo alterações consoante as diferentes fases históricas do país. Com a instituição do regime liberal republicano, em Portugal, dá-se em Angola, a partir do ano de 1912, a tentativa de se criar uma nação judaica. Este novo regime convidou não só judeus a instalarem-se no país como também colonos ibéricos e migrantes da Europa de Leste, abrindo assim o caminho para a “invasão” branca no território¹. A partir do ano de 1920, a população branca em Angola aumentou consideravelmente de 12.000 para 20.000 habitantes, numa altura em que a segregação já era visível e almejada pelo então governador-geral de Angola (Norton de Matos), que, no sentido de encorajar a imigração de portugueses brancos

¹ A visão de tornar Angola não apenas num território para a exploração de escravos, mas também numa colónia de imigrantes brancos, surgiu em 1907, com o então governador do país Paiva Couceiro. Em Angola, os níveis de escravatura aumentaram e em Portugal a crise monárquica deu lugar ao novo regime liberal republicano, concebido para fortalecer a presença de colonos brancos nas colónias brancas (Birmingham 2015, p. 92-93).

para Angola, prometeu cargos superiores aos dos negros e mestiços nativos, o que prosseguiu durante o período salazarista (Birmingham, 2015, p, 93-101).

Com a independência de Angola em 1975 e o conflito civil que se seguiu, houve um abandono dos territórios angolanos, por parte da comunidade portuguesa, e uma mudança de *habitat* (das áreas rurais para as cidades), o que levou a uma acentuada diversidade étnica, não só na capital como também nas cidades de Benguela e Huambo.

Em tempos de paz, a partir da década de 1990, surgiu um novo grupo populacional (de etnia chinesa) no território angolano (e um pouco por toda a África), numa altura em que também a China procurava expandir a sua influência pelo mundo, conquistando novos parceiros económicos.

[...] O continente africano, com todas as riquezas naturais que possui, seria, por assim dizer, o fornecedor natural dos produtos base que alimentam as indústrias e manufaturas chinesas (Pavia, 2011, p. 12).

Tal como acima referido, ao longo da sua história, Angola foi experimentando alterações demográficas que, de certo modo, ditaram um pouco daquilo que seria a sua conflituosa história, que está na base dos conflitos que ocorreram e têm ocorrido um pouco por toda a África. Apesar destas alterações demográficas, Angola sempre se revelou pertença dos angolanos, independentemente das raças ou etnias.

Nesse aspeto, Angola pode-se orgulhar de, mesmo desde os primórdios da luta de libertação nacional, ter forjado uma forte consciência nacional que permitiu formar uma ampla frente de combate político-diplomática e sobretudo ideológica contra o colonialismo português. As tentativas de dividir os angolanos pela raça, pela sua condição étnica, social e até mesmo sexual encontraram sempre resposta pronta e firme. O lema de “Cabinda ao Cunene um só povo uma só nação” foi a grande base que hoje permite aos angolanos celebrar 39 anos de independência, com um país uno e indivisível (Godwin, 2014).²

1.3. HISTÓRIA DIPLOMÁTICA DE ANGOLA

Até se afirmar como uma grande potência regional africana (como é conhecida nos dias de hoje), Angola seguiu um longo e conflituoso trajeto diplomático, tendo acabado por retirar à República da África do Sul um pouco da supremacia regional³. Graças ao pulso

² O autor deste artigo, Roger Godwin, faz uma comparação entre Angola e outros países africanos em conflito interno ou externo, uma vez que a rivalidade étnica é uma das principais causas de conflito em África.

³ A República da África do Sul, desde década de 70, vinha a afirmar-se como uma possível potência com projeção regional. Este quadro veio a alterar-se, a partir do momento em que, em 1978, em Camp David, é

pouco firme de Portugal como potência colonizadora, Angola tornou-se o palco perfeito para que as duas superpotências mundiais pudessem exercer ainda alguma da sua influência (Almeida, 2011, p. 43).

Angola foi a última colónia portuguesa a tornar-se independente, a 11 de novembro de 1975, e entrou para o “clube dos independentes”, aparentemente com o estatuto de Estado Único, sendo que se encontrava internamente fracionado por três movimentos de emancipação com ideologias, posições e até áreas geográficas divergentes. Se, por um lado, se encontrava o Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), sediado na região entre Luanda e Benguela e com o socialismo soviético como modelo (e que proclamou em Luanda, a 11 de Novembro de 1975, a República Popular de Angola), por outro lado, encontrava-se a União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), que ocupou quase toda zona entre Malange e o Sul (principalmente a zona do Ovimbundo do planalto central) e se orientava ideologicamente pela doutrina maoista, em coligação com a Frente Nacional para Libertação de Angola (FNLA), que circunscreveu a região do Bacongo e se guiava pelos ideais norte-americanos, sem menosprezar apoios vindos da República Popular da China e sem se desligar da doutrina mobutiana da *Autenticidade Cultural Africana*⁴. Esta UNITA proclama, na mesma data, a República Socialista Africana de Angola (Almeida, 2011, p. 42-43).

Esta divisão interna veio agudizar ainda mais as pretensões das duas superpotências da época: Estados Unidos da América, que apoiavam diretamente a coligação UNITA/FNLA, e a União Soviética, ligada ao MPLA que, através dos seus dois principais peões, nomeadamente a República da África do Sul, em apoio à Coligação, e Cuba, solidária ao MPLA, passaram a tomar parte nas hostilidades com as suas forças militarizadas. (Almeida, 2011, p. 43).

estabelecida a paz entre hebreus e egípcios, após a conhecida Guerra dos Seis dias, de 1967, e a navegação no Canal do Suez volta a ser aberta ao mundo, uma vez que, até então, era a África do Sul o principal ponto das rotas marítimas entre o Ocidente Atlântico e os principais produtores de petrolíferos. A isto, acrescentar-se o facto de que as grandes personalidades do *apartheid* foram perdendo cada vez mais a sua influência até ao fim do regime, em 1990, e, por último, mas não menos importante, o facto de terem adotado, a nível de metais preciosos e estratégicos, uma postura quase monopolista relativamente à economia ocidental. (Almeida, 2011, p. 45).

⁴ Esta doutrina foi proclamada em outubro de 1971, por Joseph Desirée Mobutu, autoproclamado Presidente do antigo Congo Belga, e tinha como objetivo a africanização do país. Essa africanização fez-se sentir na alteração do nome do estado do Congo (que se passou a denominar Zaire); na alteração do nome da capital (de Leopoldville para Kinshasa); em alterações no nome das pessoas, sendo que até o nome do próprio Presidente foi alterado para Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbenga Ua Za Banga; e inclusivamente nas roupas. (Almeida, 2000, p. 174-175).

Segundo o autor Eugénio Almeida, desde que Portugal e os movimentos independentistas se juntaram em Alvor para definir os contornos daquilo que viria a ser a independência de Angola, já era patente o desentendimento entre os movimentos, sendo que nem no período de transição tal entendimento seria possível. Nem Portugal nem os Movimentos que faziam parte do processo de independência estavam dispostos a agir de boa-fé, no que diz respeito à sua disponibilidade em coexistir e conduzir pacificamente o território à independência, uma vez que, desde a assinatura do mesmo acordo (Alvor), cada Movimento tinha já as respetivas forças militarizadas constituídas. A FNLA tinha o Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (ELNA), o MPLA formou as Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA) e a UNITA as Forças de Armadas de Libertação de Angola (FALA) (2011, p. 55-56).

Apesar de terem sido proclamadas duas Repúblicas em 1975, a República Popular de Angola (RPA) foi a única a ser reconhecida, ao passo que a República Democrática de Angola (RDA) não passou de uma mera proclamação pública⁵. A RPA foi reconhecida pela maioria dos países africanos apesar de outros se terem absterido de reconhecer qualquer uma das duas repúblicas, aceitando unicamente a independência de Angola. Foi reconhecida também pela URSS, pelos países latino-americanos e pelos países asiáticos (Almeida, 2011, p. 57).

É deste modo que, no dia 11 de novembro de 1975, pouco antes da meia-noite, a RPA retira, sem a presença portuguesa, a sua bandeira colonial e proclama - mediante a eleição do seu mais recente presidente, António Agostinho Neto (1922-1979) - a independência de Angola. A esta nova República, foi internacionalmente reconhecido o direito de evocar legitimidade política, administrativa, territorial e militar em relação aos seus vizinhos, sendo que, no dia 12 de fevereiro de 1976, foi reconhecida e admitida como quadragésimo sexto membro da atual União Africana (UA) (antiga Organização de Unidade para a Unidade Africana - OUA) e, a 1 de dezembro do mesmo ano, na Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU).

⁵ Eugénio da Costa Almeida aponta como fatores que levaram à implosão da RDA os seguintes: a denominação da própria República foi motivo de discussão entre os representantes da mesma, uma vez que vários nomes foram colocados em cima da mesa, nomeadamente: República Democrática e Socialista Africana de Angola e República Negra Socialista e Democrática de Angola; outro problema que o autor aponta é o facto de que os dois movimentos da coligação (UNITA/FNLA) tenham entrado em conflito de interesses, dado a relação entre os seus líderes nunca ter sido das melhores e possuírem concepções políticas e administrativas diferentes; com o avanço e a ocupação das forças cubanas para sul, na cidade do Huambo em Fevereiro de 1986, acaba por se desintegrar a RDA, nunca tendo sido reconhecida e aceite internacionalmente (2011, p. 58-59).

Embora a situação tivesse, entretanto, evoluído favoravelmente, a crise política que grassava no país estava longe de ter fim à vista, sendo necessário vencer o inimigo. Isto porque a UNITA era apoiada pela África do Sul. De modo a enfraquece-la, Angola, juntamente com as forças cubanas e soviéticas, decidiram apoiar as forças anti-*apartheid* na África do Sul e a SWAPO (*South West Africa People's Organization*), na Namíbia, autorizando a abertura de delegações de cada uma destas organizações na capital angolana, dando apoio militar a atividades subversivas conduzidas em território sul-africano e namibiano, bem como facilidades diplomáticas (Almeida, 2011, p. 63).

O inimigo foi enfraquecido, mas as tensões internas prosseguiram, desta vez dentro do próprio partido. Personalidades no seio do MPLA estavam descontentes com algumas políticas implementadas pelo governo, contrárias aos ideais pelos quais muitos militantes haviam lutado⁶.

[...] Enquanto o Governo que dava os primeiros passos se distraía com horizontes distantes, descobria de súbito que o tapete tinha sido drasticamente puxado de baixo dos seus pés, no seu próprio pátio urbano. [...] a expectativa de que a independência iria trazer ricas recompensas aos jovens negros conduziu a constantes desilusões durante não menos que dois anos de austeridade. De súbito, a frustração dos que pouco tinham ganhado com a independência e que sentiam uma inveja intensa em relação à elite cosmopolita que herdara os adornos coloniais do poder e os símbolos visíveis da prosperidade explodiu num desespero violento. (Birmingham, 2015 p. 138).

Com o rebentamento desta revolução, o Governo de Neto, apoiado pelo exército cubano, protagonizou uma série de fortes represálias para com aqueles que pudessem estar envolvidos no processo de revolução, desencadeando uma série de atos violentos, que acabaram por silenciar toda e qualquer ideia de governo ideal que pudesse até então pairar no ar, passando o Governo a adotar, a partir deste momento, um modelo cada vez mais ditatorial (Birmingham 2015, p. 141).

⁶ As diferenças surgiram logo no início de 1976, aquando da formulação da Lei Popular (...) entraram em confronto duas perspectivas distintas, por um lado Nito Alves, como Ministro da Administração Interna e membro integrante do Conselho da Revolução almejava órgãos populares com autonomia política e com função de controlo do funcionamento da administração inspirado no modelo soviético e por outro Agostinho Neto pretendia que os órgãos exercessem o cargo de mediadores entre a sociedade e o Estado (Marques, 2012, p. 62).

Na madrugada de 27 de maio de 1977, Nito Alves, liderou um movimento popular de protesto que se dirigiu para o Palácio Presidencial, para apelar ao Presidente Neto que tomasse uma posição contra o suposto rumo de influência Maoísta que o MPLA estava a seguir e para que alterasse essa tendência com o retorno à linha Marxista-Leninista pura. O Batalhão Feminino tomou a cadeia de São Paulo com o objetivo de libertar dezenas de elementos do grupo nitista, ao passo que Sita Velles e o marido, José Van-Dunem incentivaram os operários e populares a aderirem a revolta (Mateus, 2012).

2. ANGOLA E AS ORGANIZAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

2.1. A UNIÃO AFRICANA

Como foi anteriormente referido, Angola entrou para a já extinta OUA⁷, um ano a seguir à sua independência, aquando do reconhecimento da República Popular de Angola pelos 45 Estados-Membros que compunham a organização. Quanto à atuação da OUA em relação à independência de Angola proclamada pelo MPLA, pode afirmar-se que foi bastante ambígua - um grande número de países-membros consideravam a FNLA - e, conseqüentemente, a UNITA, dentro de uma coligação entre os dois movimentos - mais «genuinamente africanos» e legítimos do que o MPLA, e havia um enorme esforço da parte destes para provar que o apoio que o MPLA recebia da URSS e de Cuba só podia ser entendido como uma neocolonização do território angolano. A preocupação com este argumento está bem patente no discurso feito pelo então vice-primeiro ministro, José Eduardo dos Santos, perante a Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas. Na tentativa de solucionar o conflito angolano, houve uma clara divisão entre o grupo de países que reconhecia o Governo do MPLA e o apoio soviético-cubano e que criticava as ações da FNLA e da UNITA. Esses ficaram conhecidos como radicais, sendo que o grupo dos chamados moderados entendia ser necessário estabelecer um governo de coligação dos três movimentos. Não reconheciam o MPLA, nem a intervenção de qualquer nação estrangeira (Araújo, 2010).

Em África, os conflitos e a resolução dos mesmos foram, desde sempre, um problema para os países africanos membros da Organização supranacional. Estes procuraram sempre encontrar uma via mais propícia à paz entre os seus povos (Carvalho, 2014, p.

⁷ Esta Organização foi criada no decurso do processo de assinatura da Carta da Organização de Unidade Africana a 25 de Maio de 1963, em Adis-Abeba (Etiópia), pelos representantes de 32 governos de países africanos independentes, com o objetivo de defender uma África para os africanos, independentemente da sua cor, ao contrário dos movimentos pan-africanistas anteriores. Tinha também como objetivo o fim da segregação racial, o reconhecimento das fronteiras decorrentes da Conferência de Berlim, defendendo a sua integridade e negando o direito a qualquer secessão, e a independência das colónias (Almeida 2000, p. 72). Em época de luta contra o colonialismo, Agostinho Neto inicia, a partir de 1963, a sua luta diplomática, marcada pelo reconhecimento por parte da OUA do Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE) e as hostilidades do Governo do Zaire. A partir daí, Neto visitou e participou em várias conferências, no sentido angariar apoios para o seu partido e convencer os países africanos e a comunidade internacional de que a solidariedade internacional era essencial para se almejar a liberdade. Após uma forte ofensiva diplomática, consegue o apoio de alguns países africanos, como o Egipto, o Sudão, o Gana, a Guiné Conacri e a Argélia e também o envio de uma missão por parte da OUA, no sentido de perceber o estado da luta de libertação de Angola. Em 1966, o MPLA usou dos seus instrumentos de política externa, a Juventude do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (JMPLA), num dos seus fóruns internacionais, para solicitar aos seus parceiros e amigos do movimento o apoio na luta contra o colonialismo português, enviando telegramas à OUA e à ONU relatando a desunião das forças nacionalistas, o desrespeito pelo direito à autodeterminação dos povos e à independência de Angola (Francisco, 2013, p. 27-40).

83). Por esta via, em Setembro de 1999, foi pela primeira vez solicitada a criação de uma União Africana que fosse mais eficaz e que promovesse uma aceleração no processo de integração do continente, permitindo-lhe assim desempenhar um papel legítimo na economia global, assim como na resolução dos problemas sociais e políticos que iam ganhando novos contornos, com o decorrer no tempo. Foi na 38ª Cimeira de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da Organização da Unidade Africana, realizada em Durban (África do Sul), em 8 de julho de 2002, que foi formalizada a Constituição da União Africana, organismo que sucede à própria OUA, pois esta havia-se tornado inoperante e ineficiente, a partir do momento em que deixou de dispor de mecanismos legais de intervenção na resolução dos inúmeros conflitos regionais existentes em África (Bernardino, 2013, p. 244).

Na sequência da assinatura do Ato Constitutivo da União Africana, ficaram estabelecidos os princípios e objetivos que, a partir de então, passariam a estar na base do funcionamento da organização, em prol de uma maior unidade política e económica. Dentre os objetivos, podem citar-se os que propõem “respeitar a soberania, integridade territorial e independência dos seus Estados Membros” e “promover a paz, a segurança e a estabilidade no Continente”⁸.

Para além dos princípios e objetivos herdados da antiga OUA, instituíram-se também outros dispositivos, consoante as necessidades que foram surgindo no seio da UA, tendo esta passado a ser composta pelos seguintes órgãos: a Assembleia Geral, que conta com a presença dos Chefes de Estado de todos os Estados-Membros; o Conselho Executivo, composto pelos ministros ou autoridades designadas pelos Governos dos Estados-Membros e responsável perante a Assembleia; a Comissão da UA, que é composta por um Presidente, um Vice-Presidente e oito comissários, que tratam de assuntos da mais diversa ordem (paz e segurança, assuntos políticos, infraestrutura e energia, assuntos sociais, recursos humanos e tecnologia, comércio e indústria, economia rural e agricultura e assuntos económicos); o Comité dos Representantes Permanentes; o Parlamento Pan – Africano (PAP); o Conselho Económico Social e Cultural (ECOSOC); os Comités Técnicos Especializados; e as Instituições Financeiras (Fundo Monetário Africano, Banco Central Africano e Banco Africano de Investimento)

⁸Os princípios e objetivos estabelecidos no Ato Constitutivo da União Africana foram adotados com base na Carta da OUA e no Tratado que institui a Comunidade Económica Africana (Tratado de Abuja). “**EVOCANDO** a Declaração que adotámos durante a Quarta Sessão Extraordinária da nossa Conferência em Sirte, Grande Jamahiriya Árabe Líbia Socialista e Popular, em 9/9/99, pela qual decidimos estabelecer a União Africana, em conformidade com os objetivos fundamentais da Carta da Organização da Unidade Africana e do Tratado de criação da Comunidade Económica Africana” (African Union, 2000).

(African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p. 12).

Em 2002, foi adotado um protocolo relativo ao estabelecimento de um Conselho de Paz e Segurança (CPS), com o objetivo de substituir o “Órgão Central do Mecanismo de Prevenção, Gestão e resolução de Conflitos da OUA”, cuja principal função seria a promoção da paz, da segurança e da estabilidade, o desenvolvimento de mecanismos de alerta precoce e de diplomacia preventiva, mediação e conciliação, operações de paz, conciliação da paz e reconstrução pós-conflito, ações de ajuda humanitária, gestão de catástrofes e outras funções outorgadas pela Assembleia. Este novo Conselho iniciou as suas funções em 2004 e, a partir desta altura, passou a operar de acordo com as regras de procedimento inseridas no Protocolo CPS e no Ato Constitutivo da UA. (Bernardino, 2013, p. 245)

2.1.1. ARQUITETURA DE PAZ E SEGURANÇA AFRICANA

Com a criação da UA, surge uma abordagem da segurança diferente da que existia no continente, no século XXI, no que diz respeito à prevenção e resolução de conflitos na região. Esta nova abordagem da segurança apresenta dois níveis interligados entre si, sendo que o primeiro está diretamente ligado ao continente, com a Organização no topo daquilo que pretende ser um sistema integrado de segurança continental e o CPS, como garante dessa segurança, recorre aquilo que foi apelidado de “*Arquitetura para a Paz e Segurança para África*” (APSA). O segundo nível está diretamente ligado à questão regional em que estão inseridas as Comunidades Económicas Regionais (CERs), compostas por todos os Estados-membros que integram o continente Africano⁹ (Pavia, 2011, p.115).

⁹ Para além das CER's referidas no quadro abaixo, a UA reconhece também o Mercado Comum para a África Oriental e Austral (COMESA); a Comunidade dos Estados Sahelo-Saarianos (CEN-SAD); e a Autoridade Intergovernamental de Desenvolvimento (IGAD) (African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p. 128).

Tabela 1 – Estados Membros da União Africana¹⁰

<u>África Central</u> <u>(CEEAC)</u>	<u>África Oriental</u> <u>(CAO)</u>	<u>África Norte</u> <u>(UMA)</u>	<u>África Austral</u> <u>(SADC)</u>	<u>África Ocidental</u> <u>(CEDEAO)</u>
Angola	Quênia	Argélia	Angola	Benim
Burundi	Ruanda	Líbia	Botswana	Burkina Faso
Camarões	Burundi	Mauritânia	Lesoto	Cabo Verde
República Centro-Africana	Sudão do Sul	Tunísia	Malawi	Costa do Marfim
Chade	Uganda	Marrocos	Moçambique	Gâmbia
Congo	Tanzânia		Namíbia	Gana
República Democrática do Congo			África do Sul	Guiné
Guiné Equatorial			Seychelles	Guiné-Bissau
Gabão			Zâmbia	Libéria
São Tomé e Príncipe			Zimbabwe	Mali
Ruanda			Tanzânia	Níger
				Nigéria
				Senegal
				Serra Leoa
				Togo

Fonte: Adaptado a partir de: African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017

Relativamente à APSA, pode afirmar-se que surgiu num contexto em que, em África, a trilogia de movimentos de libertação, descolonização (ou, por assim dizer, a transição atribulada entre os períodos pré e pós colonial) e afirmação nacional, juntamente com as razões de ordem interna dos Estados (relacionadas com aspetos territoriais, económicos, políticos, sociais e com a gestão de recursos naturais estratégicos), despoletaram um acumular de conflitos regionais, que resultaram numa onda de insegurança e violência generalizada no continente africano (mais especificamente, na região da África Subsariana), passando África a ser a região com maior índice de conflitualidade a nível mundial. Este ambiente conflituoso em África entrou em divergência com o conceito mais alargado, abrangente e globalizado de segurança e defesa de cada Estado, numa era em que a segurança dos estados passou a constituir preocupação de todos. Assim sendo, os Estados e as organizações internacionais, bem

¹⁰ Os Estados-Membros da União Africana estão divididos de acordo com cinco regiões. Estes grupos foram divididos pela já extinta Organização da Unidade Africana (OUA), em 1976. [...] The AEC Treaty defines “region” by stating in Article 1 (d) that:

“Region” shall mean an OUA region as defined by Resolution CM/Res.464QCVXVI) of the OUA Council of Ministers concerning the Division of Africa into five (5) regions namely North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa (Salami, 2016, p. 7).

como toda a comunidade internacional passaram a conferir maior relevância e atenção ao fator segurança, pois sem paz e estabilidade não existem condições para um desenvolvimento sustentado. Deste modo, desde a efetiva operacionalização da UA em 2002, a mesma tem vindo a criar um conjunto de estruturas e mecanismos para garantir um nível aceitável de sucesso na gestão de conflitos regionais (Pavia, 2011, 109).

Com o Protocolo relativo à fundação do Conselho de Paz e Segurança, nascem também as “*African Standby Forces*” (ASF), que passam a ser parte integrante da APSA¹¹. No mesmo protocolo, ficaram estipuladas as áreas de atuação e os poderes de execução das ASF: entre outros, o de intervir num Estado-Membro que se encontre em circunstâncias graves ou, a pedido de um Estado-Membro, o de restaurar a paz e a segurança; o de chefiar missões de observação e monitoramento; o de envidar esforços no sentido da construção da paz, do desarmamento e da desmobilização pós-conflito (African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p. 65).

As ASF são compostas pelas forças especiais das cinco organizações sub-regionais africanas acima referidas, uma Brigada Regional de Espera Norte Africana (NASBRIG), uma Brigada de Espera para a África Oriental (EASBRIG); Uma Força Multinacional da África Central (FOMAC); Uma Brigada de Espera da África Austral (SADCBRIG); e uma Brigada de Espera da ECOWAS (ECOBRIg). Estas brigadas estão dotadas de mecanismos para desenvolver a capacidade de resposta, em tempo útil, ao surgimento de conflitos violentos em determinada região, sob supervisão da UA e com estreita ligação com a ONU (African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p. 66).

Destes mecanismos, destaca-se o posto de comando e o campo de exercícios de treino, que realizou, em 2010, o exercício de comando denominado Amani Africa I; um exercício de treino policial conhecido como Exercício Njiwa, em 2012; um exercício de

¹¹ Em substituição da Comissão de Mediação, Conciliação e Arbitragem, criada pela OUA em 1964, foi criado, também no âmbito do Protocolo do CPS, um Painel dos Sábios para integrar a APSA, com o objetivo de apoiar o CPS e o Presidente da Comissão na promoção e manutenção da paz, segurança e estabilidade em África, focando-se principalmente nas áreas da diplomacia preventiva e mediação (African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p. 61). Foi criado também o Sistema Continental de Alerta Rápido (CEWS), com o principal objetivo de antecipar e prevenir conflitos, fornecer informações oportunas sobre a evolução dos conflitos violentos, bem como controlar potenciais riscos pré ou pós conflito no continente, possibilitando que sejam tomadas as melhores decisões e de forma atempada. Um Fundo de Paz integra também a APSA, com a tarefa principal fornecer “os recursos financeiros necessários para as missões de apoio à paz e outras atividades operacionais relacionadas à paz e à segurança” (African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p. 63-65).

comando denominado Exercício Utulivu, em 2014; e um exercício de treino de campo denominado Amani Africa II, em 2015. Os dois últimos exercícios - Utulivu e Amani Africa II - foram já realizados no âmbito da African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), estabelecido pela Assembleia da UA, em maio de 2013, como um mecanismo de transição de resposta imediata a crises, passando (em Janeiro de 2014) a ser operacionalizado como um mecanismo definitivo. É composto por 7.500 militares divididos pelos Estados – Membros integrantes, nomeadamente: Argélia, Angola, Chade, Níger, Senegal, África do Sul, Sudão, Uganda e Tanzânia, Benim, Burkina Faso, Egito e Ruanda (African Union Commission, New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p. 66).

Aqui, o envolvimento das Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) visa contribuir para um aumento constante do índice de segurança na região subsariana, uma vez que, com a segurança externa garantida, reforça-se a segurança interna, ou seja, obtém-se um melhor controlo das fronteiras e da segurança marítima. As orientações político-estratégicas inseridas na Lei de Defesa Nacional e das Forças Armadas, Lei Nº 2793 de Março, apontam para uma maior participação na conjuntura regional de segurança, que irá contribuir para projetar Angola no contexto regional e evidenciar o seu dispositivo militar como elemento ativo da Política Externa e mecanismo estruturante da ação externa do Estado ao serviço não só da segurança, mas também do desenvolvimento de Angola na região subsariana e em África (Júnior *apud* Carvalho, 2014, p. 36).

2.1.2. AS COMUNIDADES ECONÓMICAS REGIONAIS

Tal como referido no capítulo anterior, Angola foi aceite e deu entrada na União Africana (UA), no ano a seguir à sua independência, aquando do seu reconhecimento por 43 Estados Africanos, em Fevereiro de 1976. Desta data para cá, o contributo Angolano tem vindo a acentuar-se, no que diz respeito à concertação, união e desenvolvimento em África, Angola surgindo agora como uma grande potência africana. Como se pode ver, Angola está inserida em duas organizações sub-regionais, nomeadamente a Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central (CEEAC) e a Comunidade Para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral (em inglês, SADC). Neste contexto, Angola tem vindo a multiplicar esforços no que diz respeito à luta pela manutenção da paz e segurança em África, e consequentemente pela sua afirmação como potência regional.

No que à CEEAC diz respeito, e de acordo com o artigo 4º do Tratado que a institui, esta tem como principais objetivos “alcançar autonomia coletiva; elevar o padrão de vida de suas populações; e manter a estabilidade económica através de uma cooperação harmoniosa”¹². Apesar de estar virada para o desenvolvimento e crescimento económico, a CEEAC tem vindo, desde a sua reativação, a criar vários mecanismos, de modo a contribuir para a segurança e estabilidade em África, uma vez que, sem segurança, não existe estabilidade e, consequentemente, não existe desenvolvimento¹³.

Angola, desde a criação desta Comunidade, manteve-se sempre com o estatuto de Estado – Observador, tornando-se formalmente Estado – Membro em 1999 (aquando da reativação da CEEAC). A partir de então, passou a intervir mais ativamente na Comunidade, consolidando o seu contributo para a paz regional entre os Estados-Membros pelo Pacto de Segurança Mútua para a África Central, em 2004, e pelo Protocolo relativo à criação de um Centro de Gestão de Conflitos, que viria a ser o órgão de planeamento e gestão das participações da organização na sua área de intervenção (Bernardino, 2013, p. 251-252).

Com a realização do exercício militar no âmbito da Comunidade, o denominado “KWANZA 2010”¹⁴, Angola demonstrou a sua decisiva importância estratégica e a sua capacidade de se afirmar cada vez mais como uma potência regional, no que diz respeito à colaboração para a paz e segurança em África.

A participação e a realização em Angola do “Exercício Kwanza – 2010” torna-se igualmente vital para as aspirações de Paz e Segurança, porque vai marcar o ponto de partida para o desenvolvimento dos objetivos da força multinacional da África Central,

¹² Decorre do Plano de Lagos de 1980, que foi assinado em outubro de 1983, entrando em funcionamento no ano seguinte (1984). Congrega como Estados – Membros Angola, Burundi, Camarões, República Centro-Africana, República Popular do Congo, Gabão, Guiné Equatorial, República Democrática do Congo, São Tomé e Príncipe e Chade. Devido a crises internas na maioria dos Estados – Membros, este protocolo permaneceu inativo a partir de 1992, sendo reativado em pela Conferência de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da Comunidade, na Conferência de Malabo de 1999, em que foram estabelecidos quatro campos prioritários para a organização, que consistiam em desenvolver capacidades para manter a paz, segurança e estabilidade como pré-requisitos essenciais para o desenvolvimento económico e social; desenvolver a integração física, económica e monetária; desenvolver uma cultura de integração humana; e estabelecer um mecanismo de financiamento autónomo para a CEEAC (Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale, 1983).

¹³ Estabeleceu, em 2002, o “Protocolo de Ligação Parlamentar da África Central”; foram aprovados os estatutos do Conselho de Paz e Segurança da África Central (COPAX); foi criada a Comissão de Defesa e Segurança e o Mecanismo de Alerta Rápido da África Central (MARAC); e foi constituído como Escalão Brigada a “Força Multinacional” para a África Central (FOMAC) (Pavia, 2011 p. 112-113).

¹⁴ Este exercício ocorreu no âmbito do Pacto de Segurança Mútua para a África Central, uma vez que este prevê a realização periódica de exercícios militares entre duas ou várias unidades das Forças Armadas dos Estados Membros, sob égide do CPS (Bernardino, 2013, p. 252).

no quadro da CEEAC – Comunidade Económica da África Central, que Angola também integra (Rosa, 2010, p. 76).

Como acima foi referido, Angola está integrada também na SADC, comunidade criada em Outubro de 1992, substituindo a Conferência de Coordenação do Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADCC), de 1980, em Lusaka, na Zâmbia, como responsável pela participação e integração económica de todos os países da África Austral, visando o crescimento económico da região. A SADC tem vindo, desde a sua fundação, a criar vários mecanismos, de modo a contribuir para a segurança e estabilidade em África¹⁵ e Angola tem vindo assumir cada vez mais um papel interventivo no seio desta Comunidade.

Em Angola, no ano de 2014, foi realizado, no âmbito da SADC, um exercício militar denominado “Vale do Keve 2014”, que diz respeito à preparação e treino das forças especiais da SADC, com vista a prepará-las para situações que possam pôr em perigo a segurança e a defesa da região, de modo a garantir a paz da mesma¹⁶. Outros foram os exercícios que Angola, pelas FAA, realizou e em que participou, no mesmo âmbito, nomeadamente: “Felino”, “Blue Ruvuma” e “Golfinho”, com o objetivo de operacionalizar os efetivos da Brigada em Estado de Alerta da SADC, para ações de manutenção da paz, de forma multidimensional, bem como para desenvolver e melhorar a cooperação regional no campo de missões de apoio à manutenção da estabilidade e de assistência humanitária (Rosa, 2010, p. 76).

2.1.3. A CONFERÊNCIA INTERNACIONAL SOBRE A REGIÃO DOS GRANDES LAGOS. A CRISE DOS GRANDES LAGOS.

A Conferência Internacional sobre a Região dos Grandes Lagos (CIRGL) foi criada pelo CSNU, aquando do reconhecimento da instabilidade política e dos constantes conflitos na região, com o objetivo de promover a paz e o desenvolvimento económico na mesma.

¹⁵ “Comité Inter-Estatal de Defesa e Segurança” comandado pelos Ministros da Defesa dos Estados-Membros, no âmbito do qual a diplomacia preventiva está na base da prevenção, gestão e resolução de conflitos; o *Pacto de Defesa Mútua* de 2003 e o SADC BRIG (referido subcapítulo anterior), que visa garantir a segurança regional; o “*Strategic Indicative Plan for the SADC Organ*” (SIPO), criado em 2004 com o objetivo de identificar as principais fragilidades em termos de segurança e defesa na organização, propondo medidas corretivas que estão ao cargo de dois outros órgãos inter estatais de diplomacia e política, nomeadamente: o *Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee*, que integra os Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros e o *Interstate Defense and Security Committee*, representado pelos Ministros da Defesa dos Estados-membros (Bernardino, 2013, p. 251).

¹⁶ Este exercício foi realizado na província angolana do Kwanza-Sul, no município da Cela, e contou com a participação das forças especiais de todos os Estados-Membros, com a exceção de Madagáscar, Lesotho, Seychelles e Ilhas Maurícias, uma vez que estas não possuíam tropas especiais no seu exército (Televisão Pública de Angola (TPA), 2014).

O seu processo de criação teve início em 2000, no decorrer da Conferência Internacional sobre a paz, segurança, democracia e desenvolvimento na Região dos Grandes Lagos, convocada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, sendo posteriormente estabelecida a Secretaria da Conferência Internacional. Em 2004, foi assinada a Declaração sobre a paz, segurança e desenvolvimento na Região dos Grandes Lagos pelos Estados Membros que compõem a organização, nomeadamente: Angola, República Centro-Africana, República Democrática do Congo, Quênia, Ruanda, Sudão e Sudão do Sul, Tanzânia, Uganda, Zâmbia, Burundi e República do Congo. A partir do ano de 2006, com a assinatura do Pacto de Segurança, Estabilidade e Desenvolvimento da Região dos Grandes Lagos, que englobou tudo aquilo que já havia sido acordado anteriormente, deu-se início à implementação prática dos objetivos (EENI - Escola Superior de Negócios Internacionais, 2017).

A região dos Grandes Lagos é formada por vários lagos de origem tectónica - alguns deles, os mais profundos do mundo, localizados na África Oriental. Esta formação geológica abrange a Etiópia, o Quênia, a Tanzânia, o Uganda, o Ruanda, o Malawi, Moçambique, a República Democrática do Congo e o Burundi¹⁷, sendo que cinco destes países são os principais responsáveis pela situação conflituosa constante a que a região está entregue, mais precisamente: o Ruanda, a República Democrática do Congo, o Burundi, a Tanzânia e o Uganda. Na origem destes conflitos, está a repartição dos territórios africanos feita pelas grandes potências aquando da realização, em 1885, da Conferência de Berlim, em que não foram respeitadas as divisões territoriais, políticas e culturais tradicionais das populações locais.

[...] Aqui confluem a política e a história. A conflitualidade latente ou efetiva, interna aos Estados e transfronteiriça - reinos, estados e comunidades africanas foram em muitas situações divididos arbitrariamente - estende-se a vastas áreas e afeta uma percentagem muito elevada das populações (Nascimento, Rodrigues, 2012, p. 12).

No Ruanda e no Burundi, apesar desta divisão territorial não ter influenciado em nada a estrutura política e as divisões da região (onde foram mantidas as práticas tradicionais já existentes), a separação étnica evidente protagonizada pelos colonos belgas – os tutsis em detrimento dos húsus – desencadeou um sentimento de desigualdade na população hútu e conseqüentemente, a partir de 1959, foi-se assistindo no Ruanda a constantes ondas de violência, que desembocaram naquele que ficou marcado como o

¹⁷ Estes países são rodeados pelos seguintes lagos: Niassa, Tanganica, Kivu, Eduardo, Alberto, Vitória (o maior de todos eles) e Turkana.

maior massacre da história de África, conhecido como o “Genocídio do Ruanda”, em Julho de 1994, em que os extremistas hútus se revoltaram contra tutsis e hútus moderados, causando perdas de vidas humanas avaliadas em 800 mil mortos, segundo a Organização das Nações Unidas (Carvalho, 2014, p. 62).

No caso da RDC, a grande diversidade cultural, política, religiosa e linguística fez com que, desde a sua independência em 1960, tivessem sempre existido movimentos separatistas e conflitos ideológicos entre o Presidente e o Primeiro-ministro. Até à chegada de Mobutu ao poder, a situação política da RDC foi sempre marcada por sucessivos golpes de Estado. A chegada deste ao poder não desanuviou a situação. Mobutu, com o apoio dos Estados Unidos, deu um golpe de Estado e, desde então, em épocas de eleições, toda e qualquer tentativa de mobilização política contra o governo era reprimida violentamente com prisões, exílios e mortes (Carvalho, 2014, p. 64).

Entre 1998 e 2002, ocorreu na RDC aquela que ficou conhecida como a “Guerra Mundial Africana”, por atingir proporções vastas e complexas, ao envolver uma rede transnacional de organizações armadas da região dos Grandes Lagos. Mais de 3,6 milhões de pessoas foram vitimadas fatalmente pelo conflito, desde 1998, nesse país de 51,7 milhões de habitantes. A crise humanitária associada aos conflitos armados teve também como consequência mais de 360 mil congoleses refugiados e cerca de 2 milhões de pessoas deslocadas no interior do país (Galvão, 2005, p. 1).

Neste conflito, Angola interveio na força da SADC, juntamente com a Namíbia e o Zimbabué, tendo combatido ao lado das forças do governo da RDC, que contava com o apoio de Chade para combater as forças do Uganda, Ruanda e Burundi, apoiadas por várias milícias (Carvalho, 2014, p. 65).

Os recursos minerais de que é rico o Congo são, desde a era colonial, também um dos principais motivos para a desestabilização do país. Desde a segunda guerra mundial, os recursos congoleses foram usados pelos colonizadores belgas como fonte de rendimento, levando ao empobrecimento do país e, nos dias de hoje, isso pode também ser considerado um dos principais motivos para a não resolução do conflito (Carvalho, 2014, p. 56).

2.1.3.1. ANGOLA NA PRESIDÊNCIA DA CIRL

Em janeiro de 2014, Angola tornou-se Presidente da Conferência Internacional sobre a Região dos Grandes Lagos. Neste mandato, Angola colocou como prioridade a resolução dos conflitos armados na República Democrática do Congo e na República Centro-Africana, uma vez que foram e têm sido os conflitos mais desestabilizadores da região (Agência Lusa, 2016).

Angola tem uma posição neutra [...] estamos na direção certa porque conhecemos a diplomacia angolana, uma diplomacia equilibrada e que certamente não irá criar problemas à região porque não tem uma dupla linguagem na gestão dos problemas da região dos Grandes Lagos (Makuto, 2013).

Foi seguindo esta linha de pensamento que, em janeiro de 2014, Angola se tornou Presidente da Conferência Internacional sobre a Região dos Grandes Lagos. Neste mandato, Angola colocou como prioridade a resolução dos conflitos armados na República Democrática do Congo e na República Centro-Africana, uma vez que foram e têm sido os conflitos que mais têm desestabilizado a região (Agência Lusa, 2016).

Fazendo uso das suas capacidades, no que diz respeito à resolução pacífica de conflitos, Angola definiu o seu mandato em três principais áreas de atuação, nomeadamente, a área política e económico-social, na qual levou em consideração o Pacto sobre a Paz, a Estabilidade e Desenvolvimento da Região dos Grandes Lagos, bem como o cumprimento dos compromissos assumidos para a estabilização da paz na RCA e no Sudão do Sul; também se pautou pelo desenvolvimento regional, tendo-se comprometido a promover as trocas comerciais e de experiências nos domínios administrativo, de gestão macroeconómica, de combate à fome e à pobreza, de aumento do emprego e de cooperação nos setores da economia real, para consolidar a diversificação das respetivas economias; o último e mais importante foco de atuação relacionou-se com a questão da defesa e da segurança, sendo que o principal objetivo foi o de continuar a promover a gestão conjunta da segurança das fronteiras comuns, e a cooperação na resolução de questões que desafiam a paz, nomeadamente, o tráfico de seres humanos, a imigração ilegal, a exploração ilícita e a pilhagem de recursos naturais, a proliferação ilegal de armas, a prevenção e o combate das atividades criminosas e do terrorismo (Lusa, 2014).

Durante este mandato, Angola fez uso de toda a sua força diplomática no sentido de abrir o caminho para a paz, nas regiões de conflito, uma vez que este - segundo o antigo

Chefe do Governo Angolano, José Eduardo dos Santos - retarda e perturba o processo de integração e desenvolvimento de África. Nesta força diplomática para a paz, estiveram envolvidas as representações diplomáticas, não só na capital angolana, mas também a nível das embaixadas dos Estados-Membros de cada país¹⁸.

Os esforços realizados por Angola, bem como os avanços resultantes dos mesmos, na Região dos Grandes Lagos, significaram para Angola mais uma positiva experiência no que concerne à resolução de conflitos pela via pacífica e, conseqüentemente, um maior prestígio dentro do continente africano e também no seio da ONU.

O Estado angolano é dos poucos que chamou a si a bandeira da paz. A política externa de Angola caracteriza-se por desempenhar um papel central para a paz e segurança na região. Esta disponibilidade fez com que os líderes da região comesçassem a ver Angola com uma perspetiva de liderança responsável e guardiã da estabilidade na região (Van-Dúnem, 2016).

Este prestígio motivou que ao país fosse novamente confiada a cadeira da presidência da CIRGL, para um segundo mandato, e contribuiu fortemente para que o país fosse eleito como membro não-permanente do CSNU para o biênio 2015-2016.

2.2. A ORGANIZAÇÃO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS

2.2.1. OPERAÇÕES DE MANUTENÇÃO DA PAZ EM ANGOLA

Como é sabido, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) é o maior e mais conhecido Órgão, no que diz respeito à resolução dos mais variados problemas internacionais (conflitos, questões humanitárias, entre outros.)¹⁹. Ela engloba todos os países do

¹⁸ Um dos desafios encarados por Angola neste mandato, foi a falta de preocupação e comprometimento por parte de certos Estados-Membros, que apenas se faziam presentes nas reuniões ministeriais ou nas conferências de Chefes de Estado e de Governo, o que culminava sempre em uma nova onda de conflitos, com diferentes atores, mas sempre com a mesma essência de fomentar a instabilidade (Van-Dúnem, 2016).

¹⁹ A ONU nasceu da antiga Sociedade das Nações (SDN), criada no final da Primeira Grande Guerra com o objetivo de constitucionalizar a ordem internacional e assegurar a paz. Esta sociedade tinha como principal objetivo *"a formação de uma sociedade geral de Nações, sob pactos específicos, com o propósito de fornecer garantias mútuas de independência política e integridade territorial, tanto para os Estados grandes como para os pequenos"*, sendo este o 14º ponto de Wilson aquando da criação do órgão. Por um lado, a realidade conflituosa da época e a ausência dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA), por outro, levou ao fracasso desta sociedade e a criação de uma organização que se demonstrasse mais competente, no que toca à resolução dos problemas mundiais (Motta, 2002, p. 2-3). Dito isto, nasce em 1945, em São Francisco, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) que, pela sua Carta (assinada a 26 de junho e entrada em vigor a 24 de outubro), no seu art. 1º, estabelece aqueles que viriam a ser os pilares de funcionamento da organização, entre eles: a cooperação internacional; a manutenção da paz e segurança internacionais; o desenvolvimento de relações de amizade entre os Estados-membros. Nesta carta (art.º 7), ficaram também definidos os órgãos que viriam a fazer parte desta nova Organização, nomeadamente, uma Assembleia Geral, um Conselho de Segurança, um Conselho Económico e Social, um Conselho de Tutela, um Tribunal Internacional de Justiça e um Secretariado.

mundo soberanamente reconhecidos e, caso seja necessário, presta apoio na conquista desta mesma soberania. O caso de Angola não foi diferente, visto que esta apoiou o país na luta contra o colonialismo português (reconheceu a sua soberania e aceitou-o como membro, em 1976) e, posteriormente, nos conflitos que decorreram no período pós-independência.

Neste conflito, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU)²⁰, fazendo uso das suas capacidades como mediador de conflitos, estabeleceu missões de manutenção da paz para resolver a crise interna do país. Assim sendo, foi criada em 1988 a “Missão de Verificação das Nações Unidas para Angola”, também conhecida como *UNAVEM*, para convencer os participantes no conflito - nomeadamente, Angola, Cuba e África do Sul - a entrarem em acordo sobre a manutenção da paz²¹.

Segundo o autor Pedro Carvalho (2003), no âmbito desta missão, o CS não passou de um mero espectador, uma vez que interveio indiretamente no processo de negociações com uma força de 70 observadores militares, para observar a retirada das 50 mil tropas estimadas (p. 112).

Apesar da fraca intervenção do CS, no âmbito da *UNAVEM*, outras tentativas de resolução do conflito foram levadas a cabo por parte de, por um lado, Mobutu, em Gbadolite (1989), e, por outro, por parte dos EUA e da União Soviética, no ano seguinte. Ambas fracassaram redondamente e o conflito prosseguiu²².

Pelos acordos de Bicesse de 1990, o conflito civil parecia ter chegado ao fim e a paz definitiva parecia uma realidade possível. Foi neste contexto que o mandato da

²⁰ Este membro da ONU, de acordo com a Carta que institui a Organização, é composto por 5 membros permanentes (EUA, China, Rússia, Inglaterra e França) e outros 10 não permanentes (eleitos por um período de dois anos). Cada um dos membros tem o direito de assumir, a cada mês, a Presidência do Conselho e tem a responsabilidade primária de manter a paz e segurança internacionais, assumindo a liderança em casos de existência de ameaça à paz ou de ato de agressão; autorizar caso seja necessário o uso da força, para manter ou restaurar a paz, em caso de a segurança internacional ficar comprometida (United Nations, 1945, cap. 5).

²¹ “[...] Decides to establish under its authority a United Nation Verification Mission and requests the Secretary – General to take the necessary steps to this effect in accordance with his aforementioned report [...] further decides that the arrangements for establishment of the Mission shall enter into force as soon as the tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa on the one hand, and the bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba on the other are signed” (United Nations Security Council, 1988, p. 19).

²² Em 1989, Mobutu, como presidente da República do Zaire, propõe-se a assumir o papel de mediador e convoca em separado os dois líderes dos partidos angolanos em conflito. Estas reuniões em separado levam a que os dois líderes aceitem assinar o acordo de paz de Gbadolite, uma vez que Mobutu, como mediador, apresentou versões diferentes para cada um dos lados. Ao presidente do MPLA, José Eduardo dos Santos, garantiu que o seu opositor Jonas Savimbi, o reconhecia como Presidente, bem como a República Popular de Angola, e a Savimbi garantiu que as suas pretensões haviam sido ouvidas pelo seu opositor (Almeida, 2011, p. 78).

UNAVEM foi renovado pela Resolução 696 do CS, de 1991, passando a UNAVEM II, com o objetivo de, numa primeira fase, verificar a implementação dos Acordos de Paz de Bicesse, até à realização das eleições, passando no ano seguinte a ter também a tarefa de supervisionar o próprio processo eleitoral. Foi Portugal, como ex-colonizador, que se revelou capaz de pôr fim ao conflito civil angolano, convocando as partes para dialogarem quanto aos “Princípios fundamentais para a instauração da paz em Angola”, sob supervisão da URSS e dos EUA. Deste acordo, ficaram estipulados os seguintes aspetos: fim das hostilidades entre o Governo e a UNITA, sendo que, por um lado, a UNITA reconhecia o Estado, o Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos e o Governo de Angola até às eleições, e que, por outro lado, a UNITA era reconhecida partido político, bem como a sua participação em atividades políticas; a formação de um exército único; e o fim do fornecimento de armamento por parte de qualquer governo. Durante o processo eleitoral, o UNAVEM II ficou encarregue de verificar os Grupos de Observação Conjuntos, compostos por um número igual de representantes do MPLA e da UNITA; vigiar a polícia angolana durante o cessar-fogo; e verificar a neutralidade das equipas de inspetores de ambas as partes (Carvalho, 2003, p. 114-117).

Apesar de algumas tensões durante o processo eleitoral, as eleições em Angola independente ocorreram de forma tranquila, como revelam as palavras da Representante do Secretário-Geral da ONU na época, Margaret Joan Anstee:

“Por todo lado, a afluência foi maciça e tranquila. [...] os angolanos sabiam o que estava em causa. [...] Angola não tinha apenas vivido a sua primeira eleição democrática. Tinha também vivido os dois dias mais pacíficos da sua existência ao fim de 30 anos de Guerra contínua”. (Anstee *apud* Carvalho, 2013, p. 119).

Este ambiente de tranquilidade não se refletiu no período pós-eleitoral, uma vez que as eleições deram vitória ao MPLA e não à UNITA, como esta havia esperado, ansiosa e positivamente. Esta insatisfação e revolta do líder da UNITA mergulhou o país numa segunda Guerra Civil que só terminou com a sua morte em fevereiro de 2002²³.

²³ O MPLA ganhou as eleições com 49,57% dos votos contra os 40,07% da UNITA (Carvalho, 2003, p. 119). Não satisfeito com o resultado, decidiu conquistar o poder por via das armas. As eleições multipartidárias ocorreram de 29 a 30 de Setembro de 1992. A 1 de Novembro do mesmo ano tem início o segundo conflito civil no território angolano. Se, nos conflitos anteriores, as zonas de guerra se circunscreviam apenas ao campo, neste, em demonstração da sua fúria, Savimbi fez questão de destruir cidades inteiras (Luanda, Huambo, Benguela, Lobito e Lubango) (Birmingham, 2015. Pág. 169). Devido às enormes baixas ocorridas durante este conflito e à recusa insistente de Savimbi em baixar as armas, o CS decide sancioná-lo, acabando este isolado da comunidade internacional. Após imensas pressões por parte da Comunidade Internacional, em Outubro de 1993, a UNITA decide respeitar os acordos paz e, a 20 de Novembro de 1994, ambas as partes assinam o Protocolo de Lusaca e concordam dar início ao cessar-fogo ainda nesse mês. Apesar da assinatura deste acordo, as partes continuaram numa corrida às armas,

No contexto desta segunda Guerra Civil, o CS das Nações Unidas é obrigado a intervir novamente em Angola, desta vez no âmbito do UNAVEM III (criado a 8 de fevereiro de 1995, pela Resolução 976 do CS). Desta vez, traduziu-se numa operação de manutenção de paz no país, com um mandato mais abrangente que incluía o controlo e proteção durante o processo eleitoral, tendo-se inclusivamente oferecido às partes mediação e bons ofícios, para acelerar o processo de paz; ajuda militar, com um aumento da vigilância e a “fiscalização” do cessar-fogo, da desmobilização das forças e da constituição do exército único; este novo mandato passou a abranger também a componente humanitária, que, através da Unidade de Coordenação de Assistência Humanitária, passou a coordenar as atividades humanitárias das organizações nacionais, internacionais e não-governamentais (ONG’s); na vertente policial, o UNAVEM III também alargou o seu mandato, passando a ter a função de integrar 5.500 soldados da UNITA no seio da polícia, de vigiar a polícia nacional angolana e de desarmar os civis e armazenar as armas (Carvalho, 2003, p. 126).

Com a morte do líder do partido da oposição e sob os auspícios da ONU, são assinados, a 4 de Abril de 2002, os Acordos de Paz em Angola e dá-se então início a uma longa caminhada para a reconstrução e desenvolvimento do país. Esta nova caminhada foi marcada pela entrada de Angola no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU), logo no ano seguinte à assinatura dos acordos de paz (2003), sendo que, não obstante a saída recente de um conflito que durara mais de 25 anos, o país viu depositada em si a confiança dos outros Estados-Membros da Organização, como forma de transmitir a respetiva experiência no que concerne à resolução de conflitos.

[...] os acontecimentos do leste do país, caracterizados por uma evolução positiva para o fim do conflito em Angola, depois da morte do líder da UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, em 22 de Fevereiro de 2002, e a consequente assinatura, em 4 de Abril de 2002, do Memorando de Entendimento Complementar ao Protocolo de Lusaca para Cessação das Hostilidades e Resolução das Demais Questões Militares Pendentes nos Termos do protocolo de Lusaca, foram igualmente determinantes para a mudança da situação no terreno diplomático, quanto à candidatura de Angola ao Conselho de Segurança. Angola dispunha de mais argumentos sobre a experiência a transmitir relativamente ao papel da dinâmica interna na conquista da paz e em matéria de conflitos (Silva, António, Godinho, 2014. p. 37).

como forma de se prepararem caso o mesmo falhasse (Carvalho, 2003, p. 122-125). A 22 de Fevereiro de 2002, o líder do partido da oposição é morto e, com isto, é aberta uma nova oportunidade para se implementar a paz definitiva no país.

2.2.2. OPERAÇÕES DE MANUTENÇÃO DA PAZ DA EM ÁFRICA

Na origem da arquitetura da paz da ONU está a necessidade se dar resposta coerente às dificuldades enfrentadas por países com processos de paz recentes e ainda em consolidação ou por países em risco de regressar a situações de conflito, para os quais a ONU não tinha estrutura organizada, com medidas na área económica e social. Este apoio é destinado aos órfãos de ajuda, não só em termos materiais como também em termos político-diplomáticos, o que explica a concentração de esforços do Fundo para a Consolidação da Paz em África. A ênfase dada, durante a primeira década do milénio, à problemática dos estados frágeis tornou evidente a necessidade de dar respostas rápidas às situações de crise. Para além disso, introduziu-se na agenda internacional a importância do papel catalisador, não só dos esforços diplomáticos, mas também da ajuda material, no apoio a processos de construção da paz (Freitas, 2012, p. 54).

É nesta conjuntura que atualmente nos apercebemos de que a ONU conta com 16 operações de paz em todo mundo, das quais, 9 são em África e, destas, 5 estão concentradas na região dos Grandes Lagos (United Nations, 2017a). São elas:

1. Missão Integrada Multidimensional das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização do Mali (MINUSMA)

A desestabilização interna do Mali teve início com o golpe de Estado de 2012 – conhecido como rebelião Touareg - liderado pelo Movimento Nacional para a Libertação de Azawad (MNL), em coligação com grupos islâmicos armados (Ansar Eddine, Al-Qaeda no Magrebe Islâmico (AQMI), o Movimento para a singularidade e a Jihad na África Ocidental (MUJAO) e outros grupos desertores das forças armadas malianas), que lançaram sucessivos ataques contra as forças governamentais no norte do país. Em 2013, os talibãs atacaram e ocuparam as regiões sul e oeste do país, mas estas foram recuperadas com o apoio militar da França.

Esta missão foi criada pela resolução 2100 do Conselho de Segurança, em Abril de 2013, com a finalidade de apoiar o país no processo de transição e estabilização política. Em Junho de 2014, pela resolução 2164, à missão foi dada a tarefa de priorizar a segurança e a proteção de civis; apoiar o diálogo político de reconciliação nacional; apoiar na restauração do Estado em todo o país e dar apoio à reconstrução do setor de segurança nacional, bem como a promoção e proteção dos direitos humanos e a ajuda humanitária (United Nations, 2017c).

2. Missão Integrada Multidimensional das Nações Unidas para a República Centro Africana (MINUSCA)

Em dezembro de 2012, a República Centro – Africana voltou a ser palco de ataques violentos perpetrados pelo grupo rebelde denominado “Seleka”. Estes ataques levaram, em março de 2013, à ocupação da capital do país pelo grupo rebelde e a saída forçada do presidente Bozizé do país.

Os constantes ataques terroristas desencadearam milhares de mortes e cerca de 2,5 milhões de pessoas precisavam desesperadamente de ajuda humanitária. Em dezembro de 2013, um novo ciclo de violência e retaliação - que ameaçou dividir o país por motivos religiosos e étnicos - levou o Conselho de Segurança a autorizar, pela resolução 2127 (2013), de 5 de dezembro, a implantação da Missão Internacional de Apoio à República Centro - Africana (MISCA) e de uma força de manutenção da paz apoiada pela França (conhecida como Operação Sangaris), para fazer frente aos ataques violentos, mas os recursos disponibilizados revelaram-se insuficientes (United Nations, 2017b).

Em março 2014, o Secretário-Geral da ONU autorizou que se implementasse uma operação multidimensional de manutenção de paz das Nações Unidas (MINUSCA), com a principal função de proteger a população civil da República Centro-Africana (United Nations, 2017b).

3. Missão de Estabilização da Organização das Nações Unidas na RDC (MONUSCO)

Após os conflitos ocorridos no Ruanda, em 1994, e a revolta contra o governo de Joseph Kabila na RDC, em 1998, foi em julho de 1999 - aquando da assinatura do acordo de cessar-fogo de Lusaca entre a RDC e cinco estados da região (Angola, Namíbia, Uganda, Ruanda e Zimbabué) - que o Conselho estabeleceu pela resolução 1279, de novembro de 1999, cria a Missão da Organização das Nações Unidas para o Congo (MONUC), com o objetivo inicial de monitorizar o processo de cessar-fogo e manter a ligação entre todas as partes envolvidas no processo (United Nations, 2017d).

Com o evoluir da situação, foram surgindo várias forças rebeldes e, consequentemente, diversos episódios de violência na região, obrigando o Conselho de Segurança, em 2010, a mudar o nome da missão do MONUC (resolução 1925 (2010)) para MONUSCO. A esta missão, foi autorizada a utilização de todos os meios necessários para cumprir o

seu mandato e passou a encarregar-se não só da proteção de civis, mas também de questões de direitos humanos e humanitários e também de apoiar o Governo da RDC na estabilização e consolidação da paz²⁴.

A 24 de fevereiro de 2013, foi assinado em Addis Abeba - por 11 países da região, pelos presidentes da UA, pela CIRGL, pela SADC e pelo Secretário-Geral da ONU - o Acordo-Quadro de Paz e Segurança e Cooperação para a República Democrática do Congo e para região circundante, zona em relação à qual seriam abordadas as causas profundas dos respetivos conflitos, no sentido de ser assegurada a manutenção de uma paz duradoura. (United Nations, 2017d)

4. Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul (UNMISS)

Tal como aconteceu no Ruanda, no Burundi e na RDC, no Sudão do Sul a divisão das fronteiras também foi feita sem que fossem tidas em conta as realidades étnicas e culturais da região. Existe uma grande disparidade entre o Sudão e o Sudão do Sul no que concerne não só as etnias mas também aos recursos petrolíferos de que é rica a parte Sul do Sudão e que com a sua independência em 2011, reclamou para si todo o direito sobre os mesmos. Estes dois fatores – étnicos e económicos - levaram com que desde a independência da região sul do Sudão, o mesmo tenha sido assolado por diversos conflitos que se refletem numa crise humanitária que tem devastado país. (Globo Notícias, 2012)

A conjuntura política do Sudão do Sul foi vista pelo CSNU como uma situação que constitui uma ameaça para a paz e segurança internacionais, o que conduziu à criação - pela resolução 1996 (julho de 2011) e no âmbito do Capítulo VII da Carta das Nações Unidas - da Missão das Nações Unidas para o Sudão do Sul. O propósito desta missão era, inicialmente, o apoio ao governo na consolidação da paz e no exercício das suas responsabilidades em matéria de prevenção, mitigação e resolução de conflitos e proteção de civis; estabelecer o estado de direito e fortalecer os setores da segurança e justiça, no país. Inicialmente, o mandato teria apenas a duração de um ano, com possibilidade de renovação, caso fosse necessário (o que se veio a verificar de seguida) United Nations, 2017e).

²⁴ Esta missão passou a incluir, além dos componentes civis, judiciais e penitenciários adequados, um complemento máximo de 19.815 soldados, 760 observadores militares, 391 policiais e 1.050 unidades formadas pela polícia (United Nations, 2017d).

Em 2013, após a crise política e de segurança despoletada pelos ataques violentos na capital do Sudão (Juba), o CS renovou o mandato da UNMISS, pela resolução 2132, de dezembro de 2013, aumentando temporariamente o número de tropas e policiamento. Em 2014, a UNMISS passou a ser uma missão de cariz militar e de policiamento (resolução 2155 (2014)) e a esta foi autorizada a utilização de todos os meios para a concretização efetiva das suas tarefas (United Nations, 2017e).

5. União Africana - Missão das Nações Unidas no Darfur (UNAMID)

A guerra civil no Darfur (oeste do Sudão) ocorreu em 2003 e levou à morte de milhares de civis e ao abandono da terra por parte de quase dois milhões de pessoas. Neste conflito, está, mais uma vez, saliente a questão étnica, uma vez que se iniciou com o ataque protagonizado por grupos rebeldes contra o governo de Cartum (capital do Sudão), acusando-o de oprimir a população negra do país e favorecer a população árabe. Na tentativa de se encontrar uma solução duradoura para esta crise, foi assinado, em maio de 2006, sob os auspícios da UA e com o apoio da ONU e de outros parceiros internacionais, o Acordo de Paz de Darfur, assinado, em fevereiro de 2010, entre o governo do Sudão e o único grupo rebelde que, até à data, concordou com o cessar-fogo (BBC Brasil, 2010).

A operação conjunta entre a UA e a ONU foi formalmente criada em julho de 2007, na resolução 1769 do Conselho de Segurança, e contava com uma força autorizada de 25.987 soldados de paz uniformizados, entre os quais, 19.555 soldados, 360 observadores militares e oficiais de ligação, 3.772 conselheiros policiais e 2.660 unidades de polícia formadas (FPU). Em meados de 2011, a UNAMID representava 90 por cento da força total autorizada, tornando-se uma das maiores operações de manutenção de paz da ONU (United Nations, 2017f).

Uma terceira missão de manutenção da paz foi destacada para a região do Sudão, nomeadamente, a Força Provisória de Segurança das Nações Unidas para Abyei (UNISFA), que, devido à abundância de recursos na região, foi alvo de severas represálias. Esta missão foi criada pela resolução 1990 (2011), para um período de 6 meses, e contou com o apoio de 4.200 militares, número que, em 2013, passou para 5.326, a pedido dos governos do Sudão e do Sudão do Sul (United Nations, 2017g).

Relativamente a África, os conflitos internos têm, de um modo geral, chamado não só a atenção da União Africana, mas também da ONU, em nome de toda a comunidade

internacional. Desde 1992 que o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas tem vindo a adotar resoluções destinadas a pôr fim às diversas crises e conflitos que afetam o continente. Estas, por sua vez, têm-se revelado ineficazes, na maioria dos casos, uma vez que são aparentemente arrastadas pelos conflitos, ao invés de se sobreporem a eles, originando uma certa perda de credibilidade, apesar dos imensos esforços.

[...] A ONU tem tido um papel muito questionado por muitos setores na região dos grandes lagos, na medida em que o mandato das forças que envia não é suficientemente eficaz para conseguir estagnar o conflito (Carvalho, 2014, p. 70).

3. ANGOLA NO CONSELHO DE SEGURANÇA DA ONU 2015-2016

3.1. CRITÉRIOS DE SELEÇÃO PARA MEMBRO NÃO-PERMANENTE DA ONU

De forma ambiciosa e assertiva, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores de Angola apresentou à Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas uma candidatura baseada em três pilares fundamentais, a fim de resolver não só os problemas do seu continente, mas também contribuir para aquilo que é a manutenção da paz mundial. (Angola. Governo, 2014)

Assim sendo, um dos primeiros objetivos da candidatura Angolana é, precisamente, a Paz e a Segurança. Neste âmbito, Angola pretendeu contribuir para o processo de reforma do Conselho de Segurança, a fim de o tornar mais eficiente e equilibrado. Sendo o desrespeito pela diferença entre os povos uma das principais causas de conflito dos últimos tempos, promover o diálogo entre as civilizações tornou-se um elemento essencial para promover a paz e prevenir conflitos. Para além disso, deve procurar-se fazer uso da diplomacia preventiva de modo a identificar as causas dos conflitos e reduzir a violência e combater, juntamente com as Nações Unidas e outras Organizações Regionais, o terrorismo internacional, o crime organizado e transnacional, bem como reforçar os mecanismos internacionais para a prevenção e mediação de conflitos. (Bernardino, 2016)

No que concerne à Prevenção de Conflitos, Angola salientou que o reforço do papel das mulheres, o combate à exploração ilegal dos recursos naturais, bem como o combate ao uso de violência sexual em ambientes de guerra seriam fatores importantes no que diz respeito à prevenção e redução de conflitos. (Angola. Governo, 2014)

Para as Missões de Manutenção e Consolidação da Paz, Angola comprometeu-se a contribuir no reforço entre o Conselho de Paz e Segurança da UA e o CS da ONU; a apoiar financeiramente a sustentabilidade da consolidação da paz; a apoiar na criação de forças de segurança e de defesa, bem como a assegurar ajuda humanitária à população civil dos países em conflito ou pós-conflito. (Angola. Governo, 2014)

Como foi referido acima, o CSNU é composto por 15 Estados-Membros, dos quais cinco representam o órgão de forma permanente, e os outros dez de forma temporária (ou

não-permanente)²⁵. A divisão dos membros não permanentes para o Conselho de Segurança atribui três lugares à região de África, dois lugares para a Ásia, América Latina e Caraíbas, um lugar para a Europa Oriental e dois lugares a Europa Ocidental e outros Estados (Silva, António, Godinho, 2014, p. 25-26).

Angola, como vimos, foi aceite na ONU logo a seguir a sua independência e exerceu o seu primeiro mandato no CSNU logo a seguir ao fim do conflito armado que assolou o país²⁶. Passados dez anos desde o seu primeiro mandato no CSNU, Angola voltou a exprimir, agora mais confiante e mais desenvolvida, a sua vontade de fazer novamente parte desta grande arena que simboliza o ponto mais alto de qualquer Estado-Membro no sistema Internacional. Dito isto, e tal como sucedeu no seu primeiro mandato, Angola percorreu um longo caminho até ser eleita pela segunda vez como membro não-permanente do CSNU.

Tal como referem os autores Silva, António e Godinho, no que diz respeito ao processo de candidaturas, existe uma série de critérios a cumprir e requisitos a preencher, que devem ser levados em conta no momento de se eleger o futuro representante de um determinado continente no Conselho de Segurança ou, pelo menos, aquele que vai concorrer à Assembleia Geral da ONU. Dito desta forma, o facto de todos os trâmites anteriores da candidatura de um país ao Conselho de Segurança serem concluídos com êxito não exclui a possibilidade de esta ser negada na Assembleia Geral da ONU, uma vez que são necessários dois terços da maioria dos votos para uma nação passar a ser oficialmente considerada membro não-permanente (2014, p. 31).

Relativamente ao continente Africano, os lugares são repartidos entre as cinco regiões africanas (Occidental, Austral, Central, do Norte e Oriental do Norte, Sul, Leste e Oeste), sendo que os países interessados apresentam a sua candidatura primeiramente ao Comité de Candidaturas do Continente Africano, em Nova Iorque, onde os países de

²⁵ Com a emenda do art.º 23º pela Assembleia Geral em 17 de Dezembro de 1963, o número de membros do CS passou de 11 para 15 e um dos principais critérios de seleção para o Conselho passou a ser a distribuição geográfica equitativa.

²⁶ A Libéria foi o primeiro país africano a representar o continente no Conselho de Segurança, no ano de 1961, de acordo com um compromisso alcançado da década de 60. Por este compromisso, a Libéria ocupava o lugar de um país da Europa Ocidental, embora cumprisse apenas um ano dos dois regulamentados pela Carta das Nações Unidas, desistindo a meio do respetivo mandato, para ceder o lugar à Irlanda. Com a entrada do Gana, em 1962, e a sua substituição por outro país africano, nomeadamente a Costa do Marfim (1964-1965), foi formalmente consagrada a presença de um assento africano na organização universal. A partir da década de 90, os países africanos de expressão portuguesa passaram, logo após as suas independências, a assumir a liderança do Conselho de Segurança. Em primeiro lugar, Cabo Verde (1996-1997), seguindo-se a Guiné-Bissau e, posteriormente, Angola (2003-2004). (Silva, António e Godinho, 2014, p. 27-28)-

cada sub-região se reúnem para a escolha do país que os represente. Uma vez escolhido o representante, o mesmo é apresentado ao Comité Ministerial de Candidaturas da União Africana (subcomité do Conselho Executivo da União Africana, que tem com função apoiar as candidaturas dos países africanos a posições em organismos internacionais) e, de seguida, ao Comité de Candidaturas. Quando o número de candidatos for superior ao número de lugares disponíveis, o Comité de Candidaturas tem em consideração vários critérios, nomeadamente, o da “não reeleição”, em que prioriza o Estado que apresenta a sua candidatura pela primeira vez, que tenha cessado as suas funções há mais tempo ou que tenha cumprido apenas um ano de mandato. Aplica também o critério da “não acumulação”, segundo o qual prioriza o Estado candidato que não tenha assento em qualquer órgão internacional, como o Conselho de Segurança, o Conselho Executivo do Fundo da ONU para a Infância (UNICEF), o Programa das Nações Unidas para o Meio Ambiente (PNUMA), o Conselho Económico e Social (ECOSOC), o Programa da ONU para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD) ou o Conselho Mundial da Alimentação. Por último, mas não menos importante, tem em conta a data do encerramento das candidaturas, sendo dada prioridade ao país que tenha sido o primeiro a submeter a sua candidatura (Silva, António, Godinho, 2014, p. 30).

Ultrapassada a fase de decisões e uma vez escolhido o futuro candidato para representar o continente, é chegada a altura de se apresentar perante a Assembleia Geral da ONU, para obtenção dos dois terços da maioria dos votos dos Estados Membros, o que, segundo os autores (Silva, António e Godinho), não é um processo meramente formal. Mesmo após terem sido preenchidos todos os requisitos e o país candidato ter sido selecionado pelo Grupo Africano, existem ainda outras condicionantes que podem culminar no afastamento do candidato ao lugar no Conselho de Segurança. (2014, p. 31)

3.2. APOIOS À CANDIDATURA DE ANGOLA AO CONSELHO DE SEGURANÇA

Passados dez anos desde a sua primeira presença no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, Angola voltou a exprimir o seu desejo de fazer parte desta grande arena, podendo assim aplicar a sua diplomacia ativa, dentro de um espírito de maior visibilidade política, maior partilha de experiência na resolução de conflitos recentes e, acima de tudo, numa tentativa de convencer a comunidade internacional da sua transição democrática, não obstante a fragilidade do respetivo processo. Neste

processo de candidaturas, o país contou com o apoio dos diversos países com quem tem desenvolvido cordiais relações.

Justifica-se por isso incremento das relações com alguns países da Ásia, dado o aumento do seu poder económico nos últimos anos, nomeadamente a República Popular da China, a República da Índia e o Império do Japão, traduzidos em acordos bilaterais, na abertura de linhas de crédito para apoiar a reconstrução nacional de Angola e favorecer um aumento do volume de trocas comerciais e serviços, bem como na ajuda não reembolsável. No continente Americano, Angola dispõe de parceiros importantes, cujo apoio tem sido relevante, incluindo na defesa das suas posições de carácter multilateral. Perspetivamos maior incremento e diversificação da cooperação com países como o Brasil, Cuba, Argentina, Venezuela, entre outros, dentro das oportunidades para o desenvolvimento económico de Angola. As relações com os EUA têm merecido uma atenção particular, estando a evoluir dentro de um acordo de parceria estratégica firmado em Washington, em Julho de 2010, que criou um mecanismo diplomático de diálogo permanente, ao nível das nossas relações bilaterais, em questões como a democracia e o desenvolvimento, segurança energética global, paz e estabilidade regional [...], Angola coopera também estreitamente com a União Europeia, facto que não exclui a manutenção de boas relações com os demais países do continente europeu, com particular realce para a Federação da Rússia, dentro de uma política de cooperação bilateral ajustada à real dimensão e importância estratégica de cada parceiro (Chikoti, 2014).

Vários apoios importantes e de grande valor estratégico foram obtidos por Angola, naquela que foi a corrida do país ao assento no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.

3.2.1. A SADC

Foi na 33^a Cimeira de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC), que se realizou a 18 de Agosto de 2013 em Lilongwe, capital do Malawi, que a organização manifestou o seu apoio à candidatura de Angola ao CS²⁷.

De acordo com o Secretário de Estado para as Relações Exteriores, Manuel Domingos Augusto, este apoio da região era fundamental para que o país pudesse, a partir deste momento, iniciar a sua campanha rumo a tão desejado objetivo. “Era necessário obter

²⁷ Contou com a participação da África do Sul, representada por Jacob Zuma; da República Democrática do Congo (RDC), que se fez representar por Joseph Kabila; da Tanzânia, representada por Jakaya Kikwete; do Zimbabué, representado por Robert Mugabe; de Angola, representada pelo seu Vice-Presidente, Manuel Vicente; de Moçambique, que se fez representar por Armando Emílio Guebuza; e pelos restantes Estados-Membros que compõem a organização.

o apoio da região para podermos partir para campanha à candidatura a membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança da ONU” (*apud* Agência Angola Press, 2013).

3.2.2. A COMUNIDADE DE PAÍSES DE LÍNGUA PORTUGUESA (CPLP)

Sob os auspícios da CPLP, Angola participou e realizou, juntamente com os demais Estados da Comunidade, o exercício militar que ficou conhecido como “Felino2010”. Este exercício foi realizado, tal como todos os outros em que Angola participou, para pôr à prova, no plano operacional, as capacidades e aptidões para executar uma Operação de Apoio à Paz e de Ajuda Humanitária, num cenário de crise e de emergência social (Bernardino, 2013, p. 586).

Na 18ª Reunião Ordinária do Conselho de Ministros da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), realizada em Julho de 2013, os países da comunidade apoiaram de forma unânime a candidatura de Angola ao CSNU²⁸.

Reconhecendo o papel da Concertação Político-diplomática na promoção da paz, segurança e estabilidade: [...] endossaram as seguintes candidaturas: (i) de Portugal a membro da Parte II do Conselho da Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (COACI/ICAO), cujas eleições terão lugar por ocasião da 38ª Assembleia-Geral do COACI, que irá decorrer, em Montreal, entre os dias 24 de setembro e 4 de outubro de 2013; (ii) de Angola a membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança em 2015 (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa. Conselho de Ministros, 2013).

Portugal, país irmão com antedecessores históricos de longa data (que já foram resumidamente referidos acima), abraçou a causa angolana e demonstrou o seu apoio à mesma, como referiu o seu antigo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Rui Machete:

“Manifestámos a decisão do governo de Portugal de apoiar a candidatura de Angola a membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas para o biênio

²⁸ A CPLP, foi criada em 1996, em Lisboa, e dela fazem parte integrante Angola, Portugal Guiné-Bissau, Brasil, São Tomé e Príncipe, Moçambique e Cabo-Verde, Timor-Leste e Guiné Equatorial. Tem como objetivos gerais a concertação político-diplomática entre os seus estados membros, para o reforço da sua presença no cenário internacional; a cooperação em todos os domínios, inclusive os da educação, saúde, ciência e tecnologia, defesa, agricultura, administração pública, comunicações, justiça, segurança pública, cultura, desporto e comunicação social; e a materialização de projetos de promoção e difusão da língua portuguesa. Estes objetivos regem-se pelos princípios da igualdade soberana dos estados membros; pela não-ingestão nos assuntos internos de cada estado; pelo respeito pela sua identidade nacional; pela reciprocidade de tratamento; pelo primado da paz, da democracia, do estado de direito, dos direitos humanos e da justiça social; pelo respeito pela sua integridade territorial; pela promoção do desenvolvimento; e pela promoção da cooperação mutuamente vantajosa. Sendo a CPLP uma organização dotada de personalidade jurídica e de autonomia financeira, para além dos seus acordos, protocolos e convénios internos, esta realiza também acordos com outras organizações internacionais, como, por exemplo, a própria ONU e outros estados denominados Estados observadores consultivos e/ou associados (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, 2007).

2015-2016 [...] o país acolhe com grande satisfação a candidatura de Angola, e espera que venha a ter o êxito que merece” (Machete *apud* Portal Angola, 2013).

Ainda no âmbito da CPLP, Angola e o Brasil têm como propósito comum continuar a partilhar esforços no sentido de apoiar e colaborar na construção da estabilidade democrática da Guiné-Bissau. Neste sentido, o Brasil reconheceu o importante papel do governo Angolano em relação ao desenvolvimento socioeconómico daquele país. Com isto, o estado brasileiro viu no seu parceiro angolano uma enorme capacidade de representar, não só o continente Africano, mas também toda a América Latina, naquele que é o maior palco das decisões mundiais, a fim de dar o seu grande contributo na consolidação da paz e da segurança internacionais²⁹.

Identificamos a necessidade de acompanhar e apoiar a Guiné-Bissau no período pós-eleitoral, etapa importante na construção da estabilidade democrática daquele país. Expressei, ao Presidente Santos, o reconhecimento brasileiro pelo importante papel de Angola em prol do desenvolvimento económico e social da Guiné-Bissau, do qual foi exemplo o trabalho desenvolvido pela missão angolana, em 2011. [...] A África e a América Latina precisam estar melhor representadas nos processos decisórios globais que necessitam de mais legitimidade, por isso, é com especial satisfação que anunciei ao Presidente Santos o apoio brasileiro à candidatura de Angola ao Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas para o próximo biénio e estou certa de que Angola poderá oferecer um olhar atento e alternativas equilibradas aos atuais desafios à paz e a segurança internacionais (Roussef, 2014).

3.2.3. A UNIÃO AFRICANA

A 28 de Janeiro de 2014, a candidatura angolana a membro não-permanente do Conselho de Segurança da ONU foi aprovada em Addis Abbeba, Etiópia, na 24^a Sessão do Conselho Executivo da União Africana³⁰ (African Union. Executive Council, 2014, p. 1).

Esta aprovação evidenciou a confiança que reina entre os países africanos em relação a Angola, no que concerne à sua representação naquela que é o maior palco de decisão

²⁹ A relação histórica entre o Brasil e Angola tem fortes laços, que vão desde os aspetos culturais aos económicos. Ambos foram colónias portuguesas e sofreram com o tráfico de escravos. Foi o Brasil o primeiro país a reconhecer a independência de Angola, mesmo antes de Portugal, como potência colonizadora. Em termos económicos, a relação entre os dois países iniciou-se no fim da década de 70, aquando da criação do primeiro canal brasileiro de investimento externo direto em Angola (IED), pela estatal Petrobrás, do setor petrolífero (Waisbich, Pomeroy, 2016, p. 2-6). Atualmente, operam em Angola empresas brasileiras como a Petrobrás, a Andrade Gutierrez, a Odebrecht, a Camargo Corrêa, a Queiroz Galvão, etc., sendo responsáveis por alguns projetos infraestruturais importantes em Angola. Existe uma pequena, mas evidente, comunidade de cidadãos brasileiros em Angola. Estima-se que existam 5.000 brasileiros registados em Angola. Por outro lado, a Embaixada Brasileira em Luanda processa 500 vistos por semana para angolanos que desejam visitar o Brasil (Angola. Embaixada de Angola na Áustria, Croácia, Eslovénia e Eslováquia, 2014).

³⁰ EX.CL/ DEC.810 (XXIV), point 3.

de questões mundiais. Com esta indicação, os outros países têm plena confiança de que Angola os representará da melhor forma na maior tribuna de decisão de questões mundiais (Chikoti, 2014).

3.2.4. EUROPA-ÁSIA

Desde a sua independência e, em alguns casos, mesmo antes desta, Angola sempre manteve relações com a Rússia, China, França e outros países do outro lado do continente, que, por um lado, contribuíram para a independência do país (como é o caso da Rússia) e, por outro, mantiveram cordiais relações após a independência e emergência de Angola como potência regional, como é o caso da França e da China.

No que diz respeito às relações político-diplomáticas entre Angola e França, é no sector petrolífero em que mais se faz sentir a presença francesa em Angola, sendo a empresa petrolífera francesa Total um dos maiores parceiros da empresa petrolífera angolana Sonangol. Angola sempre levou em conta o potencial francês relativamente a outros setores (nomeadamente, o ensino, a prestação de serviços e o setor agroindustrial), por isso, pretendeu com esta cooperação alcançar outros patamares³¹ (Santos, 2015).

Estando Angola inserida em organizações como a SADC e na CEEAC, como foi referido nos capítulos anteriores, a parceria torna-se uma mais-valia para o investidor francês, que, com pouca influência na África Austral, vê o parceiro angolano como ponto de partida para uma maior implantação francesa na região (Santos, 2015).

Em Abril de 2014, a visita do Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos a França constituiu um passo importante no sentido da normalização das relações entre os dois Estados, tendo ele mantido um encontro oficial com o seu homólogo francês na altura, François Hollande, e reunido com meia centena de empresários franceses de diferentes setores de atividade. Neste encontro, foram abordados assuntos de diversa ordem, nomeadamente, o progresso da situação na República Democrática do Congo, numa

³¹ Estas relações tiveram início em 1976, logo após o reconhecimento francês da independência de Angola. Em julho de 1982, o Acordo Geral de Cooperação marcou então formalmente o início das relações de cooperação entre os dois países. No ano de 2000, esta relação de cooperação sofreu uma rutura, devido ao caso de venda de armas russas a Angola por intermédio de empresários franceses (Pierre Falcone e Arkadi Gaydamak), o que ficou conhecido como o caso “*Angolagate*”. Os fortes litígios políticos, jurídicos e diplomáticos verificados entre ambos os países não impediram a França de manter sempre, através da empresa Total, a maior parte na exploração do petróleo angolano, que, em 2016, através do “bloco 17”, operado por si no ‘*offshore*’ angolano, foi o mais lucrativo do país. Garantiu vendas superiores a 8,7 mil milhões de euros, tornando-se o mais rentável de Angola, que passou a ficar, ao mesmo, com o estatuto de maior produtor de petróleo em África, à frente da Nigéria, segundo o relatório mensal da OPEP (Santos, 2015).

altura em que Angola assumira, desde o início de 2014, a presidência rotativa da Conferência dos Países dos Grandes Lagos, frisando o Chefe de Estado francês o papel importante de Angola para a estabilidade da região e realçando o apoio e o papel do país nos problemas da República Centro-Africana e da República Democrática do Congo. A partir desta reunião, os Chefes de Estado decidiram também criar um grupo de trabalho que se passasse a ocupar dos assuntos económicos que seriam coordenados pelos ministros das Relações Exteriores de Angola e pelo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros Francês, relativamente: agricultura e indústria agroalimentar, planeamento urbano, transportes, energias e água, construção de infraestruturas, comunicações e geologia e minas (Santos, 2015).

A candidatura de Angola a membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança da ONU foi apoiada pela França, que, pelo seu representante, Jean Claude Moyret, embaixador de França em Luanda, frisou que:

“a vontade por parte de Angola em ajudar os países africanos, pela cultura da negociação e pela busca de soluções para a saída de crises, é evidente e tem contribuído de maneira positiva para a paz e segurança no continente africano, fazendo de Angola um parceiro privilegiado no continente e fora dele” e que “Angola tem a cultura da negociação e da busca de soluções para a saída de crises, o que é uma experiência positiva que pode ajudar a resolver os problemas do mundo” (*apud* VOA Português, 2014).

No que concerne à China e como já foi dito anteriormente, com o território angolano livre de conflitos entre 1990 e 2002, aquando da chegada da paz definitiva ao país, as naturais desse país foram-se gradualmente aproximando de Angola, numa altura em que também os chineses dão início à sua política expansionista, procurando novos parceiros, novos mercados e, sobretudo, o bem mais precioso: o petróleo.

[...] O crescente interesse de Pequim pelo continente africano – segundo muitos o mais importante – seria a necessidade da China se abastecer de matérias-primas, nomeadamente petróleo, para fazer face ao seu formidável desenvolvimento económico e exponencial crescimento das exportações [...] a própria debilidade das estruturas sociais, administrativas e económicas da maior parte dos países africanos torna mais fácil um intercâmbio comercial e financeiro sem constrangimentos legais, ambientais, sociais ou de outra ordem que poderiam obstaculizar os intentos de Pequim (Pavia, 2011 p. 12).

O continente africano tornou-se, de um modo geral, o maior palco de atuação chinesa. A “troca de favores”, por assim dizer, tornou-se o ponto de partida para o início das negociações entre o país asiático e o continente africano.

Falando particularmente de Angola, a frágil e degradada estrutura interna do país, herdada dos conflitos que ocorreram, juntamente com a prontidão chinesa em investir, a sua mão-de-obra barata e o descaso chinês em relação a questões ligadas ao respeito dos direitos humanos ou aos assuntos internos dos seus parceiros, desencadearam uma série de negociações a todos os níveis. A China tornou-se o maior aliado económico de Angola, fornecendo linhas de crédito avultadas e com juros a baixo custo. A ajuda chinesa a Angola vai desde o apoio à construção e reconstrução nacional à concessão de bolsas de estudo para estudantes angolanos na China, passando pela colaboração no setor agrícola.

Foi neste contexto de profundas relações económicas e comerciais que o chefe da diplomacia de Angola, Georges Chikoti, solicitou o apoio do seu grande parceiro, não obstante ser um dos cinco membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, no que diz respeito à candidatura angolana a membro não permanente do mesmo Conselho. Para isso, o chefe diplomático angolano tornou transparente o interesse do seu país, com uma postura defensiva de diplomacia preventiva e proactiva, uma vez que são os princípios que regem a manutenção de paz e segurança internacionais.

Ter o apoio de um dos membros permanentes do CS e sendo esse país uma das maiores economias do mundo traduziu-se numa mais-valia para Angola, nesta importante “corrida”, uma vez que o peso e influência chineses bastariam para convencer os outros membros, no momento da votação.

No âmbito das Relações Internacionais modernas, a China apresenta-se cada vez mais ativa nas relações de cooperação com os seus parceiros. Nesta senda, esperamos que a República Popular da China esteja no nosso lado, ajudando a convencer os governos na consolidação da nossa pretensão: a de ocupar um lugar como membro não permanente deste importante órgão das Nações Unidas. Portanto, o Executivo angolano espera que a China tenha um “um papel ativo” nesta caminhada a que Angola se propôs (Bires, 2013).

3.3. A VOTAÇÃO

Na vigésima quinta reunião plenária da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, ocorrida a 16 de outubro de 2014, foram eleitos, dentro dos parâmetros exigidos no art.º 23º da Carta das Nações Unidas e do artº. 142 do regulamento interno da Assembleia Geral, os futuros Estados que iriam substituir a Argentina, a Austrália, o Luxemburgo, a

República Checa e o Ruanda como membros não permanentes do Conselho de Segurança.

Os países escolhidos, nomeadamente, Angola, Venezuela, Espanha, Nova Zelândia e Malásia, foram eleitos de acordo com a distribuição geográfica equitativa anteriormente referida e todos, com exceção da Espanha, reuniram a maioria necessária de dois terços dos votos, sendo eleitos logo na primeira ronda de votações.

Tabela 2 -25º Reunião Plenária da AG das Nações Unidas, 16 de outubro de 2014

Estados Eleitos	Estados Votantes	Votos Requeridos	Votos Obtidos
Angola	192	128	190
Malásia	192	128	187
Venezuela	182	122	181
Nova Zelândia	193	129	145
Espanha	192	128	132 ³²

Fonte: United Nations, 2014

Foi a partir de 1 de janeiro de 2015 que Angola, bem como os restantes novos membros, passaram a ocupar os seus respetivos cargos no Conselho de Segurança.

Aquando da sua candidatura, Angola propôs-se a colaborar com o CS nos seus mais variados campos de atuação: dando especial atenção ao seu continente e às respetivas vicissitudes; sendo uma voz ativa no que diz respeito ao debate dessas questões; colaborando na prevenção de conflitos nas zonas de crise, como na República Centro Africana, na República Democrática do Congo, no Mali, no Sahara, na Líbia e na Nigéria; olhando para a questão humanitária e lutando contra as pandemias que assolam o continente; levando em consideração o extremismo religioso como uma das principais causas de conflito, bem como as práticas de tráfico de drogas, sequestro e pirataria marítima. (Almeida, 2015)

Estes propósitos tiveram um peso relevante e contribuíram em grande escala para que os restantes membros confiassem no governo angolano (e a ele dessem o seu voto), sendo aquele que recebeu, nesta votação, o maior número de votos (como mostra o quadro acima).

³² Foram necessárias 3 rondas de votação para que a Espanha fosse eleita como o 5º membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança, uma vez que, nas primeiras duas, não obteve o número suficiente de votos requeridos.

3.4. ANGOLA NA PRESIDÊNCIA DO CONSELHO DE SEGURANÇA

Como é sabido, todos os Estados-Membros do Conselho de Segurança têm o direito a presidir, durante um mês, ao Conselho. Esta seleção para a presidência é feita seguindo a ordem alfabética dos Estados-Membros.

Em março de 2016, foi a vez de Angola assumir a presidência do Órgão, sendo representada por Ismael Gaspar Martins, Representante Permanente de Angola para as Nações Unidas, sucedendo à República Bolivariana da Venezuela representada pelo seu Representante Permanente, Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño.

Durante a sua presidência, a Agenda de Trabalhos de Angola pautou-se - tal como fora prometido no processo de candidatura - pelos seguintes pontos: “Manter a paz e a segurança internacional: A prevenção e a resolução de conflitos na Região dos Grandes Lagos” e “Mulheres, paz e segurança. O papel das mulheres na prevenção e resolução de conflitos em África.” (Carvalho, 2014, p. 73)

Além desta agenda, durante a sua presidência, Angola realizou visitas de trabalho oficiais a países como o Mali, o Senegal e Guiné-Bissau³³. Esta missão foi realizada logo no início do mandato de Angola enquanto Presidente do Conselho de Segurança, de 3 a 9 de março de 2016. No Mali, foram responsáveis pela missão a França e o Senegal, sendo que, para a Guiné-Bissau, a missão foi liderada pelo Senegal, juntamente com Angola, sendo visita ao Senegal foi liderada por Angola.

3.4.1. ANGOLA E A MISSÃO DO CONSELHO DE SEGURANÇA NA ÁFRICA OCIDENTAL

3.4.1.1. MALI

Para o Mali, estiveram em cima da mesa questões como a implementação efetiva do Acordo sobre paz e reconciliação no país, a questão da segurança local e nacional e os

³³Participaram desta missão: Angola, representada pelo Embaixador Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins; a China, representada pelo Sr. Zhao Yong; o Egito, representado pelo Embaixador Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta; a França, representada pelo Embaixador François Delattre; o Japão, representado pelo Embaixador Yoshifumi Okamura; a Malásia, representada pelo Embaixador Ramlan Bin Ibrahim; a Nova Zelândia, representada pelo Embaixador Phillip Taula; a Rússia, representada pelo Sr. Piotr V. Ilichev; o Senegal, representado pelo Embaixador Fodé Seck; a Espanha, representada pelo Embaixador Román Oyarzun Marchesi; a Ucrânia, representada pelo Embaixador Volodymyr Yelchenko; o Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte, representados pelo Embaixador Peter Wilson; Os EUA, representados pelo Embaixador David Pressman; o Uruguai, representado pelo Embaixador Luis Homero Bermúdez Álvarez; e a República Bolivariana da Venezuela, representada pelo Embaixador Henry Alfredo Suárez Moreno.

benefícios e dividendos da paz para a população nacional. Neste sentido, a presidência do CS solicitou aos envolvidos no conflito – Governo e grupos armados – que fosse reafirmada a sua intenção de seguir em frente com a implementação do Acordo de Paz e a reconciliação no país, sendo imperioso que esta implementação ocorresse com a maior brevidade possível mediante a instauração de patrulhas de segurança conjuntas no Norte do país, o mesmo sucedendo relativamente ao desarmamento, desmobilização e reintegração de combatentes armados³⁴.

Foi também reiterada pelo Presidente do Conselho a necessidade de se envidar esforços entre o Conselho Segurança, o Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral para o Mali e o MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), a fim de ser prestado apoio ao Governo e aos grupos armados, na implementação dos acordos de paz e na reconciliação das partes, bem como relativamente aos acordos de cessar-fogo e às medidas de defesa e segurança.

Durante a visita ao Mali, os membros do Conselho de Segurança foram recebidos por várias entidades nacionais, com o objetivo de receberem o *feedback* da situação local. A comitiva internacional foi recebida pelo Presidente do Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, pelo seu Primeiro-Ministro, Modibo Keïta, pelo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação Internacional e Integração Africana, Abdoulaye Diop, pelos representantes do MINUSMA e pela Comunidade Internacional. No decorrer da missão, foram também realizados encontros com representantes do Ministério da Solidariedade, Questões Humanitárias e Reconstrução do Norte, com o Ministério da Família e Promoção da Mulher, com o Ministério da Economia e Finanças, com o Ministério da Reconciliação Nacional, com o Ministério da Segurança e Proteção Civil, com o Ministério da Justiça e dos Direitos Humanos e com os Representantes da Plataforma de Coordenação do Movimento Azawad (CMA). Várias foram as questões abordadas entre a comitiva do CS e as entidades governamentais do Mali, no que concerne à implementação efetiva dos acordos de paz (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 2-5).

³⁴ O Acordo de Paz e Reconciliação no Mali foi assinado a 1 de março de 2015, para pôr fim à instabilidade e violência que grassavam no país desde 2012, como consequência do golpe de estado ao governo de Amadou Toumani Touré. Este acordo foi assinado entre o Governo do Mali e outros seis grupos armados do norte do país, nomeadamente, o Movimento Nacional de Libertação de Azawad (MNLA), o Alto Conselho para a Unidade de Azawad (HCUA), o Movimento Árabe do Azawad (MAA), o Movimento Árabe do Azawad dissidente (MAA-dissidente), a Coordenação para o Povo de Azawad (CPA) e a Coordenação dos Movimentos e Frentes Patrióticas de Resistência (CM-FPR) (Agência Lusa, 2015).

No decorrer deste encontro, o presidente maliano expôs questões relativas à segurança, tendo defendido a necessidade de se conter a expansão terrorista no centro e sul do país, em cooperação com países da região e com a criação de uma força antiterrorista; a necessidade de se alargar o mandato do MINUSMA, bem como o fortalecimento das suas funções, e de se reforçar a capacidade de resposta das forças armadas, com equipamento e treino militar, para garantir a sustentabilidade da paz. Os representantes do MINUSMA, na exposição do seu ponto de vista, salientaram as principais dificuldades com que se depararam, ao longo da missão, que os impediam de fazer cumprir o seu mandato de forma eficiente, dificuldades estas relacionadas com a multiplicidade de tarefas a realizar, numa altura de ataques violentos e contínuos contra a missão. Referiram ainda o índice deficitário de formação e equipamento para uso de emergência; a lentidão dos processos administrativos e orçamentais, que dificultavam o acesso a novas operações; e a disparidade entre as tarefas que à Missão foram atribuídas e os recursos disponibilizados para o cumprimento das mesmas (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 2-5).

Representantes da Plataforma e o CMA salientaram a necessidade de se aumentar a participação e representação do povo maliano neste processo, uma vez que esta participação popular não só serviria de alavanca, com a implementação do acordo, mas também contribuiria para impedir a radicalização e o extremismo internos, considerando que este atraso abriria espaço para que os terroristas se fortalecessem e se organizassem. A participação das mulheres no processo de negociação da paz, assim como nas instituições criadas para implementar os acordos de paz, foi criticada pelas representantes do Ministério da Família e Promoção da Mulher, uma vez que a consideraram a baixa e discriminatória, tendo também chamado a atenção para o facto de esta discriminação estar refletida em textos legislativos malianos, sendo assim facultado às mulheres pouco acesso à justiça, à educação e à saúde, contribuindo fortemente para o empobrecimento feminino (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 2-5).

Apresentadas as queixas, o Conselho de Segurança tomou anotações e deu o seu parecer sobre as diversas questões, no que diz respeito à implementação efetiva dos acordos de paz, nomeadamente:

- Investir fortemente nos processos de aconselhamento, desarmamento, desmobilização e reintegração e contribuir cada vez mais com reformas no

setor da segurança, sendo que foram estas as questões que mais preocuparam as autoridades malianas;

- A necessidade de se incluir nos processos de paz as mulheres e os jovens desprotegidos, para que não sejam aliciados pelas forças negativas, evitando assim mais tensões e possivelmente novos conflitos;
- A importância de se criar uma coligação mais forte, para combater o sentimento de insegurança, criando mecanismos de partilha de informação entre o MINUSMA, a Operação Barkhene e as forças de defesa e segurança da Malásia, do CMA e da Plataforma, de modo a poder ser avaliado mais convenientemente o respetivo contributo para o combate ao terrorismo;
- Adaptar o mandato do MINUSMA ao novo contexto, revendo a sua postura, as suas prioridades, uma nova configuração e organização interna, para que o mesmo atinja a sua total capacidade operacional, nomeadamente em termos de equipamento e formação. (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 6)

Para além disto, o Presidente do Conselho apelou a que, após a implementação dos acordos acima descritos, fossem implementadas também determinadas medidas de carácter imediato e permanente, que produzissem efeitos a longo prazo, medidas estas que estariam intrinsecamente ligadas a questões de segurança, de reforma do governo, de desenvolvimento e humanitárias que se traduzissem em benefícios concretos, como o restabelecimento de serviços básicos às populações locais. O fim das hostilidades entre os signatários do acordo e a reconciliação intercomunitária foram vistas com bons olhos por parte dos mediadores internacionais, uma vez que se revelariam um significativo progresso, pese embora a deterioração da questão da segurança, devido ao aumento dos ataques terroristas (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 6).

3.4.1.2 GUINÉ - BISSAU

Tal como sucedeu na missão realizada ao Mali, a visita à Guiné-Bissau em março de 2016 teve como objetivo informar as instituições nacionais quanto à situação interna do país, para seguidamente se poder emitir um parecer a esse respeito. Com esta visita, o Conselho teve a oportunidade de exprimir a sua preocupação relativamente a estes impasses políticos, aconselhando desde sempre uma resolução dos mesmos pela via do diálogo.

Durante a visita, a comitiva internacional realizou encontros com o Primeiro-Ministro guineense, Carlos Correia; o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Artur Silva; o Presidente da Assembleia Nacional, Cipriano Cassamá; o Presidente da Decisão do Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PIAGC), Domingos Simões Pereira; o vice-presidente do Partido da Renovação Social (PRS), Certório Biote; o Escritório Integrado das Nações Unidas para a Consolidação da Paz na Guiné-Bissau das Nações Unidas (UNIOGBIS), representado na pessoa de Miguel Trovoadá; e o Presidente da República, José Mário Vaz. Destes encontros, foi retirada informação concernente à questão da segurança do país (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 8).

Esta instabilidade política na Guiné-Bissau advém de uma série de conflitos de interesses ocorridos no país, no seio das entidades governamentais. Após ser eleito no ano de 2014 como Primeiro-Ministro da Guiné-Bissau (por José Mário Vaz, Presidente guineense), Simão Pereira viu as suas pastas serem-lhe retiradas no ano de 2015, devido a, segundo afirmações do próprio, “dificuldades de relacionamento institucional entre o Primeiro-Ministro e o Presidente da República” (Domingos Simões Pereira *apud* OdemocrataGB, 2015).

Num comunicado que o próprio tornou público, Simão Pereira apontou como principais causas destes conflitos, entre outros, a participação direta e ativa na gestão dos fundos angariados por parte do Presidente, querendo este que fosse nomeado alguém da sua confiança para tratar da gestão destes recursos financeiros; a vontade do Presidente de que fizessem parte do Governo elementos próximos a si; e a acusação por parte do Presidente de que o Governo estaria a gerir um fundo sem o seu conhecimento e não estando sujeito a qualquer tipo de fiscalização (Domingos Simões Pereira *apud* OdemocrataGB, 2015).

Desta feita, Simão Pereira considerou esta atitude do Presidente guineense como uma tentativa de provocar uma crise para justificar a decisão de destituição do Governo e como um descaso por parte do mesmo em relação às consequências negativas que tal medida poderia causar para a ordem e estabilidade internas que tinham, aos poucos, sido conquistadas, uma vez que o país já havia sofrido uma crise política com o golpe de estado de 2012 (Domingos Simões Pereira *apud* OdemocrataGB, 2015).

A esta crise, está também intrinsecamente ligada, segundo o Presidente da Guiné-Bissau, a não aprovação do programa do governo de 23 de dezembro de 2015, aquando

da expulsão de 15 parlamentares do partido PIAGC. Pelas palavras de Simão Pereira, esta expulsão foi uma consequência do fato de os mesmos se terem absterido de votar a favor do programa do governo, depois de se juntarem ao partido da oposição PRS (Partido da Renovação Social)³⁵.

Para o Conselho de Segurança, a instabilidade política existente entre os membros do governo tem vindo a impedir o progresso e desenvolvimento do país, devendo esses membros conjugar esforços para que fossem resolvidas, através do diálogo, todas as questões políticas, a fim de garantir uma estabilidade plena, não só a nível nacional como também regional. Estes esforços passavam por:

- Respeitar o Estado de Direito, no sentido de se resolver a crise, uma vez que os políticos também estavam a ela sujeitos;
- Alcançar um acordo permanente para a criação de um governo mais inclusivo e funcional, que conseguisse implementar reformas nos setores da defesa, justiça e segurança;
- Garantir que a decisão final alcançada entre as partes interessadas fosse tomada no completo respeito pela Constituição, evitando assim um escalar da crise, com impactos negativos para a população.

Esta instabilidade política na Guiné-Bissau foi vista pela CS como uma porta aberta às redes transnacionais de crime organizado, bem como uma oportunidade para aumentar o índice de ameaças transnacionais (tráfico de drogas e margem de manobra para atuação de grupos extremistas), devendo o país patrulhar, a nível regional, as suas fronteiras, para garantir condições de segurança para as suas populações (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 12).

3.4.1.3. SENEGAL

O Senegal foi o último país a ser visitado, nesta missão de 5 dias que o CS empreendeu pela África Ocidental. Esta visita ocorreu a 8 de março de 2016, em Dakar, e, juntamente com o Representante Permanente de Angola junto das Nações Unidas, que liderou a missão, estiveram reunidos os seguintes: o Escritório das Nações Unidas para a África

³⁵ De acordo com os estatutos do PAIGC, os candidatos às eleições legislativas foram propostos e apoiados pelo partido. Além disso, antes de o fazer, eles tiveram de declarar que aceitariam as condições do partido e que o apoiariam. Ao decidir não apoiar o programa do governo, os 15 deputados perderam o apoio e a adesão do partido. Além disso, a lei eleitoral não previa candidatos independentes a eleições legislativas, opinião esta que, após várias consultas, foi apoiada pela Assembleia Nacional (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 11).

Ocidental e o Sahel (UNOWAS), o corpo diplomático do Senegal, que incluiu a França, a China, a Federação Russa, o Japão, a Malásia, a Espanha, a Ucrânia e a Venezuela, vários outros países e o Presidente do Senegal, Macky Sall (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 14).

Esta visita teve como objetivos a troca de informações em relação à situação política e às condições de segurança da África Ocidental e do Sahel, o nível de implementação da estratégia das Nações Unidas para o Sahel, bem como uma possibilidade de se fundir o Escritório das Nações Unidas para a África Ocidental (UNOWA) e o Gabinete do Enviado Especial do Secretário-Geral do Sahel (OSES). Nesta visita, foram trocadas também impressões relacionadas com os desafios à paz e segurança com que o Conselho se deparou, no decorrer da sua missão (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 14).

Neste sentido, em reuniões com o Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral para a África Ocidental e o Sahel, o CS tomou conhecimento de que a questão eleitoral na região do Benim e do Níger, que acompanhou diretamente, teve um desenlace positivo, apesar de alguns percalços, e que o apoio nesse sentido prestado pelos parceiros internacionais (UA, CEDEAO e Conselho da Entente) decorreu com sucesso³⁶.

Relativamente às questões de segurança na região, foi reconhecido por todos os envolvidos que havia necessidade de se conter este mal que assola a região e de se multiplicarem esforços no combate ao terrorismo. Foi reconhecido também o papel do Boko Haram como principal desestabilizador, principalmente na região da bacia do Lago do Chade, daí resultando a realização de várias visitas aos países afetados pelo grupo extremista (Camarões, Nigéria, Níger, Chade). Sendo o terrorismo um problema transnacional, o Representante Especial para a África Ocidental fez apelo a um esforço combinado de toda a comunidade internacional para apoiar a luta contra os grupos terroristas na região. Apelou também a uma maior mobilização, a fim de serem abordados temas como a marginalização social e económica, para ser possível apoiar as comunidades afetadas pelo Boko Haram e também como meio de enfraquecer a capacidade dos terroristas na expansão das suas redes de ação, uma vez que se considerava estar na base do terrorismo e do extremismo violento o baixo nível de

³⁶ A única questão contenciosa foi relacionada com os cartões de votação a utilizar nas eleições, já que os cartões biométricos para 2016 não foram distribuídos a tempo. Em relação ao Níger, ele explicou que a primeira rodada de eleições tinha sido realizada de forma pacífica, apesar da situação altamente complicada de um dos candidatos presidenciais e um ex-presidente do parlamento, Hama Amadou, se encontrarem presos por acusações de tráfico de crianças (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 16).

desenvolvimento e de oportunidades socioeconómicas (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 17).

Sendo a pirataria e a insegurança marítima um dos fatores que prejudicam a segurança e a estabilidade em África, especialmente no Golfo da Guiné, estas questões foram também debatidas nesta reunião.




Ilustração 2 – Ataques registados na África Oriental e na África Ocidental. (Organização Marítima Internacional *apud* Melo, 2014).

Apesar de uma significativa descida do número de ataques piratas, nas regiões da África Oriental e Ocidental, como mostra o gráfico acima³⁷, foi assinado em junho de 2013, em Yaoundé (Camarões), pelos Chefes de Estado e de Governo da África Central e Ocidental e pela Comissão do Golfo da Guiné, o Código de Conduta relativo à repressão da pirataria, assaltos à mão armada contra navios e atividades marítimas ilegais na África Ocidental e Central, com o objetivo de proteger o espaço marítimo comum, comprometendo-se cada um deles a, entre outros aspetos, desenvolver políticas nacionais de luta contra a pirataria, os assaltos à mão armada e outras atividades ilícitas

³⁷ Esta descida está relacionada com a descida do preço do petróleo, mas os esforços para pôr fim a este tipo de atos devem ser contínuos, como referiu Adenike Ukonga, secretária executiva da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné: “a queda do preço contribuiu imenso para reduzir a pirataria e outros crimes marítimos no Golfo da Guiné [...] mas as nações desta região devem continuar a trabalhar para melhorar a coordenação de segurança” (Lusa, 2016).

cometidas em alto mar (Declaração Dos Chefes De Estado E De Governo Dos Estados Da África Central E Da África Ocidental Sobre A Segurança No Espaço Marítimo Comum, 2013).

Segundo o Representante Especial para a África Ocidental, múltiplos esforços foram realizados para a resolução da questão, o que se traduziu na adoção pela União Africana, em outubro de 2016, de uma “Carta Africana Sobre a Segurança Marítima e Segurança e Desenvolvimento em África”, com o objetivo de definir os meios adequados para conter atividades criminosas que constituam uma grave violação da paz e da segurança à navegação em todo o espaço marítimo africano, inclusive no Golfo da Guiné (United Nations. Security Council, 2016a, p. 18).

Esta carta veio reforçar o “*Plano de Ação para o Golfo da Guiné 2015-2020*”, adotado em março de 2015, que reflete o apoio da União Europeia à questão africana, bem como a sua estrita cooperação com parceiros em toda a África Ocidental e Central. Este plano foi criado com o objetivo de dar apoio aos esforços desenvolvidos pela CEDEAO, CEEAC, Comissão do Golfo da Guiné (CGG) e todos os estados signatários do Código de Conduta relativo à repressão da pirataria, assaltos à mão armada contra navios e demais atividades marítimas ilegais em África (Conselho da União Europeia, 2015, p. 2).

3.4.2. MANUTENÇÃO DA PAZ E DA SEGURANÇA INTERNACIONAIS: A PREVENÇÃO E A RESOLUÇÃO DE CONFLITOS NA REGIÃO DOS GRANDES LAGOS

Como foi referido acima, Angola assumiu a Presidência da Conferência Internacional sobre a Região dos Grandes Lagos (CIRGL), em Janeiro de 2014, para um mandato com duração de dois anos (até 2016). Este mandato do CIRGL coincidiu com o mandato de Angola como membro não permanente do CSNU. Deste modo, e sendo que um dos propósitos do Governo angolano, com este mandato, foi o de tornar-se uma voz ativa nas questões relacionadas com o continente africano e com a problemática da região dos Grandes Lagos.

A situação crítica da Região dos Grandes Lagos é uma questão com que Angola se deparou logo desde o início do seu primeiro mandato no CSNU (2003-2004), encontrando-se, até aos dias de hoje, longe de estar resolvida, apesar dos múltiplos esforços feitos por Angola e pela comunidade internacional, nos últimos anos.

Pela declaração presidencial de 31 de Março de 2016, procedeu-se à exposição da atual situação na região e dos contínuos esforços que foram e que devem continuar a ser feitos para combater a instabilidade que assola a região, bem como para prevenir todas as consequências que desta instabilidade advêm³⁸. Pelo relatório do Secretário-Geral sobre a implementação do Acordo-Quadro de Paz, Segurança e Cooperação (PSC) para a República Democrática do Congo, o CS demonstrou-se insatisfeito, com os lentos progressos verificados na implementação dos compromissos nacionais e regionais, uma vez que estes são os principais impulsionadores da paz e estabilidade na região (United Nations. Security Council, 2016i, p. 1).

Olhando com enorme preocupação para a contínua exploração e comercialização ilícita dos recursos naturais na região, o CS, aprovou, o Quadro Estratégico Regional para a Região dos Grandes Lagos 2016-2017 (QERGL), apresentado pelo Secretário-Geral da ONU, para dar apoio ao Quadro do PSC sob os seguintes pilares, gestão sustentável dos recursos naturais; integração económica e comércio transfronteiriço; segurança alimentar e nutrição; mobilidade de jovens e adolescentes; violência sexual e do gênero; e justiça e prevenção de conflitos³⁹. Assim sendo, Conselho aponta como prioridades no âmbito do QERGL, o fortalecimento de instituições, mecanismos e capacidades para prevenção, gerenciamento, resolução e construção da paz, através de iniciativas e parcerias transfronteiriças a nível regional incluindo a CIRGL e organizações de sociedade civil; fortalecer os esforços regionais aumentando o controlo do fornecimento de armas pequenas e armas ligeiras, que são uma fonte importante de conflito na região dos Grandes Lagos; reforçar a cooperação judiciária incluindo a aplicação da lei, o controlo das fronteiras, os serviços e os órgãos judiciais e a profissão jurídica, através da melhoria da cooperação entre os governos, as instituições de justiça e as comunidades locais, em particular zonas transfronteiriças da região dos Grandes Lagos (United Nations. Security Council, 2016k, p. 4).

Com a finalidade de neutralizar todos os grupos armados que operam no leste da República Democrática do Congo (RDC), nomeadamente, as Forças Democráticas de Libertação do Ruanda (FDLR), as Forças Democráticas Aliadas (ADF), o Exército de

³⁸ S/PRST/2016/2

³⁹ O QERGL procura transformar a exploração ilegal de recursos naturais em negócios legais devidamente regulamentados, fazer um uso mais sustentável dos recursos naturais, bem como uma gestão transparente e responsável destes mesmos recursos, para que se reflitam em ganhos significativos para os estados e as comunidades (United Nations. Security Council, 2016i, p. 2).

Resistência do Senhor (ERS) e os grupos Mai Mai, foram retomadas, de acordo com a resolução do Conselho de Segurança 2277 (2016), as operações militares conjuntas entre o Governo da RDC e a Missão de Estabilização da Organização das Nações Unidas na RDC (MONUSCO) (United Nations. Security Council, 2016k, p. 1).

No que concerne à questão humanitária, o CS salientou que o deslocamento forçado de milhões de pessoas (causado pelos constantes conflitos na região) conduz a um aumento do nível de abusos e violações dos direitos humanos. Assim sendo, apelou a que fossem cumpridas as obrigações impostas a todos os Estados-Membros da região, para que se tornasse possível fazer cumprir as normas do direito internacional, incluindo o direito internacional dos direitos humanos e o direito internacional humanitário, criminalizando e responsabilizando todos aqueles que violassem tais direitos para positivamente combater a impunidade e promover a confiança entre os cidadãos. Ainda neste contexto, o Presidente do Conselho salientou que, sendo as crianças as principais vítimas destes conflitos, era necessário capacitar os jovens e promover iniciativas de emprego juvenil, a nível regional, a fim de evitar o seu recrutamento por parte dos grupos armados. Com relação às mulheres, exortou as populações a terminar com os atos de violência e discriminação contra mulheres e meninas, passando, isso sim, a optar-se pela participação destas na construção da paz, na tomada de decisões, promovendo assim a igualdade de gênero (United Nations. Security Council, 2016h, p. 2).

A promoção de um diálogo inclusivo entre as partes nacionais interessadas revela-se fundamental, devendo ser promovida e apoiada a nível regional, com a abertura de espaços políticos para permitir a livre participação de todos os partidos políticos pacíficos, da sociedade civil e dos meios de comunicação no processo político. Este apoio regional deve também refletir-se na melhoria das capacidades eleitorais e de gestão governativa nos países da região. Apesar do apoio externo, os Estados-Membros da região devem continuar a tomar medidas, dentro daquilo que é a Carta Africana sobre Democracia, Eleições e Gestão Governativa, para garantir que os processos eleitorais sejam oportunos, pacíficos, inclusivos e, acima de tudo, credíveis, no sentido de garantir a promoção da paz e da plena segurança (United Nations. Security Council, 2016h, p. 2).

Relativamente à cooperação regional, foi realizada em Fevereiro de 2016, na capital Congoleza de Kinshasa, a Conferência de Investimento do Setor Privado, conferência esta organizada pelo Enviado Especial do Secretário-Geral da Região dos Grandes

Lagos e o CIRGL. Este ato foi vista com bons olhos por parte do CS, que considerou que um potencial impulso positivo dado pela mesma deveria ser materializado através da operacionalização por parte do Fórum do setor Privado do CIRGL, com a realização de investimentos e de um estímulo ao emprego e às oportunidades de subsistência, como ferramentas para a prevenção de conflitos e a consolidação da paz e segurança na região dos Grandes Lagos (United Nations. Security Council, 2016h).

O presidente do Conselho aprovou também resoluções concernentes à questão do Sudão e do Sudão do Sul, onde, apesar de todas as resoluções e declarações já realizadas, relativas à situação do país⁴⁰, considerou-se que a mesma continuava a constituir uma ameaça para a paz e segurança internacionais e na região e, fazendo uso das duas funções, pela resolução S/RES/2271 (2016), de 2 de março de 2016, renovou até 15 de Abril de 2016 as medidas impostas na resolução de 2015⁴¹, nomeadamente, o regime de sanções, incluindo a proibição de viagens e o congelamento de bens aos indivíduos que bloqueiem o processo de paz no país, e prorrogou o mandato do Grupo de Peritos até 15 de maio do mesmo ano, para supervisionar a implementação destas sanções (United Nations. Security Council, 2016c, p. 1).

Na 7650ª reunião do Conselho de Segurança⁴², decorrida a 17 de março de 2016, Angola, como Presidente do Conselho, interveio para falar em nome do Conselho, relativamente à questão do Sudão e do Sudão do Sul, tendo declarado que:

- O governo do Sudão do Sul e o Movimento Popular de Libertação do Sudão na Oposição (SPLM-IO) deveriam aderir imediatamente ao cessar-fogo permanente no país e unir esforços com outros atores, para que fossem implementadas de forma plena as reformas de segurança em Juba;
- O Governo do Sudão do Sul e o SPLM-IO devem ter a responsabilidade máxima de proteger a população civil e seus bens, permitir a livre circulação de pessoas e respeitar sempre as disposições relevantes do direito internacional e os princípios orientadores da ONU no âmbito da assistência humanitária;

⁴⁰ Resoluções 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), 2241 (2015) e 2252 (2015).

⁴¹ S/RES/2206 (2015) p. 9-12.

⁴² S/PRST/2016/1.

- Reconheceu o esforço que a UNMISS tem vindo a fazer, no sentido de proteger os milhares de civis que vivem sob ameaça constante de violência física, e, também, o seu contributo na estabilização da segurança no sul do Sudão;
- O Conselho de Segurança reconhece a necessidade de se fortalecer a cooperação entre o Governo do Sudão do Sul e a UNMISS para garantir a segurança dos pacificadores e outros associados das Nações Unidas, especialmente ligados a questões humanitárias. (United Nations. Security Council, 2016j, p. 1-3)

Fora do contexto da região dos Grandes Lagos, a 15 de março de 2016, o CS aprovou uma resolução respeitante à questão vivida na Líbia, considerando que esta continuava a representar uma grande ameaça à paz e segurança internacionais. Esta resolução prorrogava, até 15 de junho do mesmo ano, o mandato da Missão de Apoio das Nações Unidas na Líbia (UNSMIL), uma vez que reconhecia ser necessária a sua presença no país, para se estabelecer os respetivos acordos de segurança (UN, Security Council, 2016d, p. 2).

A 31 de março de 2016, foi aprovada uma nova resolução (S / RES / 2278 (2016)), relativamente à questão da Líbia, tendo o CS:

- Decidido prorrogar até 31 de julho de 2017 as autorizações constantes das medidas impostas pela resolução 2146 (2014)⁴³;
- Condenado as tentativas de exportação ilícita de petróleo bruto da Líbia, por instituições paralelas que não atuavam sob a autoridade do Governo de Acordo Nacional, ficando este responsável pelo fornecimento de atualizações periódicas sobre os portos, campos petrolíferos e instalações que estavam sob o seu controlo, assim como sobre os mecanismos utilizados para certificar as exportações legais de petróleo bruto ao Comité⁴⁴;
- Solicitado ao Governo do Acordo Nacional que fossem melhoradas as vias de implementação do embargo de armas, em todos os pontos de entrada sob

⁴³ Por esta resolução, os Estados-Membros ficam proibidos de transportar, carregar ou descarregar petróleo bruto líbio em navios nacionais; os nacionais de cada Estado-Membro ficam proibidos de participarem em qualquer negócio que envolva o petróleo bruto da Líbia, bem como o abastecimento ou fornecimento de combustível ou suprimentos, ou outros serviços de manutenção de navios, aos navios designados pelo Comité.

⁴⁴ Este Comité foi criado pela resolução 1970 (2011) do Conselho de Segurança.

o seu controlo, e pedido a participação e cooperação de todos os Estados-Membros, nesta questão;

- Autorizado o Governo de Acordo Nacional a enviar pedidos para o fornecimento, venda ou transferência de armas e material relacionado (munições e peças sobressalentes), para que as forças de segurança sob seu controlo pudessem combater o ISIL e outros grupos terroristas que atuam na Líbia;
- Decidido prorrogar até 31 de julho de 2017 o mandato do Painel de Peritos, que tem como principal função formular recomendações sobre as ações do Conselho, do Comité, do Governo da Líbia e de outros Estados, no sentido de melhorar a implementação de medidas relevantes.

Relativamente à Somália, preocupado com os sucessivos ataques do grupo terrorista Al-Shabaad e com ameaça que estes representam para o país, o CS reiterou a sua determinação em apoiar os esforços na luta a favor dos processos de paz e estabilidade no país, de acordo com o direito aplicável, o direito internacional dos direitos humanos, lei dos refugiados e o direito internacional humanitário. Assim sendo, reconhecendo a importância da United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) no processo político, no processo de paz e de reconciliação do Governo Federal da Somália, no que diz respeito à conclusão da formação estadual e da revisão constitucional, bem como à preparação de um processo eleitoral inclusivo, gratuito justo e transparente, o CS decidiu, pela resolução S/RES/2275 (2016) de 24 de março de 2016, prorrogar o mandato da UNSOM até 31 de março de 2017, a fim de que, para além do que já foi acima referido, seja possível prosseguir as tentativas de manutenção da sua presença em todas as capitais das administrações regionais provisórias, para apoiar estrategicamente todos os aspetos políticos e as reformas a nível da segurança (United Nations. Security Council, 2016f, p. 2).

Não se centrando apenas em África, apesar de ter vindo a ser esse o seu objeto de trabalho principal, Angola, enquanto Presidente do Conselho, aprovou outras duas resoluções: uma ligada à questão Afegã e outra relativa a República Popular da Coreia.

Antes de partir para a sua missão pela África Ocidental, o CS, reafirmando que a proliferação de armas nucleares, químicas e biológicas, bem como os seus meios de entrega, constituem uma ameaça para a paz e segurança internacionais, adotou a 2 de Março, uma resolução (S/RES/2270 (2016)) com vista a reprovar os testes nucleares e

balísticos da Coreia do Norte, aplicando sanções ao país (United Nations. Security Council, 2016b, p. 1). Com esta resolução, o Conselho de Segurança decidiu, entre outras, que:

- A República Popular da Coreia devia abandonar todos os produtos químicos e biológicos, todos os programas relacionados com armamento e passar a atuar de acordo com as normas e obrigações da Convenção sobre a Proibição do Desenvolvimento, Produção e Armazenamento de Armas Químicas e sua Destruição;
- A República Popular da Coreia ficava proibida de fornecer, vender ou transferir, direta ou indiretamente, a partir do seu território, pelos seus nacionais e recorrendo a navios ou aeronaves com bandeira coreana, produtos como carvão ou ferro, ficando os restantes Estados e os seus nacionais proibidos de adquirir qualquer produto originário da RPC;
- Os Estados deviam proibir, no seu território, a abertura e funcionamento de novas agências, balcões e escritórios de representação de bancos da RPC;
- Os Estados estavam proibidos de dar apoio financeiro público e privado, dentro do seu território ou por pessoas ou entidades sujeitas à sua jurisdição, ao comércio com a RPC, bem como de conceder crédito, garantias ou seguros para os seus nacionais ou outras entidades que se pudesse traduzir num qualquer tipo de contributo a programas ligados à construção de mísseis nucleares ou balísticos da RPC;
- Todos os Estados deviam impedir a venda ou o fornecimento, pelos seus nacionais ou a partir dos seus territórios, de combustível para a aviação (para aeronaves, de tipo *naphtha* para aviões a jato, de querosene para aviões a jato e de tipo querosene para *rockets*), originário ou não do seu território, para o território da RPC, a menos que o Comité tenha aprovado antecipadamente a transferência de tais produtos para necessidades humanitárias essenciais verificadas;

A 24 de março, o CS aprovou uma nova resolução (S / RES / 2276 (2016)), ainda relativamente à questão da RPC, com a qual decidiu prorrogar, até 24 de Abril de 2017, o mandato do Painel de Peritos, para que este pudesse continuar a acompanhar e garantir o cumprimento efetivo das sanções impostas na resolução anterior. (United Nations. Security Council, 2016g)

Relativamente ao Afeganistão, O CS aprovou (também no dia 15 de março) a resolução S / 2016/218, em que é renovado o mandato da United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) até 17 de Março de 2017, uma vez que se reconheceu o apoio que esta missão deu ao governo, nos seus esforços de melhoria dos aspetos mais críticos, incluindo a segurança, a gestão governativa, o desenvolvimento económico e a cooperação regional, bem como de apoio ao cumprimento integral dos compromissos mútuos assumidos relativamente a estas questões na Conferência de Londres, em Janeiro de 2011, e na Conferência de Cabul, em Julho de 2010 (United Nations. Security Council, 2016e, p. 9). Assim sendo, foi declarado que:

- A UNAMA, juntamente com o Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral, devia continuar a liderar e coordenar os esforços civis internacionais, tendo como prioridades o apoio ao Governo Afegão, no que diz respeito ao processo eleitoral; apoiar o Escritório das Nações Unidas do Alto Comissário dos Direitos Humanos, no fortalecimento das capacidades da Comissão Independente de Direitos Humanos do Afeganistão (AIHRC), no sentido de monitorizar a situação dos civis e promover os direitos das mulheres;
- O CS apoia o Governo do Afeganistão, em particular, as forças afegãs de defesa nacional e de segurança na luta contra o terrorismo e extremismo violento, bem como na luta contra a ameaça à segurança e à estabilidade do Afeganistão representado pelos talibãs (Al-Qaeda e Rede Haggani) e outros grupos armados ilegais;
- O CS condenou todos os ataques realizados com dispositivos explosivos, os ataques suicidas, os assassinatos e raptos, que afetaram civis e forças afegãs e internacionais, assim como o efeito negativo surtido por tais ações nos esforços de estabilização, reconstrução e desenvolvimento do Afeganistão;
- O CS também condena o fluxo contínuo de armas (de pequena dimensão e ligeiras), bem como de equipamentos militares e componentes IED para os Talibãs, expressando a sua preocupação quanto ao impacto desestabilizador de tais armas na segurança e estabilidade do Afeganistão;
- Todos os estados e partes do conflito armado tinham, em consonância com o direito internacional humanitário, a obrigação de respeitar e proteger as pessoas envolvidas nas questões humanitárias, nomeadamente, pessoal

médico e pessoal humanitário exclusivamente envolvidos em tarefas médicas. Os seus meios de transporte, equipamentos, hospitais e outras instalações médicas, não deviam ser atacados, para garantir que os feridos e doentes recebessem, tanto quanto possível e com o mínimo atraso possível, todos os cuidados e atenção necessários, sendo que os responsáveis por tais violações e abusos deveriam ser responsabilizados por tais ações.

4. CONCLUSÃO

Eugénio da Costa Almeida, num seu ensaio (que contribuiu e muito para esta apresentação) intitulado “Angola, País Regional em Emergência”, de 2011, perguntava o “que falta a Angola para ser quase uma potência regional completa, se tem poder militar, projeta política e ideologicamente a sua visão organizacional, ou seja, quase um hard power, além de ser uma clara potência emergente economicamente, embora, naturalmente, ainda se sintam os naturais problemas de crescimento de quem acabou de sair de uma guerra. [...] Como se irá projetar no futuro a visão diplomática de conciliador e pacificador que África tem de Angola [...]?” (2011. p. 161).

Passados seis anos desde esta pergunta, a resposta é-nos dada acompanhando todo o trajeto diplomático realizado por Angola, desde a sua independência até aos dias de hoje. A situação interna do país continua conturbada e complicada e, a meu ver, não está em conformidade com o enorme prestígio que o país tem alcançado, na arena internacional. Contudo, por não ser esta a questão em análise, decidi não me expandir sobre esta problemática, ao longo desta apresentação.

Angola passou por uma ocupação colonial, várias guerras civis (antes e depois da independência), mas (não obstante o atraso no desenvolvimento que estas crises motivaram) não se inibiu, como já referi, de ocupar o seu espaço no sistema internacional. Angola passou a deter uma grande responsabilidade no seio da União Africana, nas organizações sub-regionais (SADC, CPLP, CEEAC, CEDEAO) e nos restantes parceiros internacionais, uma vez que passou a servir de exemplo para os mesmos, no que diz respeito à superação das crises pela via pacífica e à sua emergência internacional.

Angola conseguiu assumir um papel importante no continente africano, no que diz respeito às operações de *peacekeeping* porque, de uma maneira muito subtil, usou todos os mecanismos possíveis para evitar o uso da força na resolução de conflitos. Angola investiu muito na diplomacia, nas suas mais amplas vertentes, e também através da priorização da realização de encontros frequentes, entre os líderes regionais, para a resolução de conflitos (Carvalho, 2014, p 34).

Este reconhecimento, por parte dos seus parceiros africanos, levou a que os mesmos confiassem ao país os comandos da resolução dos seus problemas no Conselho de Segurança, tal como abordado no subcapítulo 3.2 desta apresentação.

Como referem os autores Silva, António e Godinho, para os membros não permanentes do Conselho de Segurança, o cumprimento do mandato de dois anos naquele órgão constitui um momento histórico e de grande responsabilidade. Referem também que, para a maioria dos países, o ciclo de rotação completa chega a atingir os 30 anos, sendo que só depois desse ciclo se torna possível voltar a integrar o conselho de segurança. No caso de Angola, passados 10 anos desde o seu primeiro mandato, foi possível integrar novamente (e com grande notoriedade) este grande grupo internacional (2014, p. 395). Fazer parte do Conselho de Segurança, para além de constituir uma ocasião de muita visibilidade e também uma oportunidade de aperfeiçoamento dos mecanismos de funcionamento da máquina diplomática de um país, é também uma posição de muita exigência para os respetivos países, uma vez que são confrontados com inúmeras crises e ameaças à paz, ao mesmo tempo que se passam a encontrar sob imensa pressão, sendo alvo das mais variadas solicitações por parte dos outros estados, sobretudo dos mais influentes (Silva, António e Godinho, 2014, p. 395-396).

Tanto antes como depois de assumir a liderança do Conselho de Segurança, Angola trabalhou juntamente com os seus parceiros na resolução de variadas questões relacionadas com a manutenção da paz, nos mais diversos cenários em todo o mundo.

No primeiro ano do seu mandato, Angola participou na missão do CS no Haiti, que ocorreu de 23 a 25 de janeiro de 2015, tendo o Conselho destacado a necessidade de se alcançar uma abordagem inclusiva e um clima construtivo para a estabilidade política, a fim de se prevenirem os conflitos; reafirmou o seu apoio ao Haiti e a necessidade de todos os atores políticos do país trabalharem em conjunto para um processo eleitoral eficaz; avaliou os esforços e reconheceu os progressos realizados pela Polícia Nacional do Haiti, no sentido de promover a estabilidade e a segurança no país (UN, Security Council, 2015a).

Na missão do CS que se realizou de 9 a 13 de março de 2015, na República Centro-Africana, Burundi e Etiópia, Angola atuou como líder da missão, ao lado da França, e contribuiu, no âmbito dos esforços internacionais, para a procura de soluções exequíveis, por via do diálogo, tendo, em consonância com os seus parceiros, reconhecido e elogiado os esforços realizados pelo Burundi na conquista da paz e o seu contributo para as Nações Unidas na manutenção da paz na República Centro-Africana e na Somália (UN, Security Council, 2015b).

Não foram, de um modo geral, poucos os desafios colocados durante este mandato. A resolução dos conflitos (bem como a forma que assumiram) não depende única e exclusivamente de um ou dois países, sendo necessária a existência de uma vontade conjunta, para que os problemas sejam resolvidos e ultrapassados - foi este um dos principais aspetos com que Angola se deparou neste período.

Nem todos vêm com bons olhos o estado de paz, principalmente por questões económicas. Enquanto existirem interesses que se sobrepõem à paz, viveremos sempre em constante clima de conflito, por mais boa vontade e por mais meios de pacificação que possam ser utilizados.

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ANEXO A

Programa do Conselho de Segurança em Março de 2016

Provisional Programme of Work of the Security Council – March 2016 (as of 29 March 2016)

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
29 February	1 March <i>PR breakfast (bilateral on request)</i> 12.30 P. M. - Coordinators' meeting <hr/> <u>Consultations (P.M.)</u> - Programme of work	2 Adoption (A.M.) - Non-proliferation (DPRK) - South Sudan sanctions <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - UNSMIL - Libya sanctions <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - UNSMIL - Libya sanctions <hr/>	3 <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - Middle East <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - Middle East (Yemen) <hr/> <i>South Sudan sanctions mandate ends</i>	4	5	6
7	8 <i>UNAMA report due</i>	9 <i>MONUSCO report due</i> <i>PSC Framework report due</i>	10 <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - Peace-keeping operations: sexual exploitation and abuse <i>MINUSTAH report due</i>	11 <u>Adoption (P.M.)</u> - Peace-keeping operations: sexual exploitation and abuse	12	13
14 <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - Non-proliferation <hr/> <u>Consultations (P.M.)</u> - Middle East (Syria)	15 <u>Adoption (A.M.)</u> - UNSMIL <u>Debate (A.M.)</u> - UNAMA <hr/> <i>UNSMIL mandate ends</i>	16 <u>TCC meeting (A.M.)</u> - MINUSTAH <u>Briefing (11:00 A.M.)</u> - SC mission <hr/> <u>TCC meeting (P.M.)</u> - MONUSCO <u>Consultations (4:00 P.M.)</u> - 1701 report	17 <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - UNMIL <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - UNMIL <hr/> <u>Consultations (2 P.M.)</u> - Western Sahara <u>Adoption (P.M.)</u> - UNMISS <u>Debate (P.M.)</u> - MINUSTAH <i>UNAMA mandate ends</i>	18 <hr/> <u>Briefing (P.M.)</u> - Burundi <u>Consultations (P.M.)</u> - Burundi - Non-Proliferation/ DPRK	19	20
21 <u>Open Debate (A.M.)</u> - Maintenance of international peace and security: prevention and resolution of conflicts in the Great Lakes region <hr/> <i>SG luncheon</i> <i>UNDOF report due</i>	22 <i>2139 report due</i>	23 <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - MONUSCO <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - MONUSCO <hr/> <u>Consultations (P.M.)</u> - Middle East (Syria)	24 <u>Adoption (A.M.)</u> - UNSOM <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - Middle East <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - Middle East <hr/> <i>UNAMID report due</i>	25 <i>UN Official Holiday</i>	26	27
28 <u>Open Debate (A.M.)</u> - Women and peace and security: the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution in Africa <hr/> <i>OPCW report due</i>	29 <i>MINUSMA report due</i>	30 <u>Adoption (A.M.)</u> - MONUSCO <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - Middle East <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - Middle East (Syria) <hr/> <u>Consultations (P.M.)</u> - UNDOF <i>UNSOM mandate ends</i>	31 <u>Adoption (A.M.)</u> - Libya <u>Briefing (A.M.)</u> - UNMISS <u>Consultations (A.M.)</u> - UNMISS <i>End of Presidency reception</i> <hr/> <i>Iraq escrow account report</i> <i>UNOCI report due</i> <i>PBC review due</i> <i>Libya sanctions mandate ends</i> <i>MONUSCO mandate ends</i> <i>ICTY judges mandate ends</i>	1 April	2	3

ANEXO B

Relatório da Missão do Conselho de Segurança no Mali, Guiné-Bissau e
Senegal



Security Council

Distr.: General
11 May 2016

Original: English

Report of the Security Council mission to Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal

I. Introduction

1. In a letter dated 10 February 2016, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had decided to send a mission to West Africa (Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal). The composition of the mission and its terms of reference were communicated to the Secretary-General on 3 March 2016 in a letter from the President of the Council ([S/2016/215](#)) and are set out in annexes I and II to the present report. The Mali leg of the mission was led by the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, François Delattre, and the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, Fodé Seck. The Guinea-Bissau leg of the mission was co-led by the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations, Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins, and Mr. Seck. The Senegal leg of the mission was led by Mr. Gaspar Martins.

II. Mali

A. Background

2. The Security Council mission was the third Council visit to Mali following its visits in October 2000 (see [S/2000/992](#)) and February 2014 (see [S/2014/173](#)). Its primary purpose, in line with the press statement by the Council dated 12 January 2016, was to reiterate the Council's call for urgent and concrete progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and to assess the increased level of insecurity, including in central and southern Mali. The mission was further aimed at assessing progress in the implementation of Council resolution 2227 (2015), notably the supervision of the ceasefire arrangements, the provision of good offices and reconciliation support, stabilization and the protection of civilians, and the protection, safety and security of United Nations personnel, in addition to the progress and challenges in the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The mission liaised with the full complement of representatives of the Government of Mali, women's groups, the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) and the Platform coalition of armed groups and the international community.



B. Meetings in Bamako, Mopti and Timbuktu

3. Upon their arrival in Bamako, on 4 March, the members of the Security Council were welcomed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and African Integration, Abdoulaye Diop, and representatives of MINUSMA and the diplomatic community. On 5 March, the members met the Prime Minister, Modibo Keita, in Bamako before travelling to Mopti, where they met local authorities and MINUSMA representatives. Later that day in Timbuktu, the members met the Governor of Timbuktu and other local officials, as well as imams of the region and MINUSMA representatives. Upon their return to Bamako, the members received a briefing from MINUSMA on security trends and threats in Mali and the Sahel and participated in a dinner reception attended by representatives of the Government, MINUSMA, political parties, the Platform, CMA, international financial institutions, international non-governmental organizations and the international community, including MINUSMA troop-contributing countries and the United Nations country team.

4. On 6 March in Bamako, the members of the Security Council were briefed, successively, by representatives of the French Operation Barkhane, the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces, the MINUSMA leadership and the international mediation team. They then held a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and African Integration and representatives of the Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action and Reconstruction of the North, the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children and Family, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry for National Reconciliation, the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. At MINUSMA headquarters, they met representatives of the Platform and CMA in a joint meeting, and MINUSMA, the United Nations country team and the extended troika of development partners in Mali hosted a lunch reception for the members. They also met the political parties of the presidential majority and, separately, opposition political parties. The members then met the President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and, after a press conference, participated in a dinner reception hosted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and African Integration.

C. Key issues raised

1. Meetings with the President and the Prime Minister

5. In his meeting with the members of the Security Council, the President of Mali recognized the need for the specific and speedy implementation of the peace agreement. He also noted the need to make compromises and reach consensus among all the parties based on a relationship of trust that needed to be strengthened and nurtured. He highlighted some of the recent steps taken to implement institutional reforms, such as the creation of two new regions in northern Mali and the launch of a constitutional reform process. He informed the Council of plans for the three signatories to the agreement, who had met in Bamako on 27 February, to develop and agree on, within the coming two months, a new timeline for the implementation of the agreement. On security sector reform, he explained that Mali was on the path of recovery and that, for the sustainability of peace and security, particular attention would need to be given to the strengthening of the armed forces,

including their training and equipment. While acknowledging the problem of corruption in Mali, he urged the international community to fulfil the pledges made at the high-level international conference for the economic recovery and development of Mali, held in Paris on 22 October 2015. He expressed his appreciation for the work of MINUSMA and his desire to jointly reflect on how the Mission could better address security threats. He called for an extensive review of the mandate of the Mission, including the strengthening of its capacities, so that it would be adapted to the current context, in which MINUSMA had become a prime target of terrorist attacks.

6. The Prime Minister highlighted that Malian expectations were high and that the success of the peace agreement would be measured through the specific improvement of living conditions. He noted the areas of progress and the actions of the Government for the further implementation of the agreement, adding that insecurity remained a significant obstacle. He deplored the numerous violent attacks against national and international forces in Mali and advocated additional support in the reform and strengthening of the armed forces. Regarding cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, delays in those processes could cause elements of the signatory armed groups to be tempted to join the ranks of terrorist groups, he said.

7. The members of the Security Council emphasized to the Prime Minister, as with the President and other government interlocutors, the need to implement the peace agreement concretely and speedily. They suggested a particular focus on decentralization and the interim administrative authorities in the north, local elections, cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, reconciliation and combating impunity.

2. Implementation of the peace agreement

8. In their discussions with the members of the Security Council, the CMA and Platform representatives highlighted the need for them and the Government to accelerate the implementation of the peace agreement. The members of the Council noted that the CMA and Platform armed groups appeared united, attending a single meeting with them. They handed to the members of the Council a joint assessment of the progress made and the challenges faced in the implementation of the peace agreement, highlighting the risk of further delays. The CMA and Platform representatives suggested that increasing the participation and representation of the Malian people in the peace process would not only contribute to reconciliation and advancement in the implementation of the agreement but also prevent radicalization and counter extremism.

9. The members of the international mediation team commended the progress made since the signing of the peace agreement, especially the cessation of hostilities between the signatories and the intercommunal reconciliation, while observing that the security situation had deteriorated owing to the increase, during the same period, in terrorist attacks. They called for the accelerated implementation of the agreement, with an emphasis on the political and security provisions, and warned against the apparent competition between armed groups supporting the agreement and terrorist groups fighting for the agreement not to be implemented.

10. The MINUSMA leadership discussed the recent call for the Mission to develop an exit strategy and the relevance of engaging with the Government on mutual

commitments. In that regard, the MINUSMA leadership stressed the importance of a clear division of labour based on comparative advantages towards the strengthening of the country's own capacity to address the political, security and development challenges that it was facing. The reconciliation meeting announced by the Government, CMA and the Platform, expected to be held in Kidal from 27 to 30 March, was seen by the MINUSMA leadership as a milestone and an opportunity to address, through a nationally owned initiative, challenges in the peace process.

11. The CMA and Platform representatives noted that the National Council on Security Sector Reform was of paramount importance, given that it would provide direction to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and integration processes for which political and institutional reforms were needed. The two coalitions of armed groups explained that, on the basis of past experience, without progress on security sector reform and further clarity on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and integration, further steps relating to the defence and security elements of the peace agreement would be difficult. Meanwhile, MINUSMA representatives stressed the importance of moving forward on security sector reform, including for the purpose of providing a strategic framework for the inclusion of former combatants into State institutions. They highlighted that, while many strands of security sector reform were already in progress, there remained a need for a broader and holistic vision encompassing and linking up those many strands.

12. In the area of army reform, the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces provided a briefing on its activities, including its assistance with the implementation of the military planning law, which was synchronized with those of other actors through the existing strategic and technical security sector reform coordination mechanisms. It also stressed that the future strengthening of the Malian armed forces would need to focus on leadership education and logistics.

13. Lastly, the CMA and the Platform representatives mentioned the reluctance of combatants to engage in a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in the absence of guarantees and commitments as to their future, including with regard to integration into State institutions. They also expressed concerns and reservations at engaging in the cantonment of their combatants while terrorist groups operated in the north of Mali with significant freedom of movement. Recognizing the challenges faced, members of the Security Council reiterated that it was important for the armed groups to provide lists of combatants, which was key to better preparing the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.

3. Security situation

14. Government representatives commented that the mandate of MINUSMA had to be adapted to the current context, in which transnational organized crime and terrorism were the main challenges. The members of the Security Council explained that the strategic review of MINUSMA would provide an analysis of the needs and recommendations on the way forward, including on the mitigation of security threats, which the Council would consider ahead of the renewal of the Mission's mandate. Government representatives also pointed to the need to consider the country's security in the broader context of the Sahel, especially given the

transnational nature of the security threats. They called for better cooperation and coordination with MINUSMA on security issues and for the establishment of a new counter-terrorism force to assist in efforts to combat terrorists in the north of Mali. The establishment of a specialized judicial unit on terrorism and transnational organized crime was highlighted as part of the efforts to tackle those threats.

15. Government representatives in Mopti mentioned the current efforts to deradicalize elements of terrorist groups and requested the assistance of the international community in that regard. Government interlocutors in Timbuktu highlighted insecurity as the priority issue, which persisted despite the implementation of mitigation measures and significantly impaired freedom of movement.

16. The CMA and the Platform representatives also commented on the spread of insecurity towards the central and southern parts of Mali, calling for all stakeholders to counter negative forces together. They added that their combatants were already engaged in efforts to combat terrorism and that, once integrated into State institutions, would foster those efforts. They deplored the delays in the implementation of the peace agreement, which they assessed as providing opportunities for terrorists to strengthen and better organize themselves. They added that, alongside military options, other approaches should be considered in countering negative forces in Mali.

17. MINUSMA representatives explained that the Mission was already contributing to efforts aimed at preventing or countering terrorism, including by building the capacity of Malian institutions and patrolling. They expressed the hope that Operation Barkhane would continue to operate until the threat of terrorism had been sufficiently reduced and Malian capacities sufficiently strengthened.

18. The representative of Operation Barkhane in Mali provided a briefing on its counter-terrorist activities and highlighted the challenge of distinguishing between the various compliant and non-compliant armed groups present in the north. The representative also highlighted the apparent desire of criminal and terrorist groups to destabilize the central area of Mali, including through increased attacks against the defence and security forces and thriving banditry. The representative also commended the realistic and efficient approach of the Group of Five for the Sahel in its actions to combat terrorism.

4. Women and peace and security

19. Women's groups that met the members of the Security Council described the very low participation of women in the peace negotiations in 2013 and 2014-2015 and in the institutions established to implement the peace agreement. They highlighted how discrimination against women was felt in their daily lives and also present in Malian legislative texts. The issues of women's access to justice, education and health, and of women's poverty, were highlighted.

5. Deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

20. Political parties of the presidential majority advocated the strengthening of the military and police capacities of MINUSMA in the areas in which they were currently deployed. They handed to the members of the Security Council a

document that contained an analysis of the implementation of the peace agreement, together with recommendations on the role and mandate of MINUSMA. Also highlighted therein was the deterioration of the security situation in Mali, with a call made for greater support from MINUSMA, especially in efforts to combat terrorism.

21. MINUSMA representatives highlighted the current difficulties in delivering on the Mission's existing mandate and on the overstretch of resources and assets, especially military. The multiplicity of tasks and continuous violent attacks against the Mission were limiting the ability of MINUSMA to implement its mandate, which most senior staff viewed as sufficiently robust, but there was a need for additional or improved resources and assets for the Mission to accomplish its tasks effectively. They stressed the need for deficits in training and equipment, in particular in terms of armoured vehicles, to be addressed urgently and to further enhance the capacities and assets of MINUSMA contingents. Lastly, they called for budgetary and administrative procedures deemed slow or ineffective to be reviewed in the light of their negative impact on the further operations and security of the Mission and its personnel.

22. MINUSMA representatives in Mopti and Timbuktu pointed to the dichotomy between the tasks given to the Mission and the resources allocated. The members of the Security Council noted the specific governance, security and development opportunities and challenges faced by the region of Mopti, which were characteristic of the issues at the heart of the mandate of MINUSMA. Those challenges included a deterioration in the security situation, owing mainly to terrorist attacks, criminal activities and intercommunal violence, and in the socioeconomic situation, as evidenced by a decrease in economic activities and the closure of almost a quarter of the schools.

D. Observations

23. The members of the Security Council noted the progress made in the implementation of the peace agreement, but called upon the signatory parties to implement it concretely and as swiftly as possible, with the support of the members of the Agreement Monitoring Committee. They supported the development by the parties of timelines for the implementation of the agreement, in coordination with Committee and other key partners.

24. The members of the Security Council expressed concern at the lack of inclusiveness of the peace process, especially with regard to the inclusion and representation of women, disenfranchised young people and individuals at risk of recruitment by negative forces. They expressed the belief that a more inclusive process was key to more sustainable solutions and reconciliation, and to averting further tensions or a relapse into conflict.

25. The members of the Security Council noted that, as part of the implementation of the peace agreement, the most pressing issues appeared to be related to decentralization and the interim administrative authorities in the north, local elections, cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, reconciliation, efforts to combat impunity, stabilization and counter-terrorism.

26. More specifically, the members of the Security Council strongly encouraged the signatory parties to the peace agreement and the country's partners to support further progress in the security sector reform, cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, which were highlighted by most interlocutors as crucial confidence-building and enabling processes linked to other aspects of the agreement. They recognized the political, institutional, governance, security, development and reconciliation deficits at the heart of the crisis in Mali and the contribution that the security sector reform, cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes could make to addressing some of those root causes.

27. The members of the Security Council took note of the ongoing strategic review of MINUSMA and looked forward to its findings and recommendations ahead of the discussions on the renewal of the Mission's mandate. In that context, they noted the calls by many stakeholders, including the Government, for a revision of the role, posture and capacities of MINUSMA to ensure that its direction, priorities, configuration, internal organization and strength and assets were adapted to the new environment.

28. The members of the Security Council supported the proposal for MINUSMA and the Government to agree on mutual commitments and a division of labour towards the strengthening of the country's capacity to address the political, security and development challenges.

29. The members of the Security Council expressed serious concern at the deterioration of the security situation, especially in the central and northern areas, and strongly condemned the violent attacks against civilians, government institutions, armed groups, MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane. In that context, they discussed the relevance of creating a more structured coalition against insecurity to better identify the contributions, comparative advantages, complementarity, coordination and information-sharing mechanisms for the actions of MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane, the Malian defence and security forces, CMA and the Platform to tackle insecurity.

30. The members of the Security Council also noted the deficits that MINUSMA contingents still suffered from and expressed commitment to ensuring that MINUSMA reached its full operational capacity, including in terms of training and equipment, without further delay.

31. The members of the Security Council noted the regional and transnational nature of many of the challenges facing Mali and expressed concern at the role that organized criminal and terrorist groups in Mali played in the destabilization of West Africa and the Sahel. They encouraged all stakeholders to continue and, if possible, increase their involvement in and support for regional and subregional mechanisms and processes, including the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Nouakchott Process on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan region, with a particular emphasis on information-sharing, border security and management and community-focused initiatives.

32. The members of the Security Council took note of the call for the fulfilment of the pledges made at the high-level international conference for the economic recovery and development of Mali, held on 22 October 2015, and called upon all

partners to honour those commitments without delay. They also encouraged the Government to make progress on the creation of dedicated strategies, funds and zones for the development of the north.

III. Guinea-Bissau

A. Background

33. This was the third Security Council mission to Guinea-Bissau since its previous visits, in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The primary purpose of the visit on 7 March 2016 was to meet and gather first-hand information from the main sovereign organs of the State and to deliver key messages to national stakeholders. The mission was also aimed at assessing the situation on the ground in a context of political tensions that had intensified since August 2015, with the dismissal of the first Government following the general elections of 2014. The visit provided an opportunity for the Council to express concern about the political tensions and to call for continued respect for the rule of law and the promotion of dialogue to resolve the political impasse.

B. Meetings in Bissau

34. The schedule of the mission altered as a result of the mission's delayed arrival owing to heavy fog. Upon their arrival in Bissau, the members of the Security Council received a briefing package on the security situation in the country from the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). Thereafter, the delegation proceeded to the government palace, where the two co-leads briefly met the Prime Minister, Carlos Correia, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Artur Silva, before joining the rest of the delegation for a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister with several members of his Government, including the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Affairs, Defence, Justice, and Social Communication. The members subsequently met, separately, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Cipriano Cassamá; the President of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC), Domingos Simões Pereira; and the Vice-President of the major opposition party, the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), Certorio Biote, on behalf of the party's President, who was abroad at the time of the meeting. The final meeting was held at the presidential palace with the President, José Mário Vaz. At the end of the visit, a press stakeout was held at the airport by the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau and Head of UNIOGBIS, Miguel Trovoadá.

35. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General accompanied the members of the Security Council at all meetings. The planned encounters with civil society, members of the United Nations and the diplomatic corps had to be cancelled as a result of the delayed arrival of the mission in Bissau.

C. Key issues raised

1. Political situation

36. In their meetings with the national authorities and political parties, the members of the Security Council voiced their concern about the risks of continuing political instability in the country and expressed their full support for the authorities to resolve the political issues and ensure stability. They appealed to the main conflicting parties to make all efforts to resolve their political grievances and differences and show flexibility in doing so. They recalled the political and socioeconomic advances made following the successful general elections in 2014, which should not be reversed, including the pledges made by international partners at the international conference held in Brussels in March 2015.

37. The members of the Security Council called upon the President of Guinea-Bissau to keep in mind the regional implications of a continuing impasse. They requested him to finalize the formation of a complete cabinet by appointing the remaining two ministers, the Minister of Natural Resources and the Minister of Internal Administration. They also stressed the importance of respecting the rule of law to resolve the crisis, noting that politicians were also subject to the rule of law. They appealed to national stakeholders to reach a permanent agreement, through dialogue, towards an inclusive, functional government to implement key reforms, including in the defence, security and justice sectors. They also emphasized the benefits of political participation and multiparty systems in democratic processes.

38. The President expressed his commitment to overcoming all institutional challenges in the country and promoting reconciliation and the good functioning of State institutions. He was of the view that the current crisis was political in nature and therefore required a political solution. The legal path would only complement political efforts and should not be the sole approach. Relying on the courts alone would further undermine the situation and risk politicizing the judiciary. He gave assurances of his commitment to respecting the decisions of the judiciary, citing his acceptance of the ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice regarding the unconstitutional nature of the presidential decree appointing the third Vice-President of PAIGC, Baciroté, as the Prime Minister. Everyone had to abide by the law; no one was above the law.

39. The Prime Minister stressed that Guinea-Bissau had operated a multiparty system since 1994, with about 40 political parties. He recalled the semi-presidential nature of the political system, involving the President, the Head of Government and the Speaker of the National Assembly as among the main sovereign organs. Following its victory in the most recent legislative elections in 2014, with 57 seats, PAIGC had formed an inclusive Government, offering six cabinet positions to PRS and one each to the remaining three parties represented in the parliament. In that favourable context, the Government, the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme had co-hosted an international conference in support of Guinea-Bissau in Brussels 2015, at which donors had pledged \$1.2 billion in response to the Government's request for \$500 million.

40. However, that positive momentum had not precluded the dismissal by the President of the Government of Mr. Simões Pereira in August 2015. Subsequently, the President had taken a presidential initiative, appointing the third Vice-President of PAIGC as the new Prime Minister, without the approval of the party. The

Supreme Court of Justice had subsequently declared the presidential decree appointing Mr. Djá as unconstitutional. Consequently, following the resignation of the Prime Minister and his Government, the President had requested PAIGC to nominate another candidate. Mr. Correia, as the party's first Vice-President, had accepted the nomination and thereafter formed a new Government in October 2015. He concluded that, given that the National Assembly and the Government were functioning, currently there was no political crisis.

41. The Speaker of the National Assembly also denied that the country was going through a political crisis. He emphasized that the initial crisis had begun with the dismissal of the Government of Mr. Simões Pereira, against all expectations. He outlined the major political events following the dismissal, in particular, the appointment of Mr. Djá as Prime Minister, the above-mentioned decision of the Supreme Court of Justice, the debates at the National Assembly on the Government's programme and the situation of the 15 parliamentarians who had been expelled from PAIGC.

42. Furthermore, he deemed the incomplete nature of the Government of the Prime Minister a result of the "direct intervention" of the President, whom he blamed for being responsible for the impasse, adding that the President had wished to dismiss the current Government and exert executive power, in common with his counterparts in the subregion.

43. In the interest of time, the leader of PAIGC handed over the following documents to the members of the Security Council: the party's counterproposal to the President's draft political agreement, the party's initial observations on the proposed document and the party's correspondence on the consultation process. He recalled the inclusive approach of PAIGC following the elections in 2014, which had enabled the party to bring all political forces together in the Government and to promote concerted solutions to the country's problems. He highlighted that the main concern for his party was that the law should be respected and democratic and State institutions reinforced, thence the importance for national actors to abide by the decisions of the courts.

44. Members of the Security Council expressed the hope that national stakeholders would agree on a final solution to their problems, within the Constitution, to avoid an escalation of the situation and a negative impact on the population. They wondered whether PAIGC was ready to make a political compromise to that end.

45. The leader of PAIGC expressed his party's readiness to consider making the necessary compromise, including the formation of an inclusive Government with PRS, provided that all parties would abide by the law. For him, that PAIGC had accepted the dismissal of his Government was evidence that the party was acting in good faith and respecting the law and State institutions, as was the nomination of Mr. Correia for the position of Prime Minister instead of the party leader. He described his party's efforts to reach out to PRS and the President to discuss specific proposals. He called for the President to respect the outcome of the elections of 2014 and to allow PAIGC to lead the Government.

46. Speaking on behalf of the President of the party, the Vice-President of PRS noted that during the electoral process of 2014, his party had consistently promoted peace and stability and expressed its readiness to form an inclusive government in case of victory. Consequently, PRS had joined the inclusive Government of

Mr. Simões Pereira following the victory of PAIGC. He deplored the fact that PAIGC had not proposed a political agreement towards the formation of the Government of Mr. Correia and had allegedly sought to buy the conscience of members of PRS, instead. For that reason, PRS had not agreed to join the new Government.

47. For PRS, even though PAIGC was holding the presidency, the Government and the majority in the National Assembly, its internal divisions, which remained a chronic problem, were at the root of the current crisis. He emphasized his party's commitment to overcoming the impasse, while noting its willingness to have a political framework whereby PAIGC would rule the country as the party with the most votes in the legislative elections of 2014.

2. Situation at the National Assembly

48. The members of the Security Council praised national efforts to conduct successful elections where the people were able to freely express their votes to elect their representatives at the National Assembly, deserving the confidence of the international community.

49. The President of Guinea-Bissau stated that the non-approval of the Government's programme on 23 December had been the result of a severe crisis in the country. PAIGC had expelled 15 parliamentarians from the party and requested the National Assembly to remove their mandates and replace them with others who would vote in favour of the programme, which had been accepted by the Permanent Commission of the Assembly. The decision by the Commission to withdraw the parliamentary mandates had had a negative impact on the functioning of the parliament.

50. The Prime Minister spoke to justify the decision of the Permanent Commission to remove the parliamentary mandate of the 15 former PAIGC members, after the latter had joined PRS and abstained from voting in favour of the Government's programme in December 2015. According to the statutes of PAIGC, candidates in legislative elections were proposed and supported by the party. In addition, before doing so, they had to declare that they would accept the conditions of the party and support it. By deciding not to support the Government's programme, the 15 parliamentarians had lost both the party's support and membership. Furthermore, the electoral law did not provide for independent candidates in legislative elections.

51. The Speaker of the National Assembly stressed that, on the basis of the statutes of the National Assembly and the Constitution (copies of which he handed over to the members of the Security Council), the Assembly had sought the legal opinion of its ethical commission and thereafter concluded that the 15 parliamentarians were no longer meeting the eligibility requirements contained in the electoral law necessary to maintain their seats. He claimed that the President and the 15 expelled parliamentarians had enticed a judge of the Regional Court of Bissau to make a second ruling contradicting a previous decision of the same court in favour of PAIGC.

52. He recalled that the second debate on the Government's programme had been held on 18 January and been disrupted by the 15 former PAIGC members and PRS. The debate had eventually resumed on 28 January, with the adoption of the programme, in the absence of the above-mentioned 15 individuals and PRS.

53. He also indicated that, at the request of PAIGC, the National Assembly had created a commission of inquiry to investigate the veracity of the crimes, including corruption, nepotism and misuse of State revenue, alleged by the President. The report of the commission would be discussed at the next session of the Assembly. He alleged that the President was concerned that the commission would instead reveal his or his supporters' wrongdoing.

54. The PAIGC leader, for his part, observed that the competent institution to resolve the case of the 15 individuals was the Supreme Court of Justice. He suggested that, if the 15 former parliamentarians were committed to promoting peace and dialogue, they should go to court and present all their arguments to make their case. PAIGC could reconsider its position, should the 15 individuals so request and apologize for their actions.

55. The Vice-President of PRS underscored the key position of his party at the National Assembly with 41 seats. He justified his party's current standing at the Assembly, highlighting the alleged failure of the Prime Minister to meet the legal deadlines for submitting the Government's programme to a second vote. He added that PAIGC had lost the legal process in court and was not respecting the court decision.

3. Dialogue

56. The members of the Security Council consistently called for national stakeholders to remain committed to genuine political dialogue to resolve the impasse and deliver on the electoral promises made to the people of Guinea-Bissau.

57. The President of Guinea-Bissau informed the members about the consultation process that he had initiated, following a request from the Speaker of the National Assembly, to help to resolve the crisis. The consultations had involved all major stakeholders in the country, namely, the Assembly, political parties with and without parliamentary seats and civil society, and been held in the presence of the international community (the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union and the United Nations). In their wake, he had subsequently held several bilateral, consultative and joint meetings with the parties in conflict to reach an agreement towards governance stability until the completion of the current legislature. Consequently, he had proposed a draft parliamentary political agreement. All parties had commented on the draft, but their proposals had yet to be harmonized, as initially planned. He undertook to make all efforts to promote common understanding among national stakeholders and ensure stable governance.

58. The Speaker of the National Assembly stressed that, because the 15 former PAIGC militants had been expelled from the party, they lacked the institutional legitimacy necessary to participate alongside institutions in the consultation process launched by the President of Guinea-Bissau. PAIGC had already protested against the format of the consultations, requesting them to be held at the level of State institutions, including the Presidency, the Government and the Assembly. He insisted that he would not take part in any dialogue at the same level as the 15 expelled parliamentarians, and said that the President should have referred the case of those 15 individuals to the Supreme Court of Justice instead.

59. The leader of PAIGC reiterated his party's continued availability to engage in dialogue with political parties and other institutions to find a lasting solution to the current situation. In common with the Prime Minister and the Speaker, he rejected the format of the consultations promoted by the President, which should remain at the level of State institutions. Notwithstanding the situation, PAIGC had presented a counterproposal to the President's initial draft political agreement.

60. The Vice-President of PRS insisted on the need for profound national dialogue to bring Guinea-Bissau out of the crisis, and assured the members of the Security Council of his party's commitment to continuing to give priority to dialogue for the good of the country.

4. Security, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and human rights

61. The members of the Security Council underscored the possible negative consequences of the crisis on the security environment and the people of Guinea-Bissau, as well as the importance of improving the population's living conditions, while recalling the regional peace and security context. They insisted on the importance of patrolling the border to respond to the threat of transnational organized crime networks. They pointed to the risk of the worsening of transnational threats, such as drug trafficking, and even the possibility of extremist terrorist groups taking advantage of the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

62. The members of the Security Council reiterated their support for the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), to contribute to enhancing security in the country. They also recalled the financial contribution of the European Union to secure the operationalization of ECOMIB.

63. The Prime Minister welcomed the support of ECOMIB and assured the members of the Security Council that his country was planning for the reform of the defence and security sectors, calling for the support of the international community in that regard. He underscored that a specific financial package would be necessary to secure the demobilization and reintegration phase of the reform. He insisted that the military were anxious and ready to demobilize and return to civilian life, provided that they received the funds promised.

64. The President of Guinea-Bissau praised his first year in office as having been free from gunshots, killings, beatings and arbitrary arrests. On the contrary, there had been freedom of speech and the press, with the military remaining away from the political sphere.

5. United Nations

65. The President emphasized the important role played by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau and Head of UNIOGBIS and expressed thanks to him for his patience and facilitation efforts in the consultation process towards finding a solution to the crisis. He also welcomed the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNIOGBIS to contribute to the consolidation of the rule of law and democracy and the materialization of the security sector reform. He undertook to make all efforts to transform Guinea-Bissau into a productive partner of the United Nations. In that connection, he asked the members of the Council to consider the return of the country's armed forces to peacekeeping operations, a request also made by the Prime Minister.

66. The Speaker of the National Assembly also commended the Security Council for extending the mandate of UNIOGBIS and called for a redefinition of the mandate to enable the Office to promote the principles of democracy. He also suggested a more interventionist role for UNIOGBIS to implement mandated support to combat drug trafficking and violent extremism.

D. Observations

67. National stakeholders welcomed the visit of the members of the Security Council, which they viewed as a sign of the importance that the Council was attaching to Guinea-Bissau, as well as the Council's commitment to supporting the country's efforts towards stabilization.

68. The members of the Security Council observed that the parties were deeply divided and called upon them to give priority to dialogue in resolving their differences, in line with the country's laws and Constitution. They agreed that the problems of Guinea-Bissau must be solved by the people, highlighting the importance of respecting the rule of law, combating impunity and promoting accountability. Searching for lasting political stability should be a must for the national authorities in order to tackle the problems of the people and respond to their critical needs. That required the Government to play its executive role and the National Assembly to function in accordance with the law. While underscoring that the situation was fragile, the members of the Council acknowledged that, with patience, a commitment to seeking solutions and some flexibility, the political divergences among the political class and the organs of sovereignty could be solved.

IV. Senegal

A. Background

69. On 8 March 2016, the members of the Security Council visited Dakar on the final leg of their mission. The mission was led by the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations. They held first a meeting with the leadership of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), then with the Senegal-based diplomatic corps, which included France (Senegal and the Gambia), China, the Russian Federation (Senegal and the Gambia), Japan (Senegal and the Gambia, Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau), Malaysia (Senegal and the Gambia, Cabo Verde and Burkina Faso), Spain (Senegal), Ukraine and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (several countries). Later, they met the President of Senegal, Macky Sall.

B. Meetings

70. The aim of the visit to UNOWAS was to exchange information on the political and security situation in West Africa and in the Sahel and to be briefed on the level of implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. The mission was further aimed at assessing the implementation of the decision (see [S/2016/89](#)) to merge the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel (OSES). The visit was an opportunity for the members of the Security Council to express their full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa

and the Sahel and welcome the activities of UNOWAS in the framework of its mandate. The meeting with the diplomatic corps was aimed at exchanging information on peace and security challenges in the region and on the Council's visit to Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal.

71. In his remarks, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General described the situation in the subregion and the implementation of the UNOWAS mandate. He highlighted that security challenges and the international community response remained at the heart of the discussions in the region. He noted that, since his arrival at the head of UNOWA, he had witnessed the growing efforts aimed at improving regional coordination and cooperation, such as the African Union Peace and Security Architecture and the Group of Five for the Sahel. He said that there was a greater regional awareness of the vulnerabilities of the countries to terrorism and other security threats, which had fostered a common determination to unify forces.

72. Subsequently, the members of the Security Council held a meeting the President of Senegal in his capacity as Chair of ECOWAS. They interacted with him on the situation in West Africa, expressing interest in his evaluation of issues affecting the region, including the threat of terrorism. He shared his views on the situation in Mali and voiced the need to ensure the territorial integrity of the country. He suggested that MINUSMA should be empowered to perform its mandate in the light of the current violence affecting Mali.

73. Regarding terrorism, he emphasized the transnational nature of the problem and called for the combined efforts of all the international community to support work to combat terrorist groups in the region. He also noted the need for West African countries to develop their capacities to deal with that threat.

74. In response to a request for his views on resolving the crisis in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau, he said that the latter country's semi-presidential system was the main reason for the crisis, given that it had multiple sources of power. He suggested a constitutional review to resolve the situation in the future and urged the authorities to work together until the end of the term of office of the current President.

75. He also emphasized the role of ECOWAS in resolving the crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the financial difficulties facing ECOMIB, which was playing an important role in the maintenance of peace and security. He highlighted the danger of violence if ECOMIB were to leave Guinea-Bissau as a result of financial problems, saying that Senegal allocated an annual budget of \$20 million to support the Mission.

76. He explained that he had been in Burundi on 25 and 26 February as part of the high-level delegation of the African Union, which also comprised the Presidents of Ethiopia, Gabon, Mauritania and South Africa. They had asked the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, to conduct an inclusive dialogue with all Burundian stakeholders, including those who had left the country, and to release all political prisoners.

77. He noted the importance of the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, as facilitator of the inter-Burundian dialogue and of finding ways to reduce tensions with Rwanda. He said that the African Union should lead the negotiations in Burundi and would send 100 military observers and 100 human rights observers to the country after the refusal of the President to accept its proposal to dispatch an

African peacekeeping mission. He requested the Security Council to support the observer mission to Burundi.

C. Key issues raised

1. Elections

78. The Special Representative briefed the members on his good offices activities relating to the elections in Benin and the Niger and the continuing preparations in Cabo Verde. On the elections in Benin, he said that he had just returned from the country, where, after a peaceful campaign, the first round of the presidential elections had been successfully organized. The only contentious issue had been related to the voting cards to be used, given that the biometric cards for 2016 had not been distributed on time. He explained how, on behalf of international partners, including the African Union, ECOWAS, the Council of the Entente, present in Benin to monitor the elections, he had successfully led good offices consultations to resolve a contentious confusion between the Constitutional Court and the National Independent Electoral Commission on the issue. He would, in collaboration with other international partners, continue to carry out his good offices activities in view of the second round of elections on 29 March.

79. In relation to the Niger, he explained that the first round of elections had been held peacefully, notwithstanding the highly complicated situation in which one of the presidential candidates and a former Speaker of the parliament, Hama Amadou, was in prison on charges of trafficking in children. He noted that that matter was mainly legal and that Mr. Amadou's party had thus far exercised restraint and showed a great sense of responsibility. He added that the second round of the elections was scheduled for 20 March and he had a team on the ground and would continue his good offices in that regard. On Cabo Verde, he indicated that he would travel to Praia to meet the President and other key actors in the electoral process to encourage them in the peaceful organization of the elections on 20 March. On the political situation in Senegal, he stressed that Senegal enjoyed a well-deserved reputation as a solid democracy in Africa and that he was encouraging Senegalese actors to conduct a serene debate in view of the referendum of 20 March on constitutional reforms.

2. Terrorism and violent extremism

80. Concerning the security challenges posed by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin area, the Special Representative indicated that he and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa, Abdoulaye Bathily, had conducted a tour of countries affected by Boko Haram. In this connection, they had both visited the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Multinational Joint Task Force headquarters in N'Djamena, where they had been briefed on the progress in relation to the coordination of action among the countries concerned and on the level of deployment of troops. He highlighted that countries had even exceeded the African Union-designated level of 8,500 troops to be deployed for the Task Force. He noted that forces from Cameroon and Nigeria were working jointly to conduct cross-border operations against Boko Haram. He stated that he and the Special Representative for Central Africa had encouraged the States concerned to strengthen their unified front against the asymmetric warfare of Boko Haram and called for

synergy of efforts between the African Union and the Basin Commission with regard to access to resources. He highlighted that better coordination with the African Union was needed to ensure that international resources provided through it trickled down to the Task Force. A high-level consultative meeting in May would bring together the concerned countries. He strongly encouraged international partners to attend the meeting at the highest level.

81. Responding to the concerns voiced on the growing threat represented by terrorism and violent extremism in communities, he mentioned that at the root of violent extremism was the low level of socioeconomic development and opportunities. He highlighted that more mobilization was needed, as was currently done by United Nations country teams through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, to address social and economic marginalization and to provide support to communities affected by Boko Haram. He stressed that that would be the means of weakening the capacity of terrorists to build networks and to kill and destroy communities, given that Boko Haram appeared to receive support from everywhere, including from Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. He stressed that young people in areas affected by Boko Haram in northern Cameroon, north-eastern Nigeria, the southern Niger and Chad should be provided with more creative social and economic opportunities to open up those regions.

3. Merger of offices

82. Regarding the decision of the Security Council to merge UNOWA and OSES into UNOWAS, the Special Representative gave assurances that steps were being taken to move forward with the merger. A technical assessment team had just returned to New York and would continue to work on the draft recommendations that would be validated by the leadership of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Field Support of the Secretariat, in consultation with the mission. He expected that in the coming weeks the new unified structure would be formally adopted. In the meantime, the team was already working towards the merger.

83. On the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, he informed the Security Council that a liaison cell to the Group of Five for the Sahel was being established in Nouakchott. He emphasized that the work would be continued in synergy on issues of governance and security resilience in the Sahel with other international partners, including the European Union, which also had its own Sahel strategy, and with the United Nations Development Programme. On efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism, he recognized that good initiatives were being undertaken by the countries concerned, but that resources were a challenge. He therefore called for renewed support from international partners.

84. On the impact of corruption on the development of countries in the region, he referred to the report of Transparency International, according to which the countries in West Africa were still ranked very low. He commended the efforts made by some countries, such as Nigeria, to combat corruption, stressing that the success of Nigeria would serve as an example for other countries and, given the importance of that country in the region, it would reverberate. At the regional level and through ECOWAS, there were some initiatives aimed at learning from one another's experiences, such as the example of the development of more transparent procurement processes.

4. Piracy

85. On piracy and maritime security, the Special Representative indicated that he and the Special Representative for Central Africa had attended a high-level meeting on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, held in Yaoundé in February. The meeting had brought together ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Gulf of Guinea Commission and, among international partners, France, the European Union and the Group of Seven Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, to move forward with operationalizing the international coordination centre on the safety and security in the maritime area of Central and West Africa. At the continental level the African Union would organize a summit in Togo in October on maritime security to examine the adequate ways and means to curb criminal activities that constituted a serious breach of peace and security to navigation throughout the African maritime space, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

5. Operationalization of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security

86. Regarding the operationalization of resolution 1325 (2000) within the UNOWAS mandate, the Special Representative highlighted that women were continuously engaged in mediation and in peacebuilding efforts. He mentioned the annual open day that was focused on discussing the involvement of women on issues relating to development and peace in the region. In that regard, he stressed that UNOWA had worked with ECOWAS to train 32 women mediators across the region, and that discussions were continuing to engage with those women to support national initiatives and institutions in promoting peace, security and stability.

6. Regional role of Senegal

87. The diplomatic corps highlighted the strategic importance and positioning of Senegal in the region, which served as an example for its democratic institutions and its role in preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding in Africa. They pointed out that its specific religious system and culture of tolerance had made Senegal a stable country in a troubled region.

7. Political tensions in Guinea-Bissau

88. On the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau, the Special Representative mentioned the efforts made by the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, the President of Guinea, Alpha Condé, and the President of Senegal in his capacity as Chair of ECOWAS. He stressed that the international community should remain engaged in Guinea-Bissau, given the regional implications of the political crisis.

D. Observations

89. The members of the Security Council commended the tireless and successful efforts at preventive diplomacy made by the Special Representative and his team and reiterated their support for UNOWAS. Notably, the representatives of Angola and France emphasized the importance of UNOWAS activities that represented a model for preventive diplomacy and reiterated that the presence of such an office was complementing the response of the Council to the threats posed by Boko Haram in the region.

90. The members of the Security Council acknowledged that they shared the same views and had the same messages on Mali and Guinea-Bissau, where they had spoken with a common voice. They were particularly pleased with the positive — albeit slower-than-anticipated — trend in the peace process in Mali that they had noticed. They stressed that, at the end of their mission, they were deeply concerned about the political stand-off in Guinea-Bissau and would remain seized of the question.

91. The members of the Security Council acknowledged that security threats in West Africa and the Sahel had to be dealt with from a perspective of regional conflict prevention. They noted that the multidimensional nature of the challenges faced by West Africa and the Sahel, especially transnational organized crime and terrorism, together with the root causes of those challenges, required the United Nations and the international community to adopt multidimensional and creative approaches, including for the strengthening of the rule of law and security institutions at the regional level. They stressed that economic development and social services should be made available to the population to contain the growing frustration that promoted terrorism and violent extremism. They also noted that efforts should be made to prevent Africa becoming similar to the Syrian Arab Republic or Iraq. They acknowledged that, despite the evident destabilizing effect from jihadist infiltrations coming not only from Libya, but also from Al-Shabaab from Somalia and the Sahel itself to Boko Haram, sufficient resources had not been mobilized to confront the level of threat.

Annex I

Composition of the Security Council mission to Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal

Ambassador Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins (Angola)

Mr. Zhao Yong (China)

Ambassador Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta (Egypt)

Ambassador Francois Delattre (France)

Ambassador Yoshifumi Okamura (Japan)

Ambassador Ramlan Bin Ibrahim (Malaysia)

Ambassador Phillip Taula (New Zealand)

Mr. Petr V. Ilichev (Russian Federation)

Ambassador Fodé Seck (Senegal)

Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain)

Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine)

Ambassador Peter Wilson (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Ambassador David Pressman (United States of America)

Ambassador Luis Homero Bermúdez Alvarez (Uruguay)

Ambassador Henry Alfredo Suárez Moreno (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of)

Annex II

Terms of reference of the Security Council mission to Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, March 2016

Mission to Mali, 4 to 6 March 2016,

led by France and Senegal

References:

Security Council resolution 2227 (2015)

Security Council press statement of 12 January 2016 (SC/12198-AFR/3300-PKO/555)

Effective implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

1. To recall the primary responsibility of the Government of Mali, the Platform and Coordination armed groups for achieving lasting peace in Mali and to reaffirm its intention to facilitate, support and follow closely the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.
2. To welcome the first positive steps taken to implement the Agreement and to urge the Government of Mali, the Platform and Coordination armed groups to continue to engage constructively with sustained political will and in good faith to fully and effectively implement the Agreement without further delay.
3. To urge the Government of Mali, the Platform and Coordination armed groups to prioritize the implementation of key provisions of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali in order to bring concrete peace dividends to the populations of Mali and to urge them, in this regard, to take without delay the necessary measures to advance the deployment of joint security patrols in the North of Mali and the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed combatants, as well as the decentralization process, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement.
4. To reiterate the Security Council's full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to support the Government of Mali, the Platform and Coordination armed groups in the implementation of the Agreement.
5. To reiterate the Security Council's request to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, through his good offices mandate, to play a key role to support and oversee the implementation of the Agreement, notably by heading the secretariat of the Comité de suivi de l'Accord (CSA) and to assess the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate to support the implementation of the Agreement, including the ceasefire arrangements and defence and security measures, and to exercise good offices and facilitation at the national and local levels.
6. To urge the Government of Mali, the Platform and Coordination armed groups to cooperate fully and to coordinate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and MINUSMA, in particular on the implementation of the Agreement.

7. To reiterate its call on the members of the Comité de suivi de l'Accord and other relevant international partners to support the implementation of the Agreement and coordinate their efforts with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and MINUSMA, as well as to stress the need for clear, detailed and concrete oversight mechanisms to support the implementation of the Agreement.

8. To assess the capacities of Malian Defence and Security Forces and the contribution of international partners, including the European Union through its missions, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali and the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), to provide training and advice to the Malian Defence and Security Forces.

9. To assess the contribution of Malian civil society, notably through women's organizations, in the Malian peace process and in the implementation of the Agreement, including through the actual representation and full and effective participation of women at all levels in the monitoring committees of the Agreement, as well as in the peace, reconciliation and electoral processes, in line with relevant Security Council resolutions and the minimum gender representation quota voted by Mali in 2015.

10. To assess the performance of MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities to ensure that conflict-related violence, in particular sexual violence crimes, is taken into full account: (a) in the implementation of the peace agreement; (b) in the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform; (c) in any cease reverification mechanism; and (d) in any transitional justice arrangements.

11. To assess the performance of MINUSMA to provide specific protection for women and children, including through the monitoring and reporting of conflict-related sexual violence and grave violations against children by child protection advisers and women protection advisers, and to take into account gender considerations and child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate.

Security situation

12. To receive a briefing on the security situation in Mali and in the Sahel region, to express the Security Council's concern about the security situation, including the expansion of terrorist and criminal activities into central and southern Mali, as well as its support to the French forces who support MINUSMA, and to stress that the full implementation of the Agreement can help to contribute to improving the security situation across Mali.

13. To assess the level of cooperation of Mali and countries in the region to tackle the terrorist threat in the Sahel region, in particular through the Group of Five for the Sahel, and to consider the prospects for further cooperation, including the African Union proposals for the establishment of a counter-terrorist force in Mali and in the region.

14. To assess the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate to protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

15. To assess the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate, in support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centres and other areas where

civilians are at risk, notably in the North of Mali, including through long-range patrols, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.

16. To stress the importance of ensuring adequate protection of MINUSMA personnel, in the light of the evolution of security threats MINUSMA faces, to effectively implement its mandate, to assess the level of equipment and training of MINUSMA personnel in this regard and to reiterate its call on the Secretary-General and all MINUSMA troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as bilateral donors, to continue their efforts to ensure that MINUSMA contingents have the necessary equipment and training to fulfil their mandate.

Peace dividends to the populations of Mali

17. To reiterate its call upon the Malian authorities to address immediate and long-term needs, encompassing security, governance reform, development and humanitarian issues, to resolve the crisis in Mali and to ensure that the Agreement translates into concrete benefits for the local populations, notably through the priority projects outlined in the Agreement.

18. To assess the impact of the Agreement on the living conditions of the populations of Mali, especially in the north, to assess the efforts of the Government of Mali to restore basic services to the populations in the north of Mali and to call for the immediate fulfilment of the commitments made during the International Conference for the Economic Recovery and Development of Mali, held on 22 October 2015 in Paris.

19. To assess the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate, in support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for projects aimed at stabilizing the north of Mali, including quick-impact projects.

20. To assess the further need of institution-building and development projects with a view to consolidating the peace process.

21. To assess the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate to support cultural preservation, in collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Visit to Guinea-Bissau, to be co-led by Senegal and Angola

1. The Security Council will carry out its mission to the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, within the framework of Council resolution 2267 (2016), the press statement of 12 August 2015 (SC/12005-AFR/3195), the press statement of 14 August 2015 (SC/12007-AFR/3196) and the press statement of 21 September 2015 (SC/12054AFR/3212).

2. The Security Council will meet with the President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Prime Minister and his government, the President of the Parliament and his Vice-President, leaders of the political parties with seats in the Parliament and leaders of the political parties without seats in the Parliament, as well as civil society organizations and the leadership of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), among others.

3. In line with the framework set out in paragraph 1 above, the Security Council will deliver the following messages:

(a) To express deep concern with the continuous rise of political tensions in Guinea-Bissau among the President, the Prime Minister, the Parliament and the heads of the political parties, which are blocking the country's progress;

(b) To make a strong appeal to the parties involved to respect the country's laws and Constitution while endeavouring to solve the current impasse;

(c) To reaffirm its strong commitment and respect for the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, unity and consolidation of peace in Guinea-Bissau;

(d) To call on leaders to seek dialogue and consensus in resolving the crisis in order to preserve the interests of the people of Guinea-Bissau;

(e) To call on the President to work with the Government to complete the appointments of ministers to head the only remaining ministries without leadership (Interior and Natural Resources);

(f) To stress that the judiciary should resolve the status of the 15 parliamentarians expelled from the ruling party and barred from their National Assembly seats;

(g) To invite the President to accept the Stability Pact facilitated by the United Nations as a tool for focusing dialogue and negotiation among political players as they build a framework for the proper functioning of government institutions;

(h) To commend the important efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and encourage the Community to continue extending its political support to the authorities and political leaders of Guinea-Bissau through the use of good offices and mediation (see Council resolution 2267 (2016), para. 8);

(i) To encourage ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) to take the necessary steps towards organizing a meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, in consultation with the United Nations, the European Union and all stakeholders (see resolution 2267 (2016), para. 9) and, in that regard, to urge the Bissau-Guinean authorities to demonstrate the necessary commitment to re-establish momentum for progress in key areas (see resolution 2267 (2016), first part of paragraph 18);

(j) To reiterate its call for the non-interference of the army and security forces in the political situation;

(k) To commend the crucial role of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) in securing the state institutions and in supporting security sector reform, supports its continuation, in accordance with the expressed will of the authorities of Guinea-Bissau and urges bilateral, regional and international partners to consider providing financial assistance to support ECOWAS in sustaining the deployment of ECOMIB, as requested by the 48th ordinary session of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (see resolution 2267 (2016), para. 13);

(l) To deliver a clear message on the importance of maintaining peace and preventive diplomacy, and express the intention of the Security Council to follow the situation closely and respond appropriately in case the current situation becomes a threat to peace and security in Guinea-Bissau.

4. Council members will also perform the following tasks:

(a) To assess the consequences of the political tensions on the living conditions of the populations in Guinea-Bissau;

(b) To assess the progress achieved in the reforms sectors, such as in security sector reform, justice reforms, and so on;

(c) To assess the fulfilment by UNIOGBIS of its mandate, in support of the authorities of Guinea-Bissau, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the implementation of the priority projects aimed at stabilizing the country;

(d) To assess efforts made by the authorities of Guinea-Bissau to implement and review national legislation and mechanisms to more effectively combat transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and money-laundering, which threaten security and stability in Guinea-Bissau and in the subregion (see resolution 2267 (2016), para. 15);

(e) To reiterate the Council's support for the key role and active engagement of Miguel Trovoadá, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), including his good offices and close coordination with the international community;

(f) To reiterate the Council's support to the subregional, regional and international organizations that are actively engaged in the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau.

Visit to Senegal, to be led by Angola

I. Meeting with the Senegalese authorities

- Role as the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):

References:

Security Council press statement of 15 January 2016 (SC/12207)

Presidential statement of 11 June 2015 (S/PRST/2015/12)

- To raise the political and security situation in West Africa and actions of goodwill and mediation undertaken by Senegal, including the African Union visit to Burundi and in view of the upcoming ECOWAS summit meeting to be held in mid-2016.
- To welcome the positive political developments in West Africa, in particular the holding of free and peaceful elections in Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.

- To stress the importance of free, fair, peaceful, inclusive and credible presidential elections in the Niger, Benin, Cabo Verde, Ghana, the Gambia and Chad.
- To reiterate the Security Council's strong condemnation of the recurrent terrorist threat in the region, in particular in Mali and the Sahel, as well as in the Lake Chad Basin region, notably by Boko Haram and to assess the efforts of ECOWAS and other regional organizations, including the Lake Chad Basin Commission, to combat the terrorist threats. To reiterate the need for the region to adopt a comprehensive approach in order to successfully tackle the threat presented by Boko Haram to the region.
- To express the support of the Council to encourage cooperation between ECOWAS, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and other relevant multilateral and regional organizations to assist the region to address its political and security challenges.
- To consider the presence of ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau, particularly the future of ECOMIB.
- To discuss the preparation by ECOWAS of the meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau.

II. Meeting with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel

References: Presidential statement of 8 December 2015 ([S/PRST/2015/24](#))

Letter dated 28 January 2016 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General ([S/2016/89](#))

- To exchange views on the political and security situation in West Africa and in the Sahel region, including the preventative diplomacy engagement of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).
- To express its full support to the Special Representative and welcome the activities undertaken by UNOWAS in the areas of good offices, the enhancement of subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, as well as the promotion of good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and gender mainstreaming.
- To encourage the continued engagement of UNOWAS with regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Mano River Union, in order to promote peace and stability in West Africa and the Sahel region.
- **To reiterate its support to the Secretary-General to proceed with the full and immediate merger through a unified management and structure of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Office of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Sahel.**

- To receive an update on the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and to encourage UNOWAS to make further progress towards the implementation of the strategy and to continue to work closely with the States of the region, including the Group of Five for the Sahel, to tackle the threats to peace, security and development in the Sahel, as well as their root causes.
 - To stress the efforts to strengthen subregional capacities to fight against cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, promote good governance, the rule of law and human rights and take into account the gender issues.
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ANEXO C

Relatório do Conselho de Segurança sobre a Não-proliferação de armas nucleares na RPC (1)



Security Council

Distr.: General
2 March 2016

Resolution 2270 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7638th meeting, on
2 March 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013) and resolution 2094 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on 6 January 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population DPRK,

Regretting the DPRK's diversion of financial, technical and industrial resources toward developing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program, and condemning its declared intent to develop nuclear weapons,

Expressing deep concern at the grave hardship that the DPRK people are subjected to,

Expressing great concern that the DPRK's arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have great unmet needs,



Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches of ballistic missiles in 2014 and 2015, as well as the submarine-launched ballistic missile ejection test in 2015 and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

Expressing continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear-, and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 6 January 2016 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Council's relevant resolutions, and further *condemns* the DPRK's launch of 7 February 2016, which used ballistic missile technology and was in serious violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013);

2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation, and shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches, and *demand*s that the DPRK immediately comply fully with these obligations;

3. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities;

4. *Reaffirms* its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

5. *Reaffirms* that, pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006), all Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and *underscores* that this provision prohibits the DPRK from engaging in any form of technical cooperation with other Member States on launches using ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite launch or space launch vehicle;

6. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, including small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel;

7. *Affirms* that the obligations imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006), as extended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), apply with respect to the shipment of items to or from the DPRK for repair, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing, regardless of whether ownership or control is transferred, and *underscores* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual traveling for the purposes of carrying out the activities described in this paragraph;

8. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any item, except food or medicine, if the State determines that such item could directly contribute to the development of the DPRK's operational capabilities of its armed forces, or to exports that support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another Member State outside the DPRK, and *decides* also that this provision shall cease to apply to the supply, sale or transfer of an item, or its procurement, if:

(a) the State determines that such activity is exclusively for humanitarian purposes or exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue, and also not related to any activity prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance of such determination and also informs the Committee of measures taken to prevent the diversion of the item for such other purposes, or

(b) the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular supply, sale or transfer would not be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

9. *Recalls* that paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009) requires States to prohibit the procurement from the DPRK of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related materiel, and *clarifies* that this paragraph prohibits States from engaging in the hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training;

10. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;

11. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

12. *Affirms* that "economic resources," as referred to in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), includes assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, actual or potential, which potentially may be used to obtain funds, goods, or services, such as vessels (including maritime vessels);

13. *Decides* that if a Member State determines that a DPRK diplomat, governmental representative, or other DPRK national acting in a governmental

capacity, is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, or of an individual or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, then the Member State shall expel the individual from its territory for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters or other UN facilities to conduct United Nations business, and *decides* that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply with respect to a particular individual if: a) the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process, b) the presence of the individual is required exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or c) the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution;

14. *Decides* that, if a Member State determines that an individual who is not a national of that State is working on behalf of or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, then Member States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the individual's state of nationality, consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters or other UN facilities to conduct United Nations business;

15. *Underscores* that, as a consequence of implementing the obligations imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), all Member States shall close the representative offices of designated entities and prohibit such entities, as well as individuals or entities acting for or on their behalf, directly or indirectly, from participating in joint ventures or any other business arrangements, and *underscores* that if a representative of such an office is a DPRK national, then States are required to expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, pursuant to and consistent with paragraph 10 of resolution 2094 (2013);

16. *Notes* that the DPRK frequently uses front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating measures imposed in relevant Security Council resolutions, and, in this regard, *directs* the Committee, with the support of the Panel, to identify individuals and entities engaging in such practices and, if appropriate, designate them to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution;

17. *Decides* that all Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear

activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines;

18. *Decides* that all States shall inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including in their airports, seaports and free trade zones, that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK flagged aircraft or maritime vessels, for the purposes of ensuring that no items are transferred in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution, and calls upon States to implement such inspections in a manner that minimizes the impact on the transfer of cargo that the State determines is for humanitarian purposes;

19. *Decides* that Member States shall prohibit their nationals and those in their territories from leasing or chartering their flagged vessels or aircraft or providing crew services to the DPRK, and *decides* that this prohibition shall also apply with respect to any designated individuals or entities, any other DPRK entities, any other individuals or entities whom the State determines to have assisted in the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, any individuals or entities acting on behalf or at the direction of any of the aforementioned, and any entities owned or controlled by any of the aforementioned, *calls upon* Member States to de register any vessel that is owned, operated or crewed by the DPRK, further *calls upon* Member States not to register any such vessel that is de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to such leasing, chartering or provision of crew services notified to the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis accompanied by: a) information demonstrating that such activities are exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue, and b) information on measures taken to prevent such activities from contributing to violations of the aforementioned resolutions;

20. *Decides* that all States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and from owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK, and *decides* that this measure shall not apply to activities notified in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, following provision to the Committee of detailed information on the activities, including the names of individuals and entities involved in them, information demonstrating that such activities are exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue and on measures taken to prevent such activities from contributing to violations of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

21. *Decides* that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly, unless under the condition of landing for inspection, their

territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing, and *calls upon* all States, when considering whether to grant overflight permission to flights to assess known risk factors;

22. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the entry into their ports of any vessel if the Member State has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated individual or entity, or contains cargo the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or for inspection, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

23. *Recalls* that the Committee has designated the DPRK firm Ocean Maritime Management (OMM), *notes* that the vessels specified in Annex III of this resolution are economic resources controlled or operated by OMM and therefore subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), and *underscores* that Member States are required to implement the relevant provisions of that resolution;

24. *Decides* that the DPRK shall abandon all chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related programs, and shall act strictly in accordance with its obligations as a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, or Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, and *calls upon* the DPRK to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, and then to immediately comply with its provisions;

25. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution through the designation of additional goods, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and further *decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;

26. *Directs* the Committee to review and update the items contained in S/2006/853/CORR.1 no later than sixty days from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter;

27. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other weapons of mass destruction programs, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution;

28. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 14 through 16 of resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013), and *decides* that these paragraphs shall apply

also with respect to any items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution identified in inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 18 of this resolution;

29. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to:

(a) Coal that the procuring State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution; and,

(b) Transactions that are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

30. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

31. *Decides* that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of aviation fuel, including aviation gasoline, naptha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and kerosene-type rocket fuel, whether or not originating in their territory, to the territory of the DPRK, or unless the Committee has approved in advance on an exceptional case-by-case basis the transfer to the DPRK of such products for verified essential humanitarian needs, subject to specified arrangements for effective monitoring of delivery and use, and *decides* also that this provision shall not apply with respect to the sale or supply of aviation fuel to civilian passenger aircraft outside the DPRK exclusively for consumption during its flight to the DPRK and its return flight;

32. *Decides* that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to all the funds, other financial assets and economic resources outside of the DPRK that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by entities of the Government of the DPRK or the Worker's Party of Korea, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, that the State determines are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, *decides* further that all States except the DPRK shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their

nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, and *decides* that these measures shall not apply with respect to funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are required to carry out activities of the DPRK's missions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and related organizations or other diplomatic and consular missions of the DPRK, and to any funds, other financial assets and economic resources that the Committee determines in advance on a case-by-case basis are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

33. *Decides* that States shall prohibit in their territories the opening and operation of new branches, subsidiaries, and representative offices of DPRK banks, *decides* further that States shall prohibit financial institutions within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, unless such transactions have been approved by the Committee in advance, and *decides* that States shall take the necessary measures to close such existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices, and also to terminate such joint ventures, ownership interests and correspondent banking relationships with DPRK banks within ninety days from the adoption of this resolution;

34. *Decides* that States shall prohibit financial institutions within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction from opening new representative offices or subsidiaries, branches or banking accounts in the DPRK;

35. *Decides* that States shall take the necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within ninety days, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, and *decides* further that this provision shall not apply if the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations, or for any other purposes consistent with resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

36. *Decides* that all States shall prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, including paragraph 8;

37. *Expresses* concern that transfers to the DPRK of gold may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution, and *clarifies* that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) to the transfers of gold,

including through gold couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK so as to ensure such transfers of gold do not contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

38. *Recalls* that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has called upon countries to apply enhanced due diligence and effective countermeasure to protect their jurisdictions from the DPRK's illicit financial activity, and *calls upon* Member States to apply the FATF Recommendation 7, its Interpretive Note, and related guidance to effectively implement targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation;

39. *Reaffirms* the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and *clarifies* that the term "luxury goods" includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in Annex V of this resolution;

40. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner, and *directs* the Committee to prioritize outreach to those Member States who have never submitted implementation reports as requested by the Security Council;

41. *Calls upon* all States to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;

42. *Encourages* all States to examine the circumstances of previously reported sanctions violations, particularly the items seized or activities prevented pursuant to the relevant resolutions, so as to assist in ensuring full and appropriate implementation of these resolutions, especially paragraph 27 of this resolution, and *notes* in this regard the reporting of the Panel of Experts and the information regarding sanctions violations that the Committee has released publicly;

43. *Directs* the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution, and, in this regard, *directs* the Committee to designate additional individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution;

44. *Directs* the Committee to continue its efforts to assist Member States in implementing the measures imposed on the DPRK, and, in this regard, *requests* the Committee to draft and circulate a comprehensive compilation of all the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution so as to facilitate Member State implementation;

45. *Directs* the Committee to update the information contained on the Committee's list of individuals and entities, including new aliases and front

companies, and *directs* the Committee to complete this task within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution and every twelve months thereafter;

46. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013) and this resolution;

47. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

48. *Underlines* that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, and the work of international organizations and non-governmental organization carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK;

49. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;

50. *Reaffirms* its support to the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

51. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;

52. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. CHOE CHUN-SIK
 - a. *Description:* Choe Chun-sik was the director of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS) and was the head of the DPRK's long-range missile program.
 - b. *AKA:* Choe Chun Sik; Ch'oe Ch'un Sik
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 12 October 1954; Nationality: DPRK
2. CHOE SONG IL
 - a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Vietnam
 - b. *AKA:* NA
 - c. *Identifiers:* Passport: 472320665; Passport Date of Expiration: 26 Sep 2017; Passport: 563120356; Nationality: DPRK
3. HYON KWANG IL
 - a. *Description:* Hyon Kwang Il is the Department Director for Scientific Development at the National Aerospace Development Administration.
 - b. *AKA:* Hyon Gwang Il
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 27 May 1961; Nationality: DPRK
4. JANG BOM SU
 - a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria
 - b. *AKA:* Jang Pom Su
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 15 April 1957; Nationality: DPRK
5. JANG YONG SON
 - a. *Description:* Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) Representative in Iran
 - b. *AKA:* NA
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 20 February 1957; Nationality: DPRK
6. JON MYONG GUK
 - a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria
 - b. *AKA:* Cho'n Myo'ng-kuk
 - c. *Identifiers:* Passport: 4721202031; Passport Date of Expiration: 21 Feb 2017; Nationality: DPRK; DOB: 18 Oct 1976

7. KANG MUN KIL
 - a. *Description:* Kang Mun Kil has conducted nuclear procurement activities as a representative of Namchongang, also known as Namhung.
 - b. *AKA:* Jiang Wen-ji
 - c. *Identifiers:* Passport: PS 472330208; Passport Date of Expiration: 4 July 2017; Nationality: DPRK
8. KANG RYONG
 - a. *Description:* Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) Representative in Syria
 - b. *AKA:* NA
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 21 August 1969; Nationality: DPRK
9. KIM JUNG JONG
 - a. *Description:* Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Vietnam
 - b. *AKA:* Kim Chung Chong
 - c. *Identifiers:* Passport: 199421147 Passport Date of Expiration: 29 Dec 2014; Passport: 381110042, Passport Date of Expiration: 25 Jan 2016; Passport: 563210184, Passport Date of Expiration: 18 Jun 2018; DOB: 07 Nov 1966, Nationality: DPRK
10. KIM KYU
 - a. *Description:* Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) External Affairs Officer
 - b. *AKA:* NA
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 30 July 1968, Nationality: DPRK
11. KIM TONG MY'ONG
 - a. *Description:* Kim Tong My'ong is the President of Tanchon Commercial Bank and has held various positions within Tanchon Commercial bank since at least 2002. He has also played a role in managing Amroggang's affairs.
 - b. *AKA:* Kim Chin-So'k, Kim Tong-Myong, Kim Jin-Sok; Kim, Hyok-Chol
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB: 1964; Nationality: DPRK
12. KIM YONG CHOL
 - a. *Description:* KOMID Representative in Iran
 - b. *AKA:* NA
 - c. *Identifiers:* DOB. 18 February 1962; Nationality: DPRK

13. KO TAE HUN

- a. *Description*: Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative
- b. *AKA*: Kim Myong Gi
- c. *Identifiers*: Passport: 563120630; Passport Date of Expiration: 20 March 2018, D.O.B. 25 May 1972; Nationality: DPRK

14. RI MAN GON

- a. *Description*: Ri Man Gon is the Minister of the Munitions Industry Department.
- b. *AKA*: n/a
- c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 29 October 1945; Passport number: PO381230469; Passport Date of Expiration: 6 April 2016; Nationality: DPRK

15. RYU JIN

- a. *Description*: KOMID Representative in Syria
- b. *AKA*: NA
- c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 07 August 1965; Passport Number: 563410081; Nationality: DPRK

16. YU CHOL U

- a. *Description*: Yu Chol U is the Director of the National Aerospace Development Administration.
- b. *AKA*: n/a
- c. *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK

List Update for Alias: Ra, Kyong-Su (KPi.008) — *New AKA*: Chang, Myong Ho

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. ACADEMY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENCE
 - a. *Description:* The Academy of National Defense Science is involved in the DPRK's efforts to advance the development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs.
 - b. *AKA:* n/a
 - c. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK
2. CHONGCHONGANG SHIPPING COMPANY
 - a. *Description:* The Chongchongang Shipping Company, through its vessel, the Chong Chon Gang, attempted to directly import the illicit shipment of conventional weapons and arms to the DPRK in July 2013.
 - b. *AKA:* Chong Chon Gang Shipping Co. Ltd.
 - c. *Location:* Address: 817 Haeun, Donghung-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate Address: 817, Haeum, Tonghun-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; IMO Number: 5342883
3. DAEDONG CREDIT BANK (DCB)
 - a. *Description:* Daedong Credit Bank has provided financial services to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and Tanchon Commercial Bank. Since at least 2007, DCB has facilitated hundreds of financial transactions worth millions of dollars on behalf of KOMID and Tanchon Commercial Bank. In some cases, DCB has knowingly facilitated transactions by using deceptive financial practices.
 - b. *AKA:* DCB; AKA: Taedong Credit Bank
 - c. *Location:* Address: Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate Address: Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT: DCBK KKPY
4. HESONG TRADING COMPANY
 - a. *Description:* The Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Hesong Trading Corporation.
 - b. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK
5. KOREA KWANGSON BANKING CORPORATION (KKBC)
 - a. *Description:* KKBC provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon Commercial Bank has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving Korea Mining Development Corporation related funds.

- b. *AKA:* KKBC
 - c. *Address:* Jungson-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
6. KOREA KWANGSONG TRADING CORPORATION
- a. *Description:* The Korea Ryongbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation.
 - b. *Address:* Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK
7. MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY
- a. *Description:* The Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry was created in 2013 for the purpose of modernizing the DPRK's atomic energy industry to increase the production of nuclear materials, improve their quality, and further develop an independent DPRK nuclear industry. As such, the MAEI is known to be a critical player in the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons and is in charge of day-to-day operation of the country's nuclear weapons program, and under it are other nuclear-related organizations. Under this ministry are a number of nuclear-related organizations and research centers, as well as two committees: an Isotope Application Committee and a Nuclear Energy Committee. The MAEI also directs a nuclear research center at Yongbyun, the site of the DPRK's known plutonium facilities. Furthermore, in the 2015 Panel of Experts (POE) report, the POE stated that Ri Je-son, a former director of the GBAE who was designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in 2009 for engagement in or support for nuclear related programs, was appointed as head of the MAEI on April 9, 2014.
 - b. *AKA:* MAEI
 - c. *Address:* Haeun-2-dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK
8. MUNITIONS INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT
- a. *Description:* The Munitions Industry Department is involved in key aspects of the DPRK's missile program. MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK's ballistic missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2. The MID oversees the DPRK's weapons production and R&D programs, including the DPRK's ballistic missile program. The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences — also designated in August 2010 — are subordinate to the MID. The MID in recent years has worked to develop the KN08 road-mobile ICBM.
 - b. *AKA:* Military Supplies Industry Department
 - c. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK
9. NATIONAL AEROSPACE DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
- a. *Description:* NADA is involved in the DPRK's development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets.
 - b. *AKA:* NADA
 - c. *Location:* DPRK

10. OFFICE 39

- a. *Description:* DPRK government entity.
- b. *AKA:* Office #39; AKA: Office No. 39; AKA: Bureau 39; AKA: Central Committee Bureau 39; AKA: Third Floor; AKA: Division 39
- c. *Location:* DPRK

11. RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL BUREAU

- a. *Description:* The Reconnaissance General Bureau is the DPRK's premiere intelligence organization, created in early 2009 by the merger of existing intelligence organizations from the Korean Workers' Party, the Operations Department and Office 35, and the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Korean People's Army. The Reconnaissance General Bureau trades in conventional arms and controls the DPRK conventional arms firm Green Pine Associated Corporation.
- b. *AKA:* Chongch'al Ch'ongguk; KPA Unit 586; RGB
- c. *Location:* Address: Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate Address: Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK.

12. SECOND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

- a. *Description:* The Second Economic Committee is involved in key aspects of the DPRK's missile program. The Second Economic Committee is responsible for overseeing the production of the DPRK's ballistic missiles, and directs the activities of KOMID.
- b. *AKA:* N/A
- c. *Location:* Kangdong, DPRK

List Update for Alias: NAMCHONGANG TRADING CORPORATION (KPe.004) —
New AKA: Namhung Trading Corporation

Annex III**OMM Vessels**

<i>Ship Name</i>	<i>IMO Number</i>
1. CHOL RYONG (RYONG GUN BONG)	8606173
2. CHONG BONG(GREENLIGHT)(BLUE NOUVELLE)	8909575
3. CHONG RIM 2	8916293
4. DAWNLIGHT	9110236
5. EVER BRIGHT 88 (J STAR)	8914934
6. GOLD STAR 3 (BENEVOLENCE 2)	8405402
7. HOE RYONG	9041552
8. HU CHANG (O UN CHONG NYON)	8330815
9. HUI CHON (HWANG GUM SAN 2)	8405270
10. JH 86	8602531
11. JI HYE SAN (HYOK SIN 2)	8018900
12. JIN Tal	9163154
13. JIN TENG	9163166
14. KANG GYE (PI RYU GANG)	8829593
15. MI RIM	8713471
16. MI RIM 2	9361407
17. O RANG (PO THONG GANG)	8829555
18. ORION STAR (RICHOCÉAN)	9333589
19. RA NAM 2	8625545
20. RANAM 3	9314650
21. RYO MYONG	8987333
22. RYONG RIM (JON JIN 2)	8018912
23. SE PHO (RAK WON 2)	8819017
24. SONGJIN (JANG JA SAN CHONG NYON HO)	8133530
25. SOUTH HILL 2	8412467
26. SOUTH HILL 5	9138680
27. TAN CHON (RYONG GANG 2)	7640378

	<i>Ship Name</i>	<i>IMO Number</i>
28.	THAE PYONG SAN (PETREL 1)	9009085
29.	TONG HUNG SAN (CHONG CHON GANG)	7937317
30.	GRAND KARO	8511823
31.	TONG HUNG 1	8661575

Annex IV:

Luxury Goods

- (a) Luxury watches: wrist, pocket, and other with a case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal
 - (b) Transportation items, as follows:
 - (1) aquatic recreational vehicles (such as personal watercraft)
 - (2) snowmobiles (valued greater than \$2,000)
 - (c) Items of lead crystal
 - (d) Recreational sports equipment
-

ANEXO D

Relatório do Conselho de Segurança sobre a Não-proliferação de armas nucleares na RPC (2)



Security Council

Distr.: General
24 March 2016

Resolution 2276 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7656th meeting, on
24 March 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolutions 825 (1993), 1540 (2004), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 1887 (2009), 1928 (2010), 1985 (2011), 2050 (2012), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2141 (2014), 2207 (2015), 2270 (2016), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 ([S/PRST/2006/41](#)), 13 April 2009 ([S/PRST/2009/7](#)), and 16 April 2012 ([S/PRST/2012/13](#)),

Recalling the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph,

Recalling the interim report by the Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and the 7 March 2016 final report ([S/2016/157](#)) by the Panel,

Recalling the methodological standards for reports of sanctions monitoring mechanisms contained in the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions ([S/2006/997](#)),

Welcoming the efforts made by the Secretariat to expand and improve the roster of experts for the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, bearing in mind the guidance provided by the Note of the President ([S/2006/997](#)),

Emphasizing, in that regard, the importance of credible, fact-based, independent assessments, analysis, and recommendations, in accordance with the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009),

Determining that proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend until 24 April 2017 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in



paragraph 29 of resolution 2094 (2013), *decides* that this mandate shall apply also with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 2270 (2016), *expresses* its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 24 March 2017, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures to this effect;

2. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Committee no later than 5 August 2016 a midterm report on its work, and *further requests* that, after a discussion with the Committee, the Panel of Experts submit to the Council its midterm report by 7 September 2016, and *requests* also a final report to the Committee no later than 1 February 2017 with its findings and recommendations, and *further requests* that, after a discussion with the Committee, the Panel of Experts submit to the Council its final report no later than 15 March 2017;

3. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Committee a planned program of work no later than thirty days after the Panel's reappointment, *encourages* the Committee to engage in regular discussions about this program of work and to engage regularly with the Panel about its work, and *further requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Committee any updates to this program of work;

4. *Expresses* its intent to continue to follow the work of the Panel;

5. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013) resolution 2094 (2013), and resolution 2270 (2016);

6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

ANEXO E

Relatório do Conselho de Segurança sobre a situação na Líbia (1)



Security Council

Distr.: General
15 March 2016

Resolution 2273 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7644th meeting, on
15 March 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) and all its subsequent resolutions on Libya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) ([S/2016/182](#)),

Expressing its support for the ongoing efforts of UNSMIL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to facilitate a Libyan-led political solution to the challenges facing Libya,

Recalling resolution 2259 (2015) which endorses the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015 to support the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate government of Libya, that should be based in the capital Tripoli,

Reiterating its support for the full implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement of Skhirat, Morocco signed on 17 December 2015 to form a Government of National Accord consisting of the Presidency Council and Cabinet supported by the other institutions of state including the House of Representatives and State Council, and *welcoming* the endorsement in principle of the Libyan Political Agreement by the House of Representatives on 25 January 2016,

Recognizing the importance of continued inclusiveness and *strongly encouraging* all parties in Libya to be part of and engage constructively in good faith with the Agreement,

Encouraging the Government of National Accord to finalize interim security arrangements for stabilizing Libya as a critical step towards tackling Libya's political, security, humanitarian, economic and institutional challenges and to combat the rising threat of terrorism,

Reiterating its request that all Member States fully support the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and work with the Libyan authorities and UNSMIL to develop a coordinated package of support to build the



capacity of the Government of National Accord, in line with Libyan priorities and in response to requests for assistance, and *further reiterating* its call upon all parties to cooperate fully with the activities of UNSMIL, including taking necessary steps to ensure the security and unhindered movement for the UN and associated personnel,

Recognizing in the current circumstances, the need for a short extension of the mandate of UNSMIL, to enable the Mission to continue to assist the Presidency Council in further work in establishing the Government of National Accord, that should be based in the capital Tripoli, and implementing the Libyan Political Agreement,

Recalling its determination in resolution 2213 (2015) that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend until 15 June 2016 the mandate of UNSMIL, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 2238 (2015), under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, and *recognizes* the need for UNSMIL to re-establish its presence in Libya, and the need to make the necessary security arrangements to this effect;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report within 60 days following consultations with the Libyan authorities on recommendations for UNSMIL's support to the subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process and UNSMIL's security arrangements;

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

ANEXO F

Relatório do Conselho de Segurança sobre a situação na Líbia (2)



Security Council

Distr.: General
31 March 2016

Resolution 2278 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7661st meeting, on
31 March 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling the arms embargo, travel ban, assets freeze and measures concerning illicit oil exports which were imposed and modified by resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2009 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014) and 2213 (2015) (the Measures), and that the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014) was extended until 30 April 2016 by resolution 2213 (2015),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Recalling resolution 2259 (2015) which welcomed the signing of the 17 December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement of Skhirat, Morocco and endorsed the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015 to support the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate government of Libya, that should be based in Tripoli, and *further expressing* its determination in this regard to support the Government of National Accord,

Welcoming the meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue on 10 March 2016, which reaffirmed its commitment to uphold the Libyan Political Agreement,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Government of National Accord in taking appropriate action to prevent the illicit export of crude oil from Libya and *reaffirming* the importance of international support for Libyan sovereignty over its territory and resources,

Expressing its concern that the illicit export of crude oil from Libya undermines the Government of National Accord and poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of Libya,

Expressing support to Libyan efforts to resolve peacefully the disruptions of Libya's energy exports and reiterating that control of all facilities should be transferred back to the proper authorities,

Further reiterating its concern about activities which could damage the integrity and unity of Libyan State financial institutions and the National Oil



Corporation, *highlighting* the importance of these institutions continuing to function for the benefit of all Libyans, and *stressing* the need for the Government of National Accord to exercise sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority as a matter of urgency, without prejudice to future constitutional arrangements pursuant to the Libyan Political Agreement,

Further recalling resolution 2259 (2015) which called on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions claiming to be the legitimate authority, but which were outside the Libyan Political Agreement, as specified by it,

Recalling that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean,

Reaffirming the importance of holding accountable those responsible for violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in attacks targeting civilians and *stressing* the need to transfer detainees to State authority,

Reiterating its expression of support for the Government of National Accord, as stated in paragraph 3 of resolution 2259 (2015), and *noting* in this regard the specific requests made to the Government of National Accord in this resolution,

Reiterating its request that all Member States fully support the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and work with the Libyan authorities and United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to develop a coordinated package of support to build the capacity of the Government of National Accord, in line with Libyan priorities and in response to requests for assistance,

Determining that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Prevention of Illicit Oil Exports

1. *Decides* to extend until 31 July 2017 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014);

2. *Condemns* attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya, including by parallel institutions which are not acting under the authority of the Government of National Accord;

3. *Requests* that the Government of National Accord appoint and notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) of a focal point responsible for communication with the Committee with respect to the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), and to inform the Committee of any vessels transporting crude oil illicitly exported from Libya, and *urges* the Government of National Accord to provide regular updates to inform the Committee on ports, oil fields, and installations that are under its control, and to inform the Committee about the mechanism used to certify legal exports of crude oil;

4. *Calls on* the Government of National Accord, on the basis of any information regarding such exports or attempted exports, to expeditiously contact

the concerned vessel's flag State, in the first instance, to resolve the issue and *directs* the Committee to immediately inform all relevant Member States about notifications to the Committee from the Government of National Accord's focal point regarding vessels transporting oil illicitly exported from Libya;

Effective Oversight of the Financial Institutions

5. *Requests* that the Government of National Accord confirm to the Committee as soon as it exercises sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority;

Arms Embargo

6. *Requests* the Government of National Accord to appoint a focal point to brief the Committee at its request and provide information relevant to the Committee's work on the structure of the security forces under its control, the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Government security forces, and training needs, and *emphasizes* the importance of the Government of National Accord exercising control over and safely storing arms, with the support of the international community;

7. Affirms that the Government of National Accord may submit requests under paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014) for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, for the use by security forces under its control to combat ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also known as Da'esh), groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Ansar Al Sharia, and other, groups associated with Al-Qaida operating in Libya, *calls upon* the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) to consider expeditiously such requests, and *affirms* the Security Council's readiness to consider reviewing the arms embargo, when appropriate;

8. *Urges* Member States to assist the Government of National Accord, upon its request, by providing it with the necessary security and capacity-building assistance, in response to threats to Libyan security and in defeating ISIL, groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Ansar Al Sharia, and other groups associated with Al-Qaida operating in Libya;

9. *Urges* the Government of National Accord to improve further the monitoring and control of arms or related materiel that are supplied, sold or transferred to Libya in accordance with paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014), including through the use of end user certificates issued by the Government of National Accord, *requests* the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) to consult with the Government of National Accord about the safeguards needed to safely procure and secure arms and related materiel, and *urges* Member States and regional organizations to provide assistance to the Government of National Accord upon its request to strengthen the infrastructure and mechanisms currently in place to do so;

10. *Calls upon* the Government of National Accord to improve the implementation of the arms embargo, including at all entry points, as soon as it exercises oversight, and *calls upon* all Member States to cooperate in such efforts;

Asset Freeze

11. *Reaffirms* its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people and taking note of the letter circulated as document [S/2016/275](#), *affirms* the Security Council's readiness to consider changes, when appropriate, to the asset freeze at the request of the Government of National Accord;

Panel of Experts

12. *Decides* to extend until 31 July 2017 the mandate of the Panel of Experts (the Panel), established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), and *decides* that the Panel's mandated tasks shall remain as defined in resolution 2213 (2015);

13. *Decides* that the Panel shall provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 180 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, no later than 15 June 2017 with its findings and recommendations;

14. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies, including UNSMIL, and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the Measures decided in resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), and modified in resolutions 2009 (2011) and 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014) and 2213 (2015) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and *calls on* UNSMIL and the Government of National Accord to support Panel investigatory work inside Libya, including by sharing information, facilitating transit and granting access to weapons storage facilities, as appropriate;

15. *Calls upon* all parties and all States to ensure the safety of the Panel's members, and *further calls upon* all parties and all States, including Libya and countries of the region, to provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Panel deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;

16. *Affirms* its readiness to review the appropriateness of the Measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the Measures, and its readiness to review the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel, as may be needed at any time in light of developments in Libya;

17. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

ANEXO G

Declaração do Presidente do Conselho de Segurança, de 17 de Março de
2016



Security Council

Distr.: General
17 March 2016

Original: English

Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 7650th meeting of the Security Council, held on 17 March 2016, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses deep alarm at the situation in South Sudan. The Security Council notes that while the ceasefire has largely held in the former theatre of conflict in Greater Upper Nile, it is deeply concerned with ongoing violence, as reported in briefings to the Security Council on 19 February. The Security Council calls upon the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to uphold its responsibility for the protection of civilians.

"The Security Council expresses particular alarm at credible reports of armed men in Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) uniforms entering the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) protection of civilians site and firing on civilians. The Security Council stresses that attacks against civilians, UNMISS personnel, as well as United Nations premises are unacceptable and may constitute war crimes. The Security Council calls upon the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the attack and commends the United Nations for quickly announcing establishment of a High-Level Board of Inquiry to be convened by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support which will conduct an in-depth investigation into UNMISS' response to this incident, and awaits with interest its findings.

"The Security Council condemns reported human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and in this regard expresses deep concern over those detailed in the 11 March 2016 'Report of Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Assessment Mission to Improve Human Rights, Accountability, Reconciliation and Capacity in South Sudan' and the 4 December 2015 UNMISS/OHCHR report 'The State of Human Rights in the Protracted Conflict in South Sudan'. The Security Council expresses deep alarm at the numerous reports of sexual violence in armed conflict. The Security Council also underscores its grave concern at the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation in South Sudan, with an estimated 2.8 million people who are severely food insecure and that humanitarian access continues to be restricted.



“The Security Council underscores its support for the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) Chair, Festus Mogae, and calls on all parties to fully cooperate with him to advance the ‘Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan’ (the ‘Agreement’).

“The Security Council welcomes some progress in the implementation of the Agreement, including the commencement of the work of JMEC, establishment of some of the transitional security mechanisms, agreement on the selection of ministerial portfolios, the appointment by President Salva Kiir of Dr. Riek Machar as First Vice-President, and the parties’ endorsement of the JMEC’s transitional security arrangements proposal.

“The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the failure of the parties to fully adhere to their commitments to implement the Agreement. In this regard, the Security Council calls for the following steps to be taken:

1. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) fully and immediately adhere to the permanent ceasefire in accordance with their obligations under the Agreement.

2. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan, the SPLM-IO and all other relevant actors extend their full cooperation to complete implementation of the of Juba security arrangements as decided by the JMEC Chair and agreed by the parties on 24 February 2016.

3. The President, the First Vice-President, and Vice-President, as set out in the Agreement, take up their positions in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) in Juba.

4. The parties to the agreement abide by and take no action inconsistent with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 30-31 January 2016 communiqué, which was subsequently endorsed by the parties and JMEC, on the issue of the Presidential Decree on the creation of 28 new states.

5. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the SPLM-IO protect civilians and civilian facilities, including schools and hospitals, allow people to move freely, and allow in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and UN guiding principles of humanitarian assistance the full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to help ensure timely delivery of humanitarian assistance, to all those in need.

“The Security Council expresses its intention to review progress on the steps outlined above no later than 31 March 2016.

“The Security Council underscores the pressing need for accountability for violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in South Sudan, including ongoing violations and abuses that have been reported since the Agreement was signed. The Security Council takes note in this regard of Chapter V of the Agreement, calls for its implementation, and appreciates the 26 September 2015 AUPSC communique in which the AUPSC requested that the Chairperson of the African Union Commission take all necessary steps towards the establishment of the Hybrid Court of South Sudan, which will have jurisdiction over serious crimes

committed through the end of the transitional period. The Security Council also calls for implementation of the other mechanisms outlined in Chapter V of the Agreement, including the Commission for Truth, Healing, and Reconciliation.

“The Security Council expresses deep concern at reports of repeated violations of the Status of Forces Agreement and underscores the importance of close cooperation on this issue. The Security Council underscores its steadfast support for UNMISS and renews its deep appreciation for the courageous actions taken by UNMISS personnel and troop- and police-contributing countries to protect hundreds of thousands of civilians under threat of physical violence and to stabilize the security situation across South Sudan. The Security Council recognizes the need to strengthen cooperation between the Government of South Sudan and UNMISS to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and other United Nations and associated personnel, including humanitarian personnel.

“The Security Council reaffirms its unwavering support for the people of South Sudan.”

ANEXO H

Declaração do Presidente do Conselho de Segurança, de 31 de Março de
2016



Security Council

Distr.: General
31 March 2016

Original: English

Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 7662nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 31 March 2016, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2016/232).

"The Security Council regrets that progress made in the implementation of national and regional commitments under the PSC Framework remains limited and stresses the importance of the signatory States fully implementing their national and regional commitments under the PSC Framework, which remains essential for the achievement of lasting peace and security in the Great Lakes region (GLR).

"The Security Council reiterates the importance of neutralizing all armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Mai Mai groups in line with Security Council resolution 2277 (2016). It notes, in this regard, the announcement of the resumption of joint military operations between the Government of the DRC and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) and calls for immediate restart of joint operations to be undertaken in earnest to bring about the complete neutralization of all armed groups operating in the eastern DRC.

"The Security Council calls upon the Governments of DRC, Uganda and Rwanda to strengthen their collaboration to ensure the repatriation of former M23 combatants located in Rwanda and Uganda, consistent with the Nairobi Declarations and in line with commitments under the PSC Framework and reiterates the importance of ensuring that all provisions of the signed documents are implemented swiftly and in good faith.

"The Security Council recalls the regional commitment under the PSC Framework not to harbor war criminals or provide support to armed groups including recruitment and urges all countries in the Great Lakes region to implement this provision of the PSC Framework and to make concerted efforts



to investigate any allegations that former M23 members have committed serious crimes under international law and to hold accountable those responsible.

“The Security Council is of the view that children have been major victims of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, and stresses the absolute need to eliminate their recruitment into armed groups, and the need to empower young people and promote youth employment initiatives at the regional level.

“The Security Council calls upon all countries in the Great Lakes region to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and encourages them to actively pursue accountability for those who commit human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.

“The Security Council welcomes the credible and peaceful conduct of elections in some States of the Great Lakes region. The Security Council notes, however, recent and ongoing electoral processes in some countries of the Great Lakes region raise deep concerns about the risk of instability, insecurity, the potential for violence, human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and further displacement of people which impact all countries of the Great Lakes region.

“The Security Council urges regional support for initiatives aimed at promoting inclusive dialogue amongst national stakeholders and stresses the importance of opening political space to enable the full and free participation of peaceful political parties, civil society and the media in the political process. The Security Council further urges regional support for strengthening and improving capacity for elections and governance in the countries of the Great Lakes region. The Council calls on member states in the Great Lakes region to take steps to ensure that electoral processes promote peace and security through timely, peaceful, inclusive and credible elections, in line with countries’ own constitutions and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, as applicable.

“The Security Council is gravely concerned with the continued illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources in the eastern DRC. The Council urges the signatory states of the PSC Framework, regional organizations and the international community to coordinate their efforts to undercut the economic lifelines of armed groups that benefit from the illegal exploitation of and trade in natural resources, and prevent the exploitation of women and children in the trade of these resources.

“The Security Council takes note of the Regional Strategic Framework for the Great lakes region 2016-2017 (RSF GLR), presented to the Council by the Secretary-General, which outlines the United Nations development approach in support of the implementation of the PSC Framework, under six pillars: sustainable natural resource management, economic integration and cross-border trade; food security and nutrition; mobility; youth and adolescents; sexual and gender-based violence; and justice and conflict prevention.

“The Security Council also notes that the RSF GLR seeks to shift the illegal exploitation of natural resources into legal, regulated business, more sustainable use of natural resources and its transformation into development outcomes, implying the transparent and accountable management of these

resources, which could result in significant earnings for the states and the communities.

“The Security Council without prejudice to the conclusions of the future mandate review of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region also takes note of the Roadmap of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the priorities identified for regional action.

“The Security Council stresses that the 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region and the PSC Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region are mutually reinforcing, and are crucial tools to achieve long term peace and prosperity. The Council emphasizes that the PSC Framework demonstrates that peace, security and development are interlinked and underscores the importance of strengthening regional cooperation, including the deepening of economic integration.

“The Security Council urges the donor community to contribute to the implementation of the RSF GLR and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region’s roadmap, as an effective platform for partnership, in support of member states in the national and regional commitments aimed to address the root causes of conflicts, promote economic development and cooperation, and bring about durable peace in the Great Lakes region.

“The Security Council commends the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and welcomes the Private Sector Investment Conference which took place in Kinshasa, DRC on 24-25 February 2016, jointly organized by the Office of the Special Envoy and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and hosted by the Government of the DRC.

“The Security Council further stresses that the momentum generated by the Private Sector Investment Conference should be built upon through the operationalization of the ICGLR Private Sector Forum to realize investments, stimulate job creation and livelihood opportunities as effective tools for conflict prevention and the consolidation of peace and security in the Great Lakes region.

“The Security Council underscores that solutions to the prevailing situation in the Great Lakes region should come within a regional perspective, by addressing the root causes of conflicts, many of which are regional in nature, with cross-border issues linked to the eastern DRC assuming crucial significance, due to the large flows of natural resources and migrants and refugees, and activities of armed groups and criminal networks across the borders.

“The Security Council stresses that the forced displacement of millions of persons in the Great Lakes region is a key driver of conflict, leading to regional instability, insecurity, humanitarian consequences and human rights violations and abuses.

“The Security Council encourages regional initiatives aimed at increasing youth employment and livelihoods, to enhance young people’s economic self-

sufficiency and the development of entrepreneurial skills, particularly marginalized adolescents and young people in the border areas of the Great Lakes region countries and those formerly associated with armed groups.

“The Security Council shares the view expressed in the RSF GLR that there is an urgent need to address violence and discrimination against women and girls, including rape and other forms of sexual violence in the Great Lakes region and take into account the link between women’s participation in peace and security decision-making, for peace and gender equality.

“The Security Council supports the regional initiatives on the issue of gender related violence in armed conflict to influence regional and local decision makers, aimed at the implementation of the commitments of the Kampala Declaration addressing impunity for gender based crimes at the country level and to improve women’s visibility, empowerment and resilience.

“The Security Council, noting the link between justice and conflict prevention, calls upon countries of the Great Lakes region to hold accountable perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and to effectively support measures of conflict prevention, by ending the culture of impunity.

“The Security Council welcomes efforts by national governments to reverse such trend by setting a strategy that seeks to realize tangible improvements in holding accountable those responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law and to build trust between citizens and governments.

“The Security Council underlines the importance of peacebuilding efforts to prevent relapses into conflict and encourages close cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and relevant regional organizations.

“The Security Council takes note of the priority “Interventions” set in the RSF GLR to strengthen institutions, mechanisms and capacities for conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace building, through cross-border initiatives and partnerships at the regional level, including the ICGLR and civil society organizations; strengthen regional efforts by increasing controls on the supply of small arms and light weapons which are a major source of conflict in the Great Lakes region; enhance judicial cooperation, including law enforcement, border control, prosecution services, judicial bodies and the legal profession, specially by improving cooperation between governments, justice institutions and local communities, particularly in cross border areas of the Great Lakes region.”

ANEXO I

Relatório do Conselho de Segurança sobre a República Democrática do
Congo



Security Council

Distr.: General
30 March 2016

Resolution 2277 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7659th meeting, on
30 March 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), especially its resolutions 2211 (2015), 2198 (2015), 2147 (2014), 2136 (2014), and 2098 (2013),

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peace-keeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and *emphasizing* the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Recalling that the Government of the DRC bears the primary responsibility to protect civilians within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including protection from crimes against humanity and war crimes,

Recalling the commitments under the PSC Framework by all States of the region not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, and to neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups,

Noting that eastern DRC has continued to suffer from recurring cycles of conflict and persistent violence by armed groups, both Congolese and foreign, *recalling* the strategic importance of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the Region, and *reiterating* its call to all signatories to fulfil promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments under this agreement in order to address the root causes of conflict and put an end to recurring cycles of violence, and promote lasting regional development,

Encouraging the continuation of efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU) to restore peace and security in eastern DRC, *encouraging* the Government of the DRC to ensure continuous close cooperation with these and other international parties,



and *recognizing* the efforts of the Government of the DRC aiming at the achievement of peace and national development,

Reiterating its deep concern regarding the security and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC due to ongoing destabilizing activities of foreign and domestic armed groups, *expressing* particular concern at the reports of growing inter-communal violence in some areas of eastern DRC, *stressing* the importance of neutralizing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and all other armed groups in the DRC, and *recognizing* the efforts of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) in that regard,

Expressing concern at the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources by armed groups, and the negative impact of armed conflict on protected natural areas, which undermines lasting peace and development for the DRC, and *encouraging* the Government of the DRC to continue efforts to safeguard those areas,

Remaining deeply concerned by the persistent high levels of violence and violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, *condemning* in particular those involving targeted attacks against civilians, widespread sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children by certain parties to the conflict, the forced displacement of significant numbers of civilians, extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests, *recognizing* their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in the DRC, and *emphasizing that* all those responsible for all such violations and abuses must be swiftly apprehended, brought to justice and held accountable,

Remaining greatly concerned by the humanitarian situation that continues to severely affect the civilian population, in particular in eastern DRC, *expressing deep concern* regarding the very high number of internally displaced persons in the DRC, at more than 1.6 million, and the 170,000 refugees in the DRC, as well as the over 450,000 refugees from eastern DRC as a result of ongoing hostilities, as well as violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, *calling upon* the DRC and all States in the region to work towards the peaceful environment conducive to the realization of durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons, including their eventual voluntary return and reintegration in the DRC in conditions of safety and dignity, with the support, as appropriate, of the United Nations Country Team, *stressing* that any such solution should be in line with relevant obligations under international refugee law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and *stressing* the need to manage the closure of camps in a manner that respects the rights of internally displaced persons, in accordance with international law,

Expressing further concern at increased impediments to humanitarian access in eastern DRC resulting from insecurity, and attacks against humanitarian actors and assets, and *calling upon* all parties in the conflict to respect the impartiality, independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors,

Noting with deep concern the delays in the preparation of the presidential elections scheduled for November 2016, in accordance with the Constitution, and that the update of the electoral register has not yet begun,

Stressing the crucial importance of a peaceful and credible electoral cycle, in accordance with the Constitution, for stabilization and consolidation of

constitutional democracy in the DRC, *expressing deep concern* at increased restrictions of the political space in the DRC, in particular recent arrests and detention of members of the political opposition and of civil society, as well as restrictions of fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of expression and opinion, and *recalling* the need for an open, inclusive and peaceful political dialogue among all stakeholders focused on the holding of elections, while ensuring the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights, paving the way for peaceful, credible, inclusive, transparent and timely elections in the DRC, particularly presidential and legislative elections by November 2016, in accordance with the Constitution, while respecting the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

Remaining deeply concerned by reports of increased serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed by some members of the FARDC, the National Intelligence Agency (ANR), the Republican Guard and Congolese National Police (PNC), including against members of the opposition and of civil society in the context of the electoral process, *urging* all parties to refrain from violence and provocation, and *emphasizing* that the Government of the DRC must respect human rights and comply with the principle of proportionality in the use of force,

Welcoming the agreement between the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and the National Human Rights Commission to monitor and investigate all allegations of human rights violations and abuses before, during and after the electoral process, *noting with concern* the lack of progress in the investigations against alleged perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses committed during the 2011 electoral process as well as reports of instrumentalization of judicial institutions for political purposes, *and calling for* further efforts to hold those responsible to account,

Recalling the importance of fighting impunity within all ranks of the FARDC and PNC, *commending* the DRC authorities for recent prosecutions and condemnations of FARDC and PNC officers for crimes against humanity and war crimes, and *stressing the need* for the Government of the DRC to continue to ensure the increased professionalism of its security forces,

Taking note of the adoption by the National Assembly of the law implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in December 2015, *stressing* the need for continued cooperation with the ICC by the Government of the DRC, and *stressing* the importance of actively seeking to hold accountable those responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions on women, peace and security, on children and armed conflicts, and on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, also *recalling* the conclusions on children and armed conflicts in the DRC (S/AC.51/2014/3) adopted on 18 September 2014 by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflicts pertaining to the parties in armed conflicts of the DRC, and *welcoming* efforts of the Government of the DRC in this regard,

Welcoming the efforts of MONUSCO and international partners in delivering training in human rights, international humanitarian law, gender mainstreaming, child protection and protection from sexual and gender-based violence for Congolese security institutions and underlining its importance,

Welcoming the efforts of the Government of the DRC, including the Presidential Adviser on Sexual Violence and the Recruitment of Children, to cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence, and MONUSCO, to implement the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence by the FARDC, and to combat impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, including sexual violence committed by the FARDC,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2014/181) which includes a list of parties credibly suspected of committing patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, being on the Security Council agenda,

Reaffirming that the successful protection of civilians is critical to the fulfilment of MONUSCO's mandate and the delivery of an improved security environment, also *stressing* the importance of peaceful means and progress on key reforms to promote the protection of civilians,

Reaffirming its strong support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the DRC and MONUSCO in the implementation of their mandate, and *strongly encouraging* the continuation of their efforts,

Stressing the urgency of resuming joint operations between FARDC and MONUSCO against armed groups, *welcoming* that on 28 January 2016 the Government of the DRC and MONUSCO committed to resume cooperation with a view to carrying out joint military operations against the FDLR, as well as other armed groups, including the ADF, and *strongly encouraging* the urgent resumption of such operations,

Recalling that it is important that all MONUSCO contingents, including the contingents of the Intervention Brigade, are properly prepared and effectively equipped, staffed and supported to be able to sustain their commitment to carry out their respective tasks,

Reiterating its call on all parties to cooperate fully with MONUSCO and to remain committed to the full and objective implementation of the Mission's mandate, *reiterating* its condemnation of any and all attacks against peacekeepers, and *emphasizing* that those responsible for such attacks must be held accountable,

Reiterating its call upon the Secretary-General to take all measures deemed necessary to strengthen United Nations field security arrangements and improve the safety and security of all military contingents, police officers, military observers, and especially unarmed observers,

Underlining the importance of MONUSCO deterring any threats to the implementation of its mandate,

Emphasizing that MONUSCO's activities should be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding, prevention of relapse into armed conflict and progress towards sustainable peace and development,

Determining that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

PSC Framework

1. *Reiterates* that fulfilment of the commitments made by the Government of the DRC and all signatory States under the PSC Framework remains essential to the achievement of long term stability of eastern DRC and the region, and *urges* the signatories to redouble their efforts in order to fully and promptly implement their commitments in good faith, including not harbouring war criminals;

2. *Calls on* the Government of DRC, which has the primary responsibility for safeguarding the DRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to make further meaningful progress in implementing its commitments under the PSC Framework, in particular as regards the consolidation of State authority, reconciliation, tolerance and democracy, and to remain fully committed to protecting the civilian population through the swift establishment of professional, accountable and sustainable security forces, the deployment of an accountable Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, judiciary, prison and territorial administration and the consolidation of rule of law and promotion and protection of human rights;

3. *Notes with deep concern* the limited progress in those fields essential for the DRC's stabilization and *reiterates* its call to the Government of the DRC to take further steps to uphold its national commitments to Security Sector Reform (SSR), including the support of an effective and sustainable Rapid Reaction Force, and to implement fully and immediately the national Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme, all of which will require the allocation of necessary resources to the implementation of these critical processes;

4. *Calls for* continued national efforts to address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through ensuring the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO, as appropriate and within existing resources;

5. *Calls on* the United Nations Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, to continue his regional and international engagement in furtherance of peace, stability, and economic development in the DRC and the region, including through the promotion of timely, credible, and inclusive national elections, regional dialogue and by continuing, in close coordination with the Secretary-General Special Representative for the DRC, to lead, coordinate and assess the implementation of the national and regional commitments under the PSC Framework, as well as to continue his engagement in regional initiatives with key partners to address the underlying root causes of conflict;

6. *Takes note* of the United Nations Great Lakes Region Strategic Framework, and *urges* the donor community to provide the necessary support to help its implementation;

Political situation

7. *Calls on* the Government of the DRC and its national partners, including the CENI, to ensure a transparent and credible electoral process, in fulfilment of their primary responsibility to create propitious conditions for the forthcoming elections, including prioritization of those conditions necessary for the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for November 2016 in accordance with the Constitution;

8. *Urges* the Government as well as all relevant parties to ensure an environment conducive to a free, fair, credible, inclusive, transparent, peaceful and timely electoral process, in accordance with the Congolese Constitution, which includes free and constructive political debate, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, equitable access to media including State media, safety and freedom of movement for all candidates, as well as for election observers and witnesses, journalists, human rights defenders and actors from civil society including women;

9. *Calls for* the publication of a revised comprehensive electoral calendar for the full electoral cycle by the CENI and *calls on* the Government of the DRC to put swiftly in place an adequate electoral budget and an electoral code of conduct, and conduct without delay a credible update of the electoral register, to ensure the successful and timely holding of elections, in particular presidential and legislative elections on November 2016, in accordance with the Constitution, while respecting the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and further *calls upon* all stakeholders, to engage into an open and inclusive political dialogue over the holding of presidential elections, in accordance with the Constitution;

10. *Underlines the importance* of credible dialogue to ensure peaceful and credible presidential and legislative elections, in line with the Constitution, *expresses support* for the decision taken by the AU to undertake consultations on this dialogue, *urges* all national stakeholders to extend cooperation to the AU in this regard, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide political support to these efforts consistent with this resolution, including through his good offices;

Human Rights

11. *Urges* the Government of the DRC to hold accountable those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights, as applicable, in particular those that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, including those committed in the context of the electoral process, and *stresses the importance* to this end of both regional cooperation and cooperation with the ICC;

12. *Calls upon* the Congolese authorities to ensure the prosecution of those responsible for the crimes involving grave human rights violations and abuses committed in the context of the 28 November 2011 elections and current electoral process;

13. *Welcomes* efforts made by the Government of the DRC to combat and prevent sexual violence in conflict, including progress made in the fight against impunity through the arrest, prosecution and conviction of perpetrators from the FARDC and the PNC, and *encourages* the Government of the DRC to continue to strengthen its efforts in this area, including through the full implementation of its National Strategy and the commitments outlined in the Joint Communiqué between the Government of the DRC and the United Nations on the Fight Against Sexual Violence in Conflict adopted in Kinshasa on 30 March 2013;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of the DRC to continue its efforts to combat impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, including sexual violence committed by the FARDC at all levels, noting that failure to do so may result in the FARDC being named again in future Secretary-General's reports on sexual violence, and to

provide all necessary services and protection to survivors and victims, *and further calls upon* the Government of the DRC to take the necessary steps to ensure full compliance of its security forces with the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses, and to take steps to institutionalize the mechanisms put in place to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence by the FARDC;

15. *Welcomes* the progress made in the implementation of the Action Plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children by the FARDC, and *calls upon* the Government of the DRC to take all necessary steps to end and prevent violations and abuses against children, including those involving enlistment or detention of children by the FARDC;

Armed Groups

16. *Strongly condemns* all armed groups operating in the region and their violations of international humanitarian law as well as other applicable international law, and abuses of human rights including those involving attacks on the civilian population, United Nations personnel and humanitarian actors, summary executions, sexual and gender based violence and large scale recruitment and use of children in violation of applicable international law, and *reiterates* that those responsible must be held accountable;

17. *Demands* that the FDLR, the ADF, the LRA, and all other armed groups cease immediately all forms of violence and other destabilizing activities, including the exploitation of natural resources, and that their members immediately and permanently disband, lay down their arms and release children from their ranks, and *recalls* in this regard its resolution 2198 (2015) renewing the sanctions regime established by its resolution 1807 (2008);

18. *Calls for* the urgent resumption of joint operations by the FARDC and MONUSCO, in accordance with its mandate, to ensure all efforts possible are being made to neutralize the FDLR and other armed groups and *stresses* the need to carry out operations in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable;

19. *Reiterates* that the durable neutralization of the FDLR remains essential in bringing stability to and protecting civilians of the DRC and the Great Lakes region, *recalls* that the FDLR is a group under United Nations sanctions whose leaders and members include perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed, and have continued to promote and commit ethnically-based and other killings in Rwanda and the DRC, *encourages* the Government of the DRC, with the support of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, to engage regional actors to find a durable solution to the repatriation of disarmed FDLR members and dependents, and *encourages* further disarmament of FDLR active leadership and combatants;

20. *Condemns* the brutal killings of more than 500 civilians in the Beni area since October 2014, *expresses deep concern* regarding the persistence of violence in this region, *stresses the need* for a thorough and prompt investigation into these attacks in order to ensure that those responsible are held to account, *calls on* the Government of the DRC to take further military action, in accordance with

international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable, and with the support of MONUSCO in accordance with its mandate, to end the threat posed by the ADF and all other armed groups operating in the region;

21. *Requests* the Governments of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda to strengthen their collaboration to ensure the repatriation of former M23 combatants located in their territories consistent with the Nairobi declarations and in line with commitments under the PSC Framework, *calls upon* the former M23 leadership to cooperate fully with the repatriation of former combatants consistent with its commitment under the Nairobi declarations, and *reiterates the importance* of ensuring that all provisions of the signed documents are implemented swiftly and in good faith and, in this regard, that the M23 does not regroup, join other armed groups, or, resume military activities;

22. *Calls on* the Government of the DRC to continue to implement and provide without delay appropriate funding to its DDR Plan including with regards to reintegration, training, and preparation for resettlement in communities, as well as to weapons and ammunition management activities, in order to be able to effectively deal with former combatants, including those already under FARDC responsibility and acknowledges that the absence of a credible DDR process is preventing armed elements from laying down their weapons;

23. *Recognizes* the ongoing contribution of MONUSCO and FARDC in the fight against the LRA, *encourages* further efforts of the AU-Regional task force (AU-RTF), and *urges* greater cooperation, including operational cooperation, and information-sharing between MONUSCO, other United Nations Missions in the LRA-affected region, the AU-RTF, regional forces, national governments, international actors and non-governmental organisations, as appropriate, in tackling the threat of the LRA;

MONUSCO's mandate

24. *Decides* to extend until 31 March 2017 the mandate of MONUSCO in the DRC, including, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, its Intervention Brigade;

25. *Decides* that MONUSCO will maintain an authorized troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units;

26. *Takes note* of the recommendation of the Secretary-General in his letter of 16 December 2015 ([S/2015/983](#)) to reduce the MONUSCO Force by 1,700 troops, taking into account progress in the development of an exit strategy and in addressing the threat posed by armed groups;

27. *Recalls* the reduction of the MONUSCO Force by 2,000 troops endorsed in paragraph 3 of its resolution 2211 (2015), *reaffirms* its intention to make the troop reduction permanent through a revised troop ceiling, and to consider any further troop reduction once significant progress has been achieved regarding the priorities of MONUSCO's mandate, consistent with paragraph 29 below, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report specifically on this issue in his next report pursuant to paragraph 50 below;

28. *Reiterates* that any future reconfigurations of MONUSCO and its mandate should be determined in consultation with the Government of the DRC on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground and, in the context of implementation by the Government of the DRC and all other signatories of the PSC Framework, progress towards the objectives set out in paragraph 29 a) and b) below;

29. *Decides* that the strategic priorities of MONUSCO are to contribute to the following objectives:

(a) Protection of civilians, through a comprehensive approach involving all components of MONUSCO, including through reduction of the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups and of violence against civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children to a level that can be effectively managed by the Congolese justice and security institutions;

(b) Stabilization through the establishment of functional, professional, and accountable state institutions, including security and judicial institutions, and through support to the creation of an environment conducive to peaceful, credible and timely elections reducing the risk of instability, including open political space, and promotion and protection of human rights;

30. *Reiterates* that multi-dimensional peacekeeping requires a comprehensive approach, and *further requests* all components of the MONUSCO Force as well as its police and the civilian components to work together in an integrated way;

31. *Notes* that drivers behind different armed groups' activities are varied and that there is no purely military solution to the problem of armed groups, *underlines* the importance of enhanced political and conflict analysis to inform comprehensive military and civil responses to these armed groups across MONUSCO, including through collecting and analysing information on the criminal networks which support these armed groups, and *further underlines* the need for tailored responses in tackling armed groups;

32. *Stresses* the need for coordination and cooperation between the Government of the DRC and other national authorities, United Nations entities and development actors to stabilize, improve security situation and assist in restoration of State authority;

33. *Reaffirms* that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources;

34. *Authorizes* MONUSCO, in pursuit of the objectives described in paragraph 29 above, to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate within its capabilities and areas of deployment;

35. *Decides* that the mandate of MONUSCO shall include the following priority tasks, bearing in mind that these tasks as well as those in paragraph 36 below are mutually reinforcing tasks:

(i) Protection of civilians

(a) Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, including by deterring, preventing and stopping armed groups from inflicting violence on the populations, paying particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian

personnel and human rights defenders, with a focus on violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, as well as in the context of elections, and mitigating the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation;

(b) Work with the Government of the DRC to identify threats to civilians and implement existing prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation, including joint-planning, to ensure the protection of civilians from abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses committed against children and persons with disabilities, and *requests* MONUSCO to accelerate the coordinated implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence;

(c) Enhance its interaction with civilians to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities through a comprehensive public outreach programme, to strengthen its early warning mechanism, and to increase its efforts to monitor and document violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, including in the context of elections;

(d) Neutralize armed groups through the Intervention Brigade: in support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collection and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade in cooperation with the whole of MONUSCO, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, and in accordance with the standing operating procedures applicable to persons who are captured or who surrender, and with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations-support to non-United Nations forces (HRDDP), prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities;

(e) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of DRC to ensure actions against armed groups are supported by civilian and police components as part of consolidated planning which provides a comprehensive response to area-based stabilization efforts;

(f) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation with other international partners, in the DDR of Congolese combatants not suspected of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or abuses of human rights, into a peaceful civilian life in line with a community-based approach that is coordinated under the framework of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), while paying specific attention to the needs of children formerly associated with armed forces and groups;

(g) Provide support to the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) process to return and reintegrate foreign combatants not suspected of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or abuses of human rights and their dependents to a peaceful civilian life in their country of origin, or a receptive third country while paying specific attention to the needs of children formerly associated with armed forces and groups;

(ii) Political situation

(a) Promote peace consolidation and inclusive and transparent political dialogue among all Congolese stakeholders, consistent with the Constitution, with a view to furthering reconciliation and democratization, while ensuring the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights, paving the way for the holding of elections, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 8 above;

(b) Monitor, report to the Security Council, and follow-up on human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including in the context of elections, to report on restrictions on political space and violence in the context of the elections, and support the United Nations system in-country to ensure that any support provided by the United Nations shall be consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law and refugee law as applicable;

(c) Provide technical assistance and logistical support for the revision of the electoral register, and, only upon notification to the Security Council by the Secretary-General that the conditions outlined in paragraph 8 are being met, provide logistical support, as appropriate and in coordination with Congolese authorities and the UNCT, to facilitate the electoral cycle, and *decides* that this support will be continually assessed and reviewed according to the progress made by the Congolese authorities in the steering of the electoral process, particularly on presidential elections, in accordance with paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above;

(d) Support and work with the authorities of the DRC to arrest and bring to justice those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the country, including leaders of armed groups, including through cooperation with States of the region and the ICC;

(e) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC to promote human rights, in particular civil and political rights, and to fight impunity, including through the implementation of the Government's "zero tolerance policy" with respect to discipline and human rights and international humanitarian law violations, committed by elements of the security sector;

(f) Continue to collaborate with the Government of the DRC in the swift and vigorous implementation of the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence against children by the FARDC, and continue dialogue with all listed parties to obtain further commitments and work towards the development and implementation of action plans to prevent and end violations and abuses against children;

(iii) Stabilisation

Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation with other international partners, in the implementation of the revised ISSSS and related Provincial Stabilization Plans, and lead the coordination and oversight of the ISSSS;

(iv) Protection of the United Nations

Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

36. Further authorizes MONUSCO to use its capacities for the following essential tasks:

(i) Security Sector Reform (SSR)

(a) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC for the reform of the police, including by contributing, in compliance with the HRDDP, to the provision of training to units of the PNC and including human rights training;

(b) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC to encourage and accelerate national ownership of security sector reform by the Government of the DRC, including through developing a national strategy for the establishment of effective and accountable security institutions, as well as the development of a clear and comprehensive SSR implementation roadmap including benchmarks and timelines, and play a leading role in coordinating the support for SSR provided by international and bilateral partners and the United Nations system;

(c) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in compliance with the HRDDP, for army reform that would enhance its accountability, efficiency, self-sustainability, training, vetting and effectiveness, while noting that any support provided by the UN, including in the form of rations and fuel, should be subject to appropriate oversight and scrutiny;

(d) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC for the implementation of any appropriate recommendations for justice and prison sector reforms as contained in the final report of the Etats généraux de la Justice, including on the fight against impunity, for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, in order to develop independent, accountable and functioning justice and security institutions;

(ii) Arms embargo

Monitor the implementation of the arms embargo as described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2198 (2015) in cooperation with the Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004), and in particular observe and report on flows of military personnel, arms or related materiel across the eastern border of the DRC, including by using, as specified in the letter of the Council dated 22 January 2013 ([S/2013/44](#)), surveillance capabilities provided by unmanned aerial systems, seize, collect, record and dispose of arms or related materiel brought into the DRC in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 2198 (2015), and exchange relevant information with the Group of Experts;

(iii) Mining activities

Encourage the consolidation of an effective national civilian structure that controls key mining activities and manages in an equitable manner the extraction, transport, and trade of natural resources in eastern DRC;

Child protection, Sexual Violence and Abuse

37. *Requests* MONUSCO to take fully into account child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of the DRC in ensuring that the protection of children's rights is taken into account, inter alia, in DDR processes and in SSR as well as during interventions leading to the separation of children from the FARDC and armed groups in order to end and prevent violations and abuses against children;

38. *Requests* MONUSCO to take fully into account gender considerations as a crosscutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of the DRC in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels, including in stabilisation activities, SSR and DDR processes, as well as in the national political dialogue and electoral processes, through, inter alia, the provision of gender advisers, and *further requests* enhanced reporting by MONUSCO to the Council on this issue;

39. *Recalls* its Presidential statement [S/PRST/2015/22](#) and its resolution 2272 (2016), *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of MONUSCO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed through his reports to the Council about the Mission's progress in this regard, and *urges* troop- and police-contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action including predeployment awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

40. *Requests* MONUSCO to ensure that any support provided to national security forces is in strict compliance with the United Nations HRDDP, and *calls upon* the Government of the DRC to work with MONUSCO to support the promotion of DRC security service personnel with reputable human rights records;

Humanitarian Access

41. *Demands* that all parties allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel, equipment and supplies and the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need, in particular to internally displaced persons, throughout the territory of the DRC, respecting the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and relevant provisions of international law;

42. *Calls on* all Member States to generously contribute to the United Nations humanitarian appeal for the DRC to help ensure that United Nations humanitarian agencies and other international organizations are fully funded and able to address the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced people, survivors of sexual violence, and other vulnerable communities;

Support to the Group of Experts

43. *Expresses* its full support to the United Nations Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004), *calls for* enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, MONUSCO and the Group of Experts, *encourages* timely information exchange between MONUSCO and the Group of Experts, further *encourages* all parties and all States to ensure cooperation with the Group of Experts by individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their

control and *reiterates* its demand that all parties and all States ensure the safety of its members and its support staff, and unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;

Force transformation and Exit strategy

44. *Demands* that all relevant parties cooperate fully in the deployment, operations, and monitoring, verification, and reporting functions of MONUSCO, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security, and unrestricted freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, throughout the territory of the DRC;

45. *Requests* MONUSCO to continue to maximise Force interoperability, flexibility and effectiveness in the implementation of the entirety of MONUSCO's mandate, including by deploying rapidly deployable units and continuing to modernise and to strengthen the performance of the Force, bearing in mind the safety and security of all military contingents, police officers, military observers, and especially unarmed observers;

46. *Stresses* that MONUSCO's exit should be gradual and progressive, tied to specific targets to be jointly developed by the Government of the DRC and MONUSCO, in consultation with UNCT and other stakeholders;

47. *Reiterates its call* to the Government of the DRC to make further steps to enter into a regular strategic dialogue with the United Nations, building on the joint assessment process initiated in 2010 to jointly develop a roadmap and exit strategy for MONUSCO, including its Intervention Brigade;

48. *Reiterates* the need for a clear exit strategy of the Intervention Brigade, including through sustainable progress in ending the threat of armed groups and the implementation of sustainable SSR which may include the development of a Congolese rapid reaction force, *requests* the Secretary-General to report by December 2016 on the implementation of the tasks of the Intervention Brigade on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground, its integration within MONUSCO and its effectiveness, as well as on the progress of the transformation of the Force;

49. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to make recommendations on the transition and reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in the country, based on the comparative advantages of the Mission and the UNCT, in order to continue to streamline the tasks assigned to MONUSCO, and *urges* the international community and donors to support MONUSCO and the UNCT and calls upon the Government of the DRC and neighbouring States to remain engaged in this process;

Reports by the Secretary-General

50. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of MONUSCO's mandate, including its Intervention Brigade, as set out in this resolution, including on:

(i) the situation on the ground, including updates on operations to neutralize armed groups and any instances where the Mission's protection of civilians

obligations are not fully met, as well as sexual violence and the impact of conflict on women and children;

(ii) progress made by the DRC on protecting human rights, on the electoral process, including on the provisions of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above, and in the implementation of its commitments under the PSC Framework, including through the establishment and implementation of a national SSR roadmap, its provincial stabilisation plan supported by the ISSSS and on the implementation of the DDR and DDRRR plans;

(iii) progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review, notably the measures taken to transform MONUSCO's Force, including the deployment of rapidly deployable battalions, to become more efficient and effective in implementing its mandate;

(iv) progress on the definition of an exit strategy for MONUSCO, including the Intervention Brigade, and an assessment of the outcomes of the strategic dialogue with the Congolese authorities;

(v) the risks and their implications for the safety and the security for the United Nations personnel and facilities as a result of the possible military operations as well as measures taken to strengthen their security and mitigate risks;

51. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council every six months, in coordination with the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the DRC on the implementation of the commitments under the PSC Framework, and *requests* the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of the mandate of his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region by 30 September 2016 in order to present recommendations for the Special Envoy to better support Member States in the full implementation of their commitments under the PSC Framework, in full complementarity with MONUSCO, and taking into consideration the evolving challenges facing the region;

52. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide an update to the Council in his next report pursuant to paragraph 50 on the ways in which MONUSCO will be best prepared to address security risks and to monitor and report on human rights violations and abuses in the context of the elections, including in terms of deployment of the Force in areas identified as potential zones of instability and configuration of civilian and police component of MONUSCO;

53. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

ANEXO J

Relatório do Conselho de Segurança sobre a situação da Somália

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 March 2016

Resolution 2275 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7655th meeting, on
24 March 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia,

Strongly condemning recent attacks by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, *expressing* serious concern at the ongoing threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and *reiterating* its determination to support efforts, including through a comprehensive approach, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia, in accordance with applicable international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law,

Paying tribute to the bravery and sacrifices made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army personnel in the fight against Al-Shabaab,

Commending the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in supporting peace and reconciliation, the state formation process and the promotion and protection of human rights in Somalia,

Expressing its full support for the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSOM, Michael Keating, and the new Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and the Head of AMISOM, Francisco Caetano José Madeira,

Welcoming the holding of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Troop and Police Contributing Countries of AMISOM in Djibouti on 28 February 2016, and their commitment to improving coordination within AMISOM,

Welcoming the decision by the Federal Government of Somalia on an electoral model for 2016, *commending* the leaders of Somalia's existing and emerging federal member states for their efforts to reach a compromise, and *recalling* the commitment of the FGS and the regional state leaders to deliver an electoral process in August 2016, alongside the development and implementation of a roadmap between now and 2020, in particular to reach one person, one vote elections by 2020,



Underlining that a professional and inclusive security sector, with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, is a crucial part of long-term peace in Somalia and is important for conflict prevention,

Welcoming the Federal Government of Somalia's active engagement with the Universal Periodic Review process, *encouraging* full implementation of all accepted recommendations, *condemning* the continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia and *underscoring* the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those responsible for crimes involving violations or abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law,

UNSOM

1. *Decides* to extend UNSOM's mandate, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2158 (2014) until 31 March 2017;

2. *Underscores* the importance of UNSOM's support to the political process, including the provision of United Nations good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia's peace and reconciliation process, in particular with regard to the completion of the state formation and constitutional review processes as well as preparation of an inclusive, free, fair and transparent electoral process in 2016 and universal elections by 2020;

3. *Welcomes* the strong relationship between UNSOM and AMISOM, and *underlines* the importance of both entities continuing to strengthen the relationship further;

4. *Encourages* UNSOM to enhance its interaction across Somali civil society, including women, youth, business and religious leaders, and to help ensure that the views of civil society are incorporated in the various political processes;

5. *Requests* UNSOM to strengthen further and maintain its presence in all capitals of Interim Regional Administrations, subject to United Nations security requirements and the security situation, in order to support strategically the political, peace and reconciliation process, and security sector reform including by engaging with the Interim Regional Administrations in support of a federal structure;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to conduct a review of the United Nations presence in Somalia after the 2016 electoral process, to ensure that the United Nations is properly configured to support the next phase of state-building in Somalia, and to present options and recommendations to the Security Council by 30 January 2017;

7. *Underlines* the importance of rapid implementation of the provisions of resolution 2245 (2015) including continued efforts to enable UNSOS to respond swiftly to the operational demands in Somalia;

Somalia

8. *Welcomes* President Hassan Sheikh's and the Federal Government of Somalia's commitment to an inclusive and credible electoral process in August 2016 in line with the Mogadishu Declaration of 16 December 2015, *calls on* all leaders of the existing and emerging federal member states to fully cooperate with the Federal Government of Somalia in implementing the electoral process, *underlines* the

importance of implementing this commitment, and *emphasizes* the importance of reconciliation across the country as the basis of any long-term approach to stability as well as of continued progress towards the objective of universal elections by 2020, including by ensuring that the National Independent Electoral Commission and Boundaries and Federation Committee are operational without further delay;

9. *Underlines* the urgent need to ensure progress without further delay in the Somali-led constitutional review process, in order to establish an effective federal political system and a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration, *further underlines* in this regard the importance of supporting the peaceful and inclusive completion of the federal state formation process and providing effective mediation when necessary, and *encourages* close dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal and regional administrations, civil society and the Somali public in this regard, with the continued support of international and regional partners;

10. *Underlines* the Council's expectation that there should be no extension of electoral process timelines for either the executive or legislative branches and *calls on* all key actors and institutions in Somalia, including Parliament, to engage constructively to ensure progress on Vision 2016 before an electoral process in 2016;

11. *Underlines* the importance of governing in a spirit of national unity in an inclusive manner, in order to ensure no further delays in the political process;

12. *Stresses* the importance of adhering to the political road map between now and 2020, in particular in order to reach one person, one vote elections by 2020;

13. *Welcomes* President Hassan Sheikh's and the Federal Government of Somalia's commitment to security sector reform, including commitments to increase transparency and accountability of security sector financial management and to agree on the national security architecture to deliver early implementation of a national security policy, and *underlines* in this regard the need to ensure full consultation with, and support from, all Federal states and Interim Regional Administrations;

14. *Underlines* the importance of Security Sector Reform, in particular the rapid and effective development of the Somali National Army including the planned and coordinated integration of regional forces, to help facilitate more effective Somali National Army participation in joint operations with AMISOM, so that the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia are able to take on greater responsibility in maintaining peace and security and the protection of Somali citizens, and *further underscores* the importance of completing a National Threat Assessment, and agreeing and endorsing the National Security Policy by May 2016, and *calls upon* Member States to support the Federal Government of Somalia's efforts in this regard, as appropriate and in line with previous resolutions;

15. *Welcoming* the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia and emerging Federal states to establish basic policing services across Somalia, as outlined in the Heegan (Readiness) Plan in October 2015, including through UNSOM/AMISOM's partnership and *welcoming* capacity-building for the maritime police force in line with resolution 2246 (2015) by the Federal Government of Somalia with the support of UNSOM, and *looking forward* to progress towards its implementation;

16. *Encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia to implement fully the Action Plan of its Human Rights Roadmap and establish its National Human Rights Commission and to pass legislation, including legislation aimed at protecting human rights and investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of crimes involving human rights violations;

17. *Underlines* the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, by all parties to the conflict in Somalia;

18. *Reiterating* its concern at the high number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the ongoing forced evictions of IDPs in Somalia, *stresses* that any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks, *calls upon* the Federal Government of Somalia and all relevant actors to strive to provide concrete durable solutions for internal displacement, and *further calls upon* the Federal Government of Somalia and all relevant actors to strive to create the conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs with the support of the international community;

19. *Expresses* concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, *commends* the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors to deliver life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, *condemns* any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance, *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia, *underlines* the importance of proper accounting in international humanitarian support, and *encourages* national disaster management agencies in Somalia to scale up capacity with support from the United Nations to take a stronger leadership role in coordination of humanitarian response;

20. *Reaffirms* the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, *stresses* the importance of their participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, *notes* that women are not adequately represented in most of the assemblies of the new interim regional administrations and *urges* the Federal Government of Somalia and Interim Regional Administrations to continue to promote increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in Somali institutions including through realising the Federal Government of Somalia's commitment to ensure the reservation of 30% of seats for women in the 2016 elections;

21. *Welcomes* Somalia's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, *encourages* full implementation of the Convention as well as ratification of or accession to its Optional Protocols, and underscores the need to strengthen the legal framework for the protection of children;

22. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of this resolution, including through oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, with the first written report by 12 May 2016 and every 120 days thereafter;

23. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

ANEXO K

Relatório do Conselho de Segurança sobre a situação do Afeganistão



Security Council

Distr.: General
15 March 2016

Resolution 2274 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7645th meeting, on
15 March 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolution 2210 (2015) extending through 17 March 2016 the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as established by resolution 1662 (2006),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, as well as its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their country and strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and development and constitutional democracy,

Recalling the completion at the end of 2014 of the Transition (Inteqal) Process and the initiation of the Transformation Decade (2015-2024) with the assumption of full responsibility for the security sector by Afghan institutions, *recognizing* that transition is not only a security process but also entails the full assumption of Afghan leadership and ownership in governance and development, and *affirming* that the United Nations support in Afghanistan takes full account of the completion of the transition process in Afghanistan,

Emphasizing the Kabul Process towards the primary objective of reinforced Afghan leadership and ownership, strengthened international partnership and regional cooperation, improved Afghan governance, enhanced capabilities of Afghan security forces, economic growth, sustainable development and better protection for the rights of all Afghan citizens, in particular women and girls, and *welcoming* specifically the commitments made by the Afghan Government,

Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach to address the security, economic, governance and development challenges in Afghanistan, which are of an interconnected nature, and *recognizing* that there is no purely military solution to ensure the stability of Afghanistan,

Welcoming the start of the second year of the National Unity Government and *emphasizing* the importance of all parties in Afghanistan working within its framework in order to achieve a unified, peaceful and prosperous future for all the people of Afghanistan,



Welcoming further the strategic consensus between the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community on a renewed and enduring partnership for the Transformation Decade based on their refreshed mutual commitments as laid down in the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) adopted by the Senior Officials Meeting on 5 September 2015 in Kabul, *welcoming* progress made towards meeting the mutual commitments set out in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) and reaffirmed at the 2014 London Conference, to support the sustainable economic growth and development of Afghanistan, and *reaffirming* the importance of continued efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community towards meeting their mutual commitments, and *looking forward* to the Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan to be held in Brussels in October 2016,

Affirming that sustainable progress on security, political stability, governance, fiscal sustainability, human rights, especially women's rights, rule of law and development as well as the cross-cutting issues of counter-narcotics, anti-corruption and accountability are mutually reinforcing and that governance and development programmes should be consistent with the goals set forth in the Tokyo Declaration and be consistent with the Government of Afghanistan's reform agenda, and *welcoming* the continuing efforts of the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to address these challenges through a comprehensive approach,

Reaffirming specifically in this context its support for the implementation, under the leadership and ownership of the Afghan people, of the commitments set out in the London and Kabul Conferences Communiqués, and in the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) outcome document of the Afghan Government reform agenda and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, as part of the comprehensive implementation strategy to be taken forward by the Government of Afghanistan with the support of the region and the international community, and with a coordinating role for the United Nations as facilitator and co-convener of donors, consistent with the Kabul Process,

Welcoming the Afghan government reform programme entitled "Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership" that contains strategic policy priorities for Afghanistan towards realizing self-reliance in the Transformation Decade for improving security, political stability, economic and fiscal stabilization, advancing good governance, including electoral reform and strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly in relation to women and girls, fighting corruption and the illicit economy, including narcotics, and paving the way for enhanced private sector investment and sustainable, social, environmental and economic development, and in this context *affirming* its support for the implementation of this reform programme under leadership and ownership of the Government of Afghanistan,

Stressing the crucial importance of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, stability and economic and social development in Afghanistan, *recalling* the importance of the Kabul Declaration of 22 December 2002 on Good-Neighbourly Relations (Kabul Declaration) ([S/2002/1416](#)), *welcoming*, in this regard, the continued commitment of the international community to support stability and development in Afghanistan, and *noting*

international and regional initiatives such as the two Afghan-led regional processes, namely the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan and the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) process, as well as other initiatives such as the Trilateral Summit of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, the Trilateral Summit of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey and the Trilateral Summit of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the UK, as well as those by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Organization (CSTO) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),

Commending the outcome of the Fifth Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Ministerial Conference, convened in Islamabad in December 2015, where Afghanistan and its regional partners, while stating their belief that “a secure, peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan, with strong commitment to human rights” is “vital to peace, stability and prosperity of the region as a whole”, recognized that “Afghanistan is one of the countries at the forefront of the war against terrorism, fighting regional and international terrorist groups and safeguarding the region against the spread of terrorism”, reaffirmed that it is their “collective responsibility to help and support Afghanistan in combating” the collective challenges it faces, and urged “the international community to stand by its commitments made during the London Conference of continued financial support to Afghanistan’s National Unity Government”, *welcoming* the confidence-building measures on Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Narcotics and Trade, Commerce and Investment Opportunity, and those on Education, Disaster Management and Regional Infrastructure, *welcoming* the Sixth Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference, to be held in New Delhi in 2016, and *noting* that the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process is intended to complement and cooperate with, and not substitute for, existing efforts of regional organizations, particularly where they relate to Afghanistan,

Welcoming also the outcome of the high-level segment of the UNHCR Executive Committee on the Afghan refugee situation held in Geneva on 6 and 7 October 2015, and the International Conference on the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries, held in Geneva on 2 and 3 May 2012, and *looking forward* to the further implementation of the joint communiqué of the Conference, aimed at increased sustainability of returns and continued support for host countries, through sustained support and directed efforts of the international community,

Stressing the important role that the United Nations will continue to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by coordinating amongst international donors and supporting the Afghan Government’s efforts in the role it plays in leading and coordinating between the Government and the international community and by working closely with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to advocate for allocation of critical international resources for Afghanistan, all of this consistent with the principle of Afghan leadership, ownership and sovereignty in governance and development and in line with the Kabul Process and the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) and based on the Government of Afghanistan’s reform agenda, including, jointly with the Government of Afghanistan, the coordination and monitoring of efforts in implementing the Kabul Process through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in support of the priorities set up by the Government of Afghanistan and affirmed at the Tokyo and London Conferences; and *expressing* its

appreciation and strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Afghanistan and in particular the women and men of UNAMA who are serving in difficult conditions to help the people of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the March 2015 Portfolio Review presented by the UN Country Team to the Government of Afghanistan, which highlights the work of the United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes in meeting the development objectives and expectations of the people of Afghanistan,

Stressing the importance of a comprehensive and inclusive, Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political process in Afghanistan to support reconciliation for all those who are prepared to reconcile as laid forth in the 20 July 2010 Kabul Conference Communiqué on dialogue for all those who renounce violence, have no links to international terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida, respect the constitution, including its human rights provisions, notably the rights of women, and are willing to join in building a peaceful Afghanistan, and further elaborated in the 5 December 2011 Bonn Conference Conclusions supported by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community, with full respect for the implementation of measures and application of the procedures introduced by the Security Council in its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2160 (2014) and 2255 (2015), as well as other relevant resolutions of the Council,

Welcoming the direct talks held in 7 July 2015 in Muree, Pakistan, between the Government of Afghanistan and Taliban representatives, facilitated by Pakistan and observed by China and the United States of America,

Recalling the Government of Afghanistan's commitments at the Kabul, Tokyo and London Conferences and in the agreement creating the National Unity Government to strengthen and improve Afghanistan's electoral process, including long-term electoral reform, in order to ensure that future elections will be transparent, credible, inclusive and democratic, *looking forward* to preparations for the upcoming parliamentary elections, and *emphasizing* the need for continued support of UNAMA, at the request of the Afghan authorities in this regard,

Reaffirming that Afghanistan's peaceful future lies in the building of a stable, secure, economically sustainable state, free of terrorism and narcotics and based on the rule of law, strengthened democratic institutions, respect for the separation of powers, reinforced constitutional checks and balances and the guarantee and enforcement of citizens' rights and obligations, *welcoming* the contribution of the International Contact Group to the United Nations efforts in coordinating and broadening international support for Afghanistan,

Underlining the importance of operationally capable, professional, inclusive and sustainable Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) for meeting Afghanistan's security needs, with a view to lasting peace, security and stability both in Afghanistan and the region, *stressing* the long-term commitment of the international community to support, throughout the Transformation Decade (2015-2024), the further development, including training, and professionalization of the ANDSF, and the recruitment and retention of women to the ANDSF, *acknowledging* the contribution of Afghanistan's partners to peace and security in Afghanistan, *welcoming* the agreement between NATO and Afghanistan which led to the establishment on 1 January 2015 of the non-combat Resolute Support Mission, for training, advising and assisting the ANDSF at the invitation of the Islamic Republic

of Afghanistan, *noting* the responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan to sustain a sufficient and capable ANDSF, *noting also* NATO and contributing partners' contribution to the financial sustenance of the ANDSF and the long-term NATO-Afghanistan "Enhanced Enduring Partnership", with a clear view to the gradual assumption of full financial responsibility by the Government of Afghanistan for its own security forces, *recalling* in this context resolution 2189 (2014), and *looking forward* to the 2016 Warsaw NATO summit deliberations on Afghanistan,

Stressing the need for all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, through the country team mechanism and a "One-UN" approach under the guidance of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to further increase its focus on joint programming at all levels, to avoid duplication, ensure value for money and reduce transaction costs, as well as to establish progress indicators and transition benchmarks with the view to moving from co-ownership to affirming the full ownership and management of programmes by the Government, in full consultation and cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, to achieve further greater coherence, coordination, efficiency and full alignment with the Government of Afghanistan's reform agenda,

Encouraging the international donor community to continue their civilian and development efforts from 2017 to 2020 to assist the Government and the people of Afghanistan in advance of the Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan to be held in Brussels in October 2016 and hosted by the European Union, and *also encouraging* the international community to continue their contributions consistent with the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) in a coordinated manner with the Afghan authorities and UNAMA, with a view to strengthening Afghan leadership and ownership as reaffirmed in the Kabul Process and at the Tokyo Conference in July 2012 and the London Conference in December 2014,

Stressing the need to further improve the efficient and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, including through enhanced coordination among the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and between the United Nations and other donors, especially where it is most needed, *welcoming* the establishment of the United Nations Common Humanitarian Fund, and *supporting* the Afghan Government's essential role in the coordination of humanitarian assistance to its citizens,

Emphasizing the need for all, within the framework of humanitarian assistance, of upholding and respecting the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence,

Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the region based violent extremist activities by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, as well as Al-Qaida and other violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups, criminals and those involved in the production, trafficking or trade of illicit drugs, and the strong links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, including women, children, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel, including humanitarian and development workers, and *expressing also* its deep concern for the record number of civilian casualties, in particular women and children from

conflict-related violence in Afghanistan, as noted in the February 2016 UNAMA report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,

Recognizing the continuously alarming threats posed by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, as well as Al-Qaida, ISIL (Da'esh) affiliates and other violent and extremist groups and illegal armed groups as well as the challenges related to the efforts to address such threats, and *expressing* its serious concern over the harmful consequences of violent and terrorist activities by all the above-mentioned groups on the capacity of the Afghan Government to guarantee the rule of law, to provide security and basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the improvement and protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Expressing serious concern at the presence and potential growth of ISIL (Da'esh) affiliates in Afghanistan, and *affirming* its support to the efforts by the ANDSF to combat them as well as assistance by Afghanistan's international partners in this regard,

Recalling its resolutions 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, *expressing* its grave concern with the high number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, in particular women and children, the increasingly large majority of which are caused by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other violent and extremist groups and illegal armed groups, *condemning* the suicide attacks, often in civilian-populated areas, and the targeted and deliberate killings, in particular of women and girls, including high-level women officials and those promoting women's rights, as well as journalists, *reaffirming* that all parties to armed conflict must take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians, especially women, children and displaced persons, including from sexual violence and all other forms of gender-based violence, and that perpetrators of such violence must be held accountable, *calling for* all parties to comply with their obligations under international law including international humanitarian law and human rights law and for all appropriate measures to be taken to ensure the protection of civilians, and *recognizing* the importance of the ongoing monitoring and reporting to the United Nations Security Council, of the situation of civilians and in particular civilian casualties, *taking note* of the efforts made by Afghan and international forces in minimizing civilian casualties, and *noting* the February 2016 report by UNAMA on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and the December 2015 UNAMA special report on Kunduz Province,

Expressing also concern with the serious threat that anti-personnel mines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices (IED) pose to the civilian population, and *stressing* the need to refrain from the use of any weapons and devices prohibited by international law,

Supporting the Afghan Government's continued ban of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, *urging* prompt action to implement applicable regulations for the control of all explosive materials as well as raw materials and components, including detonators, that can be used to manufacture IEDs, thereby reducing the ability of Taliban, Al-Qaida and other violent and extremist groups to use them for that purpose, *noting* the need to enhance coordination and information-sharing, both between Member States and with the private sector, to prevent the flow of IED components to those groups, and *calling upon* the international community to support the Afghan Government's efforts in this regard,

Encouraging the international community and regional partners to further effectively support Afghan-led sustained efforts to address drug production and trafficking in a balanced and integrated approach, including through the JCMB's working group on counter-narcotics as well as regional initiatives, and *recognizing* the threat posed by the production, trade and trafficking of illicit drugs to international peace and stability in different regions of the world, and the important role played by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in this regard,

Taking note of the recent decrease in production and cultivation of drugs suggested by the 2015 UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey, *reiterating* the serious harm that opium cultivation, production and trafficking and consumption continue to cause to the stability, security, public health, social and economic development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, and *stressing* the important role of the United Nations to continue to monitor the drug situation in Afghanistan,

Acknowledging that illicit proceeds of drug trafficking significantly contribute to the financial resources of the Taliban and its associates, and *stressing* the need for increased coordinated regional efforts to combat the drug problem,

Welcoming the ongoing work of the Paris Pact Initiative as one of the most important frameworks in the fight against opiates originating in Afghanistan, *taking note* of the Vienna Declaration, and *emphasizing* the aim of the Paris Pact to establish a broad international coalition to combat the traffic of illicit opiates, as part of a comprehensive approach to peace, stability, and development in Afghanistan, the region and beyond,

Recalling the declaration addressed to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) by the Government of Afghanistan that there is no legal use for acetic anhydride in Afghanistan for the time being and that producing and exporting countries should abstain from authorizing the export of this substance to Afghanistan without the request from the Afghan Government, *encouraging*, pursuant to resolution 1817 (2008), Member States to increase their cooperation with the INCB, notably by fully complying with the provisions of article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, and *encouraging* further international and regional cooperation with a view to prevent the diversion and trafficking of chemical precursors into Afghanistan,

Recalling its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006), 1894 (2009) and 2222 (2015) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) on women and peace and security, its resolution 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014) on children and armed conflict, and 2117 (2013) on small arms and light weapons, and *taking note* of the reports of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict ([S/2015/453](#)), on Children and Armed Conflict ([S/2015/409](#)), and in particular the report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan ([S/2015/336](#)) as well as the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General of 7 March 2016 (S/2016/218);

2. *Expresses* its appreciation for the United Nations long-term commitment, including throughout the Transformation Decade, to support the Government and the people of Afghanistan and *reiterates* its full support to the work of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and *stresses* the need to ensure continued adequate resourcing for UNAMA to fulfil its mandate;

3. *Welcomes* the work by the Tripartite Review Commission on the United Nations in Afghanistan, established in accordance with Security Council resolution 2210 (2015) in order to examine the role, structure and activities of all United Nations entities in Afghanistan, in full consultation and engagement with the Government of Afghanistan and key stakeholders, including the donor community, and *acknowledges* the conclusions and recommendations contained in its final report;

4. *Decides* to extend until 17 March 2017 the mandate of UNAMA, as defined in its resolutions 1662 (2006), 1746 (2007), 1806 (2008), 1868 (2009), 1917 (2010), 1974 (2011), 2041 (2012), 2096 (2013), 2145 (2014) and 2210 (2015), and paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 below;

5. *Recognizes* that the renewed mandate of UNAMA is in support of Afghanistan's full assumption of leadership and ownership in the security, governance and development areas, consistent with the Transformation Decade (2015-2024) and with the understandings reached between Afghanistan and the international community in the international conferences in Kabul (2010), London (2010 and 2014), Bonn (2011) and Tokyo (2012) and the Lisbon (2010), Chicago (2012) and Wales (2014) Summits;

6. *Calls on* the United Nations, with the support of the international community, to support the Government of Afghanistan's reform agenda outlined in the document entitled "Realising Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnerships" regarding the issues of security, governance, justice and economic and social development and to support the full implementation of mutual commitments made on these issues at international Conferences, as well as on continuing implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy fully consistent with the principle of Afghan leadership, ownership and sovereignty reaffirmed in Kabul, Tokyo and London Conferences;

7. *Decides further* that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, within their mandate and in a manner consistent with Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership, will continue to lead and coordinate the international civilian efforts, in full cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan and in accordance with the London, Kabul and Tokyo Conferences Communiqués and the Bonn Conference Conclusions, with a particular focus on the priorities laid out below:

(a) promote, as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan Government's development and governance priorities, including through supporting the ongoing development and sequencing of the Government's reform agenda, mobilization of resources, coordination of international donors and organizations as facilitator and co-convenor of development policy fora, including in developing and

monitoring frameworks of mutual accountability, promoting coherent information sharing and analysis, design and delivery of development assistance in a manner consistent with Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership, and direction of the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in particular for counter-narcotics, reconstruction and development activities; at the same time, coordinate also in a manner consistent with the Afghan leadership, ownership and sovereignty, international partners for follow-up, in particular through information sharing, prioritize efforts to increase the proportion of development aid delivered through the Afghan Government, in line with the commitments made at the Kabul and Tokyo Conferences, and support efforts to increase the mutual accountability and transparency, and the effectiveness of aid use in line with the commitments made at the Kabul and Tokyo Conferences, including cost-effectiveness in this regard;

(b) support, at the request of the Afghan authorities, the organization of future Afghan elections, including the upcoming parliamentary elections, as well as to strengthen, in support of the Government of Afghanistan's efforts, including electoral reform efforts, the sustainability, integrity and inclusiveness of the electoral process, as agreed at the London, Kabul, Bonn and Tokyo Conferences and the Chicago Summit; and provide capacity-building and technical assistance to the Afghan institutions involved in this process in close consultation and coordination with the government of Afghanistan;

(c) provide outreach as well as good offices to support, if requested by and in close consultation with the government of Afghanistan, the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, including through support to the High Peace Council and its activities and proposing and supporting confidence-building measures also in close consultation with the government of Afghanistan within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and with full respect for the implementation of measures and application of the procedures introduced by the Security Council in its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011) and 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012) and 2255 (2015) as well as other relevant resolutions of the Council;

(d) support regional cooperation, with a view to assisting Afghanistan utilize its role at the heart of Asia to promote regional cooperation, and to work towards a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, building on the achievements made;

(e) continue, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to cooperate with and strengthen the capacity of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), to cooperate also with the Afghan Government and relevant international and local non-governmental organizations to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection, to promote accountability, and to assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a State party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights, including the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW);

(f) closely coordinate and cooperate, where relevant, with the non-combat Resolute Support Mission agreed upon between NATO and Afghanistan, as well as with the NATO Senior Civilian Representative;

8. *Calls on* UNAMA and the Special Representative to further increase efforts to achieve greater coherence, coordination and efficiency among relevant United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes in Afghanistan based on a “One-UN” approach in close cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan with a view to maximizing their collective effectiveness in full alignment with the Government of Afghanistan’s reform agenda, and continue to lead, in a manner fully consistent with the Afghan leadership, ownership and sovereignty, international civilian efforts aimed at reinforcing the role of Afghan institutions to perform their responsibilities, with an increased focus on capacity building in key areas identified by the Afghan Government, with a view, in all UN programmes and activities, to move towards a national implementation model with a clear action-oriented strategy for mutually agreed condition-based transition to Afghan leadership and ownership including making greater use of country systems, in the following priority areas:

(a) support through an appropriate UNAMA presence, to be determined in full consultation and cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, and in support of the Afghan Government’s efforts, implementation of the Kabul Process throughout the country, including through enhanced cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in line with the Government’s policies;

(b) support the efforts of the Afghan Government in fulfilling its commitments as stated at the London, Kabul, Bonn and Tokyo Conferences, to improve governance and the rule of law including transitional justice, budget execution and the fight against corruption, throughout the country in accordance with the Kabul Process and the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), with a view to helping bring the benefits of peace and the delivery of services in a timely and sustainable manner;

(c) coordinate and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including in support of the Afghan Government and in accordance with humanitarian principles, with a view to reinforcing the Government’s capacity, including by providing effective support to national and local authorities in assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and to creating conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees from neighbouring and other countries and internally displaced persons, with a particular focus on development solutions in areas of high returns;

9. *Calls upon* all Afghan and international parties to coordinate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and in efforts to promote the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country;

10. *Reiterates* the need to ensure security of United Nations staff and its support for the measures already taken by the Secretary-General in this regard;

11. *Stresses* the critical importance of a continued and broad subnational presence of UNAMA and other United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes in the provinces, in close consultation and coordination with and in support of the Afghan Government, in response to needs and with a view to security and including the objective of overall United Nations effectiveness, and *strongly supports* the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the coordination of all activities of United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes in Afghanistan based on a “One-UN” approach;

12. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to continue his current efforts to take necessary measures to address the security issues associated with the United Nations presence and, particularly *encourages* careful coordination with the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces;

13. *Underscores* the importance of a sustainable democratic development in Afghanistan with all Afghan institutions acting within their clearly defined areas of competence, in accordance with the relevant laws and the Afghan Constitution, and *welcomes*, in this regard, the commitment of the Government of Afghanistan at the Kabul Conference, reaffirmed at the Bonn and Tokyo Conferences, to deliver further improvements to the electoral process, including addressing the sustainability of the electoral process, and, *taking into account* the commitments by the international community and the Afghan Government made at the London, Kabul, Bonn, and Tokyo Conferences, *reaffirms* UNAMA's important supporting role, at the request of the Afghan Government, in the realization of these commitments, and *requests* that, upon the request of the Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA provide assistance to the relevant Afghan institutions to support the integrity and inclusiveness of the electoral process, including measures to enable the full and safe participation of women, *welcomes* the participation of women in the electoral process as candidates, registered voters and campaigners, and *further calls upon* members of the international community to provide assistance as appropriate;

14. *Welcomes* the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government to advance the peace process, including by the High Peace Council and the implementation of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, to promote an inclusive, Afghan-led and Afghan-owned dialogue on reconciliation and political participation as laid forth in the 20 July 2010 Kabul Conference Communiqué on dialogue for all those who as part of an outcome of such a process renounce violence, have no links to international terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida, respect the Constitution, including its human rights provisions, notably the rights of women, and are willing to join in building a peaceful Afghanistan, and as further elaborated in the principles and outcomes of the 5 December 2011 Bonn Conference Conclusions, and *encourages* the Government of Afghanistan to make use of UNAMA's good offices to support this process as appropriate, in full respect of the implementation of measures and procedures introduced by the Security Council in its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2160 (2014) and 2255 (2015), as well as other relevant resolutions of the Council;

15. *Welcomes* the recent appointment of chairman and senior members of the High Peace Council, and *expresses* support to its efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in the country;

16. *Welcomes also* in this regard the establishment in January 2016 of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the United States of America on the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation process, aimed at facilitating an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process with a view to achieving lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region, *welcomes* the finalization of the roadmap stipulating the status and steps in the process and the beginning of the implementation review of this roadmap, *takes note* of the work of the Group towards the holding of early direct peace talks between the Afghan Government and authorized representatives of the Taliban groups, *calls upon* the member countries of the Group to continue in their efforts, welcoming also

the important role of the International Contact Group as well as regional support, and also *calls upon* all those other actors in a position to do so to cooperate in creating an environment conducive to commencement of such a process, which will lead towards a political *settlement* resulting in the cessation of violence and durable peace in Afghanistan and further prosperity and stability to the region;

17. *Stresses* the role of UNAMA in supporting, if requested by and in close consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, while continuing to assess, including in collaboration with the AIHRC, the impact of the aforementioned peace process on human rights and gender, including on the promotion and protection of human rights and on the participation of women, and *encourages* the international community to assist the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan in this regard, politically and financially;

18. *Welcomes also* the measures taken by the Government of Afghanistan, including the publication, in June 2015, of the National Action Plan for the implementation of the Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and encourages it to continue to increase the participation of women as well as minorities and civil society in outreach, consultation and decision-making processes, *recalls* that women play a vital role in the peace process, as recognized in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and related resolutions, therefore *reiterates* the need for the full, equal and effective participation of women at all stages of peace processes, and *urges* their involvement in the development and implementation of post-conflict strategies in order to take account of their perspectives and needs as affirmed by the Bonn and Tokyo Conferences;

19. *Notes* the ongoing work of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1988 (2011), its role in supporting the peace and reconciliation process, *welcomes the continuation of* the cooperation of the Afghan Government, the High Peace Council and UNAMA with the Committee including its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, including through submitting travel ban exemption requests in support of the peace and reconciliation process to the Committee, providing relevant information for updating the 1988 List, and by identifying individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, as per the designation criteria set out in Security Council resolution 2255 (2015), *notes* that means of financing or supporting these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities includes but is not limited to proceeds derived from illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs originating in and transiting through Afghanistan, the trafficking of precursors into Afghanistan, the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Afghanistan, kidnap for ransom, extortion and other criminal activities, and *notes with concern* the increasing cooperation of the Taliban with other organizations involved in criminal activities;

20. *Reaffirms* its support to the ongoing Afghan-led regional effort within the framework of the “Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan”, *looks forward* to the next Ministerial Conference to be held in New Delhi (India) in 2016, *calls on* Afghanistan and its regional partners to keep up the momentum and continue their efforts to enhance regional dialogue and confidence through the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process, and *notes* that the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process is intended to

complement and cooperate with, and not substitute for, existing efforts of regional organizations, particularly where they relate to Afghanistan;

21. *Welcomes* ongoing efforts by the Government of Afghanistan, its neighbouring and regional partners and international organizations, including the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to foster trust and cooperation with each other as well as recent cooperation initiatives developed by the countries concerned and regional organizations, including Trilateral, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) Summits;

22. *Calls for* strengthening the process of regional cooperation, including measures to facilitate regional trade and transit, including through regional development initiatives such as the “Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative, and regional and bilateral transit trade agreements, expanded consular visa cooperation and facilitation of business travel, to expand trade, to increase foreign investments and to develop infrastructure, including infrastructural connectivity, energy supply, transport and integrated border management, with a view to strengthening Afghanistan’s role in regional economic cooperation, promoting sustainable economic growth and the creation of jobs in Afghanistan;

23. *Emphasizes* in this regard, the importance of strengthening local and regional networks of transportation that will facilitate connectivity for economic development, stability and self-sustainability, particularly the completion and maintenance of local railroad and land routes, the development of regional projects to foster further connectivity, and the enhancement of international civil aviation capabilities;

24. *Reaffirms* the central role played by the JCMB, in a manner consistent with Afghan leadership, ownership and sovereignty, in coordinating, facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the Government of Afghanistan’s reform agenda, and *calls upon* all relevant actors to enhance their cooperation with the JCMB in this regard, with a view to further improve its efficiency;

25. *Calls on* international donors and organizations and the Afghan Government to adhere to their commitments made at the Kabul and Tokyo Conferences and previous international conferences, and reaffirmed in the 2014 London Conference, and *reiterates* the critical importance of enhancing the predictability and effectiveness of aid by increasing on-budget assistance to Afghan government in tandem with the improvements to Afghan budget and expenditure systems and improving aid coordination and effectiveness, through ensuring transparency, combating corruption, and enhancing the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to coordinate aid;

26. *Reiterates* its support for the Government of Afghanistan, and in particular to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, in their task of securing their country and in their fight against terrorism and violent extremism, and *calls upon* the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, as well as Al-Qaida and other violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups, criminals

and those involved in the production, trafficking or trade of illicit drugs, and *encourages* the Government of Afghanistan to continue its efforts to prevent violent extremism with the support of the international community;

27. *Welcomes* the increasing cooperation between Afghanistan and relevant regional and neighbouring partners and organizations against the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, as well as Al-Qaida and other violent extremist and criminal groups and illegal armed groups;

28. *Reiterates* the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector through appropriate vetting procedures, training including on women's and children's rights and on gender issues in support of the implementation of resolution 1325 and Afghanistan's 1325 National Action Plan, mentoring, equipping and empowerment efforts, for both women and men, in order to accelerate progress towards the goal of self-sufficient, ethnically balanced and women-inclusive Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country, *stresses* the importance of the long-term commitment by the international community to ensure a capable, professional and sustainable Afghan National Security Force and *notes* in this context the establishment of the non-combat, train, advise and assist Resolute Support Mission, based on the bilateral agreements between NATO and Afghanistan and at the invitation of Afghanistan;

29. *Welcomes* in this context the continued progress in the development of the Afghan National Army and its improved ability to plan and undertake operations, and *encourages* sustained training efforts and assistance, including through the contribution of trainers, resources and Advisory Teams through the NATO Resolute Support Mission, and advice in developing a sustainable defence planning process as well as assistance in defence reform initiatives;

30. *Takes note* of the ongoing efforts of the Afghan authorities to enhance the capabilities of the Afghan National Police, *calls for* further efforts towards that goal and *stresses* the importance, in this context, of international assistance through financial support and provision of trainers and mentors, including the contribution of the NATO Resolute Support Mission, as agreed to and accepted by the Government of Afghanistan, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) contribution to this mission and the European Union's through its police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan), as well as the German Police Project Team (GPPT) and the contribution of the Russian Federation to the international effort supporting capabilities of the Afghan National Police by the recent transfer of non-repayable weapons and ammunition, *notes* the importance of a sufficient and capable police force for Afghanistan's long-term security, *takes note* of the commitment by the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police to develop an effective strategy for coordinating increased recruitment, retention, training, and capacity development for women in the Afghan National Police, as well as furthering the implementation of their gender integration strategy, and *welcomes* UNAMA's continued support for women police associations;

31. *Welcomes* the progress in the implementation by the Afghan Government of the programme of disbandment of illegal armed groups and its integration with the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, and *calls for* accelerated and harmonized efforts for further progress, with support from the international community;

32. *Condemns* in the strongest terms all attacks, including improvised explosive device attacks, suicide attacks, assassinations and abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan and international forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, and *condemns further* the use by the Taliban and other violent and extremist groups of civilians as human shields;

33. *Strongly condemns* the continued flow of weapons, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), military equipment and IED components to the Taliban, including the Haqqani network and other violent and extremist groups, *expresses* serious concern at the destabilizing impact of such weapons on the security and stability of Afghanistan, and emphasizing the need for enhancing control over the transfer of illicit SALW in this regard *encourages* Member States to share information, establish partnerships and develop national strategies and capabilities to counter IEDs;

34. *Further condemns* recent terrorist acts against diplomatic missions as well as all acts of violence against diplomatic and consular officials and other representatives of the international community in Afghanistan, which apart from endangering or taking innocent lives seriously impede the normal work of such officials and representatives;

35. *Notes* with concern the continued high incidence of attacks against humanitarian and development workers, including attacks on health-care workers and medical transports and facilities, *condemns* these attacks in the strongest terms emphasizing that the attacks impede efforts to aid the people of Afghanistan, and *calls on* all parties to ensure full, safe and unhindered access of all humanitarian actors, including United Nations staff and associated personnel, to comply fully with applicable international humanitarian law, and to respect the United Nations guiding principles of emergency humanitarian assistance;

36. *Recalls* the obligations of all States and parties to an armed conflict, in accordance with international humanitarian law, to respect and protect humanitarian personnel, including medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, and hospitals and other medical facilities, which must not be attacked, and to ensure that the wounded and sick receive, to the fullest extent practicable, and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required and *stresses* that those responsible for such violations and abuses shall be held accountable;

37. *Welcomes* the achievements to date in the implementation of the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan, *encourages* the Government of Afghanistan, with the support of the United Nations and all the relevant actors, to continue its efforts towards the removal and destruction of anti-personnel landmines, anti-tank landmines and explosive remnants of war in order to reduce the threats posed to human life and peace and security in the country, *expresses the need* to provide assistance for the care, rehabilitation, and economic and social reintegration of victims, including persons with disabilities and *calls on* the Government of Afghanistan, with support of UNAMA, UNMAS and relevant actors, to strengthen mine risk education programmes in order to reduce the risks posed to civilians, in particular to children, by anti-personnel landmines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and explosive remnants of war;

38. *Expresses* its strong concern about the recruitment and use of children by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other violent and extremist groups in Afghanistan, in particular the use of children in suicide attacks, *reiterates* its strong condemnation of the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and all other violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict, including those involving killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, abduction of children, denial of humanitarian access, and attacks against schools, education and health-care facilities, including the burning and forced closure of schools, and the intimidation, abduction and killing of education personnel, particularly those attacks targeting girls' education by illegal armed groups, including the Taliban, and *noting*, in this context, the listing of the Taliban in the annex of the report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2015/409), and *calls for* those responsible to be brought to justice;

39. In this context, *stresses* the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict and subsequent resolutions, noting concern over increasing child casualties, continuing instances of recruitment and use of children and the need for protection of schools and hospitals, *supports* the decree by the Minister of the Interior reaffirming the Afghan Government's commitment to preventing violations of the rights of the child dated 6 July 2011, *welcomes* the progress made on the implementation of the Action Plan and its annex on children associated with the ANDSF signed in January 2011, and the Road Map to Compliance, in particular the establishment of the Afghan Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on Children and Armed Conflict, the entry into force of the presidential decree criminalising child recruitment and use by the ANDSF, the establishment of child protection units within Afghan National Police recruitment centres and the endorsement of national age assessment guidelines to prevent underage recruitment, *calls for* further implementation of the above mentioned provisions, in close cooperation with UNAMA and other relevant United Nations agencies, and for those responsible for violations and abuses against children to be held accountable;

40. *Requests* UNAMA to continue to support efforts to strengthen the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including engagement with the Afghan Government to fully implement the Action Plan and Road Map, and actions to address other violations and abuses, including sexual violence against children, and *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to give priority to the child protection activities and capacity of UNAMA and continue to include in his future reports the matter of children and armed conflict in the country in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions;

41. *Remains concerned* at the serious harm that opium cultivation, production and trafficking and consumption continue to cause to the stability, security, public health, social and economic development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, *takes note* of the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015 released in October 2015 and of the decrease in production and cultivation of drugs suggested in it, *welcomes* the launch in September 2015 of the National Drug Action Plan, *calls on* the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to accelerate its implementation as well as that of the National Drug Control Strategy, including through alternative livelihood programmes, and to mainstream counter-narcotics throughout national

programmes, *encourages* additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy, and commends the support provided by the UNODC to the Triangular Initiative and the Central Asian Regional Coordination and Information Centre (CARICC) within the framework of the Paris Pact Initiative and the Rainbow Strategy and the UNODC regional programme for Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, as well as the contribution of the Domodedovo Police Academy of Russia;

42. *Acknowledges* that illicit proceeds of the drug trafficking significantly contributes to the financial resources of the Taliban and its associates, and *calls for* a review, in close consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, of the United Nations role in supporting the Government of Afghanistan to combat illicit economy, including counter-narcotics, and encouraging international cooperation in this regard including to further address regional linkages and concerns;

43. *Welcomes* the continued efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in empowering the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics-led implementation of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy, including through the JCMB's Counter Narcotics Monitoring Mechanism;

44. *Calls upon* States to strengthen international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs originating in Afghanistan, with a view to its progressive elimination, in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility in addressing the drug problem of Afghanistan, including through strengthening the law enforcement capacity and cooperation against the trafficking in illicit drugs and precursor chemicals and money-laundering and corruption linked to such trafficking, and *calls for* full implementation of its resolution 1817 (2008);

45. *Appreciates* the work of the Paris Pact initiative and its "Paris-Moscow" process in countering the production, trafficking and consumption of opium and heroin from Afghanistan and the elimination of poppy crops, drug laboratories and stores as well as the interception of drug convoys, *underlines* the importance of border management cooperation, and *welcomes* the intensified cooperation of the relevant United Nations institutions with the OSCE and the CSTO in this regard;

46. *Reiterates* the importance of accelerating the establishment of a fair and transparent justice system, eliminating impunity and contributing to the affirmation of the rule of law throughout the country and *welcomes* steps taken by the Government of Afghanistan in this regard such as ensuring the declaration of assets by the members of the Supreme Court, launching a systematic performance review and further increasing the number of female judges;

47. *Stresses* in this context the importance of further progress in the reconstruction and reform of the prison sector in Afghanistan, in order to improve the respect for the rule of law and human rights therein, *emphasizes* the importance of ensuring access for relevant organizations, as applicable, to all prisons and places of detention in Afghanistan, *calls for* full respect for relevant international law including humanitarian law and human rights law, *notes* the recommendations contained in the report of the Assistance Mission dated 25 February 2015, *welcomes* the adoption of the National Action Plan to fully eliminate torture in Afghan detention facilities, and *encourages* the Government of Afghanistan to consider

measures that focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration for children formerly associated with armed forces and armed groups and to ensure they are treated in accordance with international juvenile justice standards, including as outlined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights;

48. *Notes* with strong concern the effects of corruption on security, good governance, counter-narcotics efforts and economic development, *welcomes* the anti-corruption commitments made by the Government of Afghanistan at the Tokyo Conference in 2012 and reinforced in September 2015 in the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), *welcomes* the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan in this regard, including the issuance of the presidential decree in July 2012, *calls for* continued action by the Government to fulfil those commitments in order to establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration at the national, provincial and local levels of government and *also welcomes* continued international support for Afghanistan's governance objectives;

49. *Encourages* all Afghan institutions, including the executive and legislative branches, to work in a spirit of cooperation, *recognizes* the Afghan Government's continued efforts in pursuing legislative and public administration reform in order to tackle corruption and to ensure good governance, as agreed at the Bonn Conference, with full representation of all Afghan women and men, and accountability at both national and subnational levels, and *stresses* the need for further international efforts to provide technical assistance in this area, and *recognizes* the Government of Afghanistan efforts in this regard;

50. *Calls for* full respect for and protection for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of human rights defenders, and of international humanitarian law throughout Afghanistan, *welcomes* the growth in Afghan free media, but *notes with concern* the continued restrictions on freedom of media, and attacks against journalists by terrorist as well as extremist and criminal groups, *commends* the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) for its courageous efforts to monitor respect for human rights in Afghanistan as well as to foster and protect these rights and to promote the emergence of a pluralistic civil society, *stresses* the importance of full cooperation with the AIHRC by all relevant actors and promoting their independence as well as of ensuring their safety, and supports broad engagement across government agencies and civil society for the realization of the mutual commitments made, including the commitment to provide sufficient government financing for the AIHRC, *reiterates* the important role of the AIHRC, and *supports* the efforts of the AIHRC to strengthen its institutional capacity and independence within the framework of the Afghan Constitution;

51. *Recognizes* that despite progress achieved on gender equality, enhanced efforts, including on measurable and action-oriented objectives, are necessary to secure the rights and full participation of women and girls and to ensure that all women and girls in Afghanistan are protected from violence and abuse, that perpetrators of such violence and abuse are held accountable, and that women and girls enjoy equal protection under the law and equal access to justice, *welcomes* the publication, in June 2015, of the National Action Plan for the implementation of the Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), *emphasizes* the importance of maintaining adequate legislative protections for women, and of ensuring that women fleeing

domestic violence are able to find safe and secure refuge, *strongly condemns* discrimination and violence against women and girls, in particular violence aimed at preventing girls from attending schools, and *stresses* the importance of implementing Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) noting the mainstreaming commitments introduced therein, and *welcomes* in this regard the establishment in January 2016 of a new Trust Fund for Victims of Violence against Women by the Government of Afghanistan to support victims of violence against women;

52. *Welcomes* the Afghan Government's commitment to strengthen the participation of women in the Afghan political life and in all Afghan governance institutions including elected and appointed bodies and the civil service and *notes* the progress in this regard, *welcomes* its continued efforts to protect and promote the full participation of women in the electoral processes and *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to include in his reports to the Security Council relevant information on the process of integration of women into the political, economic and social life of Afghanistan, *notes* the UNAMA report on the Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan, and *calls on* the Government of Afghanistan to urgently develop a strategy to fully implement it, including services to victims and access to justice, *welcomes* in this regard the launch in November 2014 by the Ministry of Public Health of the Gender-based Violence Treatment Protocol for Healthcare Providers, *recalls* that the promotion and protection of women's rights are an integral part of development, peace, reintegration and reconciliation and that women play a vital role in the peace process, *welcomes* the Afghan Government's commitment to developing, implementing and monitoring the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and identifying further opportunities to support participation of women in the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, and *welcomes* the commitment of the Government of Afghanistan to develop a Women's Economic Empowerment Action Plan;

53. *Expresses* its concern over the recent increase in the number of internally displaced persons in and refugees from Afghanistan, *stresses* that stability and development of Afghanistan require that its citizens can see a future for themselves within their country, *welcomes* the commitment of the Government of Afghanistan in making repatriation and reintegration of Afghan refugees among its highest national priorities including their voluntary, safe and dignified return and their sustainable reintegration in the national development planning and prioritization processes, *encourages* all efforts of the Government of Afghanistan towards the implementation of this commitment, and *calls for* continued and enhanced international assistance in this regard;

54. *Strongly supports* the Government of Afghanistan in its commitment to create the necessary conditions for the repatriation and sustainable reintegration of Afghan refugees in the country with emphasis on youth empowerment, education, livelihoods, social protection and infrastructure, and *stresses* in this regard the key importance of attaining peace and stability for solving the refugee crisis as well as of advances in social and economic welfare leading to the improvement of the living conditions inside Afghanistan through the coordinated efforts of the Government of Afghanistan with the support of the international community;

55. *Notes* the need to continue to strengthen, with the support of the international community, Afghanistan's absorption capacity for the full rehabilitation and sustainable reintegration of Afghan returnees and internally displaced persons;

56. *Requests* that the Secretary-General reports to the Council every three months on developments in Afghanistan, and to include in his reports an evaluation of progress made against the benchmarks for measuring and tracking progress in the implementation of UNAMA's mandate, including at the subnational level, and priorities as set out in this resolution;

57. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.
