



Universidades Lusíada

Saraiva, Luís Eduardo Marquês, 1956-

Effects of accession of Turkey to the EU's energy security

<http://hdl.handle.net/11067/1022>

<https://doi.org/10.34628/7rj2-a560>

Metadados

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Data de Publicação | 2013 |
| Resumo | Energy security is a subject that concerns all the Europeans. More and more the access to the energetic resources is part of the geostrategic concerns of the nations. Europe, very needed of energy, presently depends largely on Russia provisions. The diversification of the energy sources must continue to have a high priority in the preoccupations of Europe. Will the land route through the Asia Minor be or not one of the options to decrease the stress of Russia over the energetic needs of the Euro... |
| Palavras Chave | Política energética - Turquia, Política energética - Países da União Europeia |
| Tipo | article |
| Revisão de Pares | Não |
| Coleções | [ULL-FCHS] LPIS, n. 08 (2013) |

Esta página foi gerada automaticamente em 2025-05-17T09:12:50Z com informação proveniente do Repositório

EFFECTS OF ACCESSION OF TURKEY TO THE EU'S ENERGY SECURITY

**Luís Eduardo Saraiva
Prof. Auxiliar da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa**

Abstract

Energy security is a subject that concerns all the Europeans. More and more the access to the energetic resources is part of the geostrategic concerns of the nations. Europe, very needed of energy, presently depends largely on Russia provisions. The diversification of the energy sources must continue to have a high priority in the preoccupations of Europe. Will the land route through the Asia Minor be or not be one of the options to decrease the stress of Russia over the energetic needs of the European community? To make viable this type of facilities the role of Turkey inside the European Union is inescapable. Being so, will Europe prefer to go under an era of austerity and almost monopolistic dependency from Russia, or will Europe accept Turkey in its club, therefore easily acceding to the energy sources of Middle East and the Caspian basin, while, at the same time, enlarging the European borders up to areas of endemic security weaknesses?

Key-words

European Union, Turkey, security, energy, Middle East

Resumo

A segurança energética é um assunto que interessa a todos os europeus. Cada vez mais o acesso aos recursos energéticos faz parte das preocupações geoestratégicas dos Estados. A Europa, muito carente de energia, depende largamente dos fornecimentos da Rússia. A diversificação das fontes de energia deverá continuar a ter uma alta prioridade nas preocupações da União Europeia. A rota terrestre da Ásia Menor será ou não uma das formas de diminuir a pressão da Rússia sobre as necessidades energéticas da Europa comunitária? Para a viabilização dessa facilidade é incontornável o papel da Turquia na União Europeia. Assim, preferirá a Europa uma época de austeridade e dependência quase monopolista da Rússia, ou aceitará a Turquia no seu seio, acedendo assim facilmente às fontes energéticas do Médio Oriente e da bacia do Cáspio, mas levando as fronteiras europeias até a áreas de endémicas fragilidades em termos de segurança?

Palavras-chave

União Europeia, Turquia, Segurança, energia, Médio Oriente

Introduction

Energy security is a subject that concerns us all. One of the concerns raised during the revision, in the year 2008, of the European Security Strategy (first approved in 2003) was identified by a problem: the EU is too much dependent in energy from Russia. The only solution for this problem seems to be the diversity of sources. And the better option, as this paper will try to argue, is to develop closer ties with Turkey.

The European security strategy was firstly issued on 2003 and it raised some concerns mainly focused on the need for European Union to reinforce its defence capacity. Having confirmed that the European side of NATO, although with solid military capabilities individually, could not collectively raise enough power to fulfil its desires of becoming a global power, EU identified some areas where it was considered crucial to put great efforts in order to, at least, be able to face any type of threat to its defence. In 2003, however, energy security did not seem to be a priority issue. The stress was on creating a system of a duty roster of battle groups (a headquarters brigade size over a battalion size military unit) able to be deployed wherever needed, outside Europe. In 2008, the identification of the need to revise the security doctrine of EU led to the proposal of a new Security Strategy. However, this was not seen as absolutely necessary and a simple update of the document was approved. But from that time on the relevance of energy security was underlined. And it became clear that EU had to find solutions for its too much dependency from Russia energy supplies.

In the last decades Turkey has been defining its strategic objectives always taking into account the prospects of becoming an EU member. Apart from being for decades a very relevant member of the collective defensive system of Europe, its security concerns have been reflecting also this approach. But lately, with the deceleration of the accession process, Turkey has been looking around and started taking care of "its own business". In other words, disappointed with Europe, Turkey is facing the other side, looking towards the Middle East, and confirming that there is a role of a major regional power to be played there. Furthermore, Anatolia, the great Asian peninsula where Turkey mainly stands, is the natural bridge that links the pivot area to all the other parts of the World-island defined by Mackinder, and mainly with Europe. That is to say that if EU wants to access the richest areas of the planet in energy resources it has to go through Turkey.

And it is better to have Turkey inside the team than having it as an outsider.

In fact the richest area of the planet in what concerns energy is the area that goes from the Arabian Peninsula to the Caspian Sea. And the Western world gets the most of its energy needs from that large area. But the energy routes are dire: the tankers have to pass, in their long journeys, through the Gulf of Aden and along the African coasts of the Indian Sea, where the risks are high and the distances huge. Mainly in what concerns the area to be the most desirable in the near future the Caspian Sea basin, the energy routes, the most natural and practical are to be traced on land, crossing Turkish territories towards Europe. The other major routes towards Western Europe necessarily have to pass through Russian territory. Therefore, it seems clear that in the near future the conflicts for the possession of the richest deposits of fossil fuel will take place around and in the Caspian basin.

There is a common approach between EU and Turkey in what concerns energy security: both want to access and use the inexhaustible energy resources available in their vicinity. But the Turkish vicinity may cause unrest to Europe. Europe has reluctance to have borders with countries considered as rogue states, or where the terrorism has safe heavens, or where an endemic unrest lies. But the resources of the Caspian are huge, and the countries along its coasts are willing to sell their resources to who is willing to pay. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and even Iran can feed pipelines that, crossing Turkey, will reach EU. The scenario is clear, but are willing the main powers in Europe to open a second continental tap, thus decreasing the overwhelming pressure of monopolistic businesses with Russia? This must be the theme of clear debates in Europe, or at least, this subject must be a sound topic for discussion concerning the future of Turkey in Europe.

The final part of this paper will raise the question of Turkey being or not a solution for the dependency on Russia, proposing that this thesis deserves a try, to say the least, because, trapped between the interests of two major powers – The USA and Russia –, both looking with a close eye to the last energy rich areas of the planet, the EU has to expand towards the vicinity where the fossil fuels are, and this movement can only be possible with more capacities, not only on the field of security and defence, but also on the field of political ability and in the domain of geopolitics.

1. The importance of Energy Security for EU

During the last three decades, European Community was able to grant some success in the pursuit of its energy objectives (like growing energetic independency, finding replacements for oil, the implementation of measures for energy saving, etc.) (Leal, 2011, p. 130), but didn't express concerns on energy security until recently.

In fact, even the text of the European Security Strategy (ESS), approved in 2003, very lightly only touched the theme of energy security. It raised some con-

cerns mainly focused on the need for European Union to reinforce its defence capacity to address some threats, and it dedicated some attention on the need to build security in the neighbourhood and the efforts to be assigned to the pursue of an international order based on effective multilateralism.

Feeling that the European side of NATO, although with solid military capabilities individually, could not collectively raise enough power to fulfil its desires of becoming a global power, EU identified then some areas where it was considered crucial to put greater efforts in order to, at least, be able to face any type of threat to its defence. The stress was on identifying military needs, approve what was known as Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) and raising a system of a duty roster of battle groups (consisting roughly in a headquarters with the size of Brigade HQ and military subunits forming a military unit with the size of a battalion) able to be deployed wherever needed, outside Europe.

In the ESS the EU has identified three strategic objectives, namely addressing the threats, building security in the neighbourhood of EU, and an international order based on effective multilateralism. The second objective indicated already that some interest would be attached to the richer region in the world in fossil fuels. Referring the "need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there", the text of the Strategy underlined the attention that EU had to start paying to the region: "We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region" (European Commission, 2003, p. 8).

Already in its initial pages the ESS indicated that a concern to Europe was the energy dependency and vulnerability, and that it needed to be addressed: "These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence - and so vulnerability - on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields" (European Commission, 2003, p. 3).

In fact it was underlined that energy dependence was a source of problems, therefore being considered "a special concern for Europe", mainly due to Europe being the world's largest importer of oil and gas. "Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa." (European Commission, 2003, p. 3).

Considering that much of the security environment had changed in five years since the first issue of the Security Strategy, and that almost half of the Member-States didn't participate in the drafting of the initial ESS, the need for a new one was proposed in 2008. But, at the end, this was not seen as absolutely necessary and a simple update of the document was approved. In fact, this update put more stress on the question of energy security: "But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society - such as information systems and energy supplies - are more vulnerable." (European Council, 2008, p. 1)

A complete section was now dedicated to energy security. It stressed that in the last five years, from 2003 to 2008, the concerns about energy dependence have increased. As the production declined inside Europe, it was estimated that by 2030 up to 75% of oil and gas would have to be imported (European Council, 2008, p. 5). As these imports would come from a few countries only, that would increase the probabilities of Europe facing the effects of a crisis. Therefore, EU would have to face a set of challenges in defence. The solution presented is the need of an EU energy policy that must include the internal and the external dimensions.

As noted in the document, the solution has to consider “greater diversification of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes”, but also “good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries.” The 2008 revision notes that “EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean.” A privileged status was assigned to Russia, above all other EU partners in energy: “Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations.” Nevertheless, some other partners had their role underlined, at least due to their geographical positioning: “Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine.” With others, like China, India and USA, EU proposes to deal with the promotion of a rational use of energy and a fair world trade (European Council, 2008, p. 5).

When one is referring to the European Security Strategy, it is then clear that: First -EU has a strategy for energy, but the EU member-states have bilateral arrangements to fulfil their own needs.¹ Second - the EU is too much dependent on Russian sources. And third - the EU needs to diversify sources: from Northern Africa, South Atlantic, sub-Saharan Africa, etc... As noted in the revision of the ESS, “Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential,” (European Council, 2008, p. 5). And, specifically, the EU refers the interest in other energy routes: “Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine.” (European Council, 2008, p. 5).

It is worth noting that, concerning its energy strategy, the EU has the following Energy Security Priorities: Baltic Interconnection Plan; Gas Southern Corridor; LNG (liquid natural gas) Action Plan; Mediterranean Energy Ring (electricity, gas, solar and wind); North-South interconnections of gas and electricity in Central and South East Europe. There is also a need of a model for the offshore net at the North Sea. These priorities materialize the main concerns of Europe about energy, but the main issues do not seem to relate to sources of fuel coming from Southeast.

As noted by Charles King, but also as referred somehow in the update of

¹ In the EU Treaty, energy is defined as a shared competence. The objectives of the EU energy policy are (i) to assure the functioning of the energetic market; (ii) to assure the safety of the energy supply within EU; and (iii) to promote energy efficiency and savings, and the development of new and renewable energies (Leal, 2011, p. 129).

the 2003 ESS, the region of the Black Sea, an area that a decade ago was at the most far away limit of the European thoughts, is presently the next frontier of the European strategic thinking in what concerns energy security, commercial nets, migrations and other important political areas (King, 2008, 1-2).

The Black Sea neighbourhoods to East and South, including the Middle East, Maghreb, Anatolia and Caucasus are of vital importance to the growth and reinforcement of European Security. And, according to this, it is now of crucial importance the contributions of Turkey to the security of Europe, as it was important the accession of Turkey to NATO in 1950.

But the ESS of 2003 and its update from 2008 may be already outdated. In a policy Brief edited in July 2012, Margriet Drent and Lennart Landman presented clearly "Why Europe needs a new European Security Strategy" (Drent & Landman, 2012). "The EU of 2003 and the EU of 2012 look markedly different" (...) "To be fair, what Ashton and the EEAS mostly lack is clear guidance from the Council, which makes the argument for devising a renewed strategy outlook all the more relevant (Drent & Landman, 2012, p. 3). "A new strategy should clarify the link between the EU's security ambitions - be it their internal or external aspects - and which capabilities are needed to accomplish them" (Drent & Landman, 2012, p. 3). "A new strategy should review threats, assess and prioritize, and translate them to capability needs and planning" (Drent & Landman, 2012, p. 4). And a crucial question is posted by the authors of those lines above: "The need for strategy is clear, but what should it look like?" (Drent & Landman, 2012, p. 4).

2. Energy - New Priority on Turkey's Security

Having joined the Allies in 1945, Turkey decisively took the party of the Western powers, thus becoming in the aftermath of the Second World War one of the defenders of Europe against any threats, as the beginning of the Cold War would clearly show.

The adhesion to NATO in 1952 was therefore natural and Turkey is now the second ally in what concerns the amount of men in the Armed Forces. What is clear is that in the last decades Turkey has been defining its strategic objectives always taking into account the prospects of becoming an EU member. Since 1959 Turkey has been trying to join EU (or ECMM initially). Since 1963 Turkey is an associated member of EU.

So, the participation in the Western Europe Union (WEU) since 1992 as an associate member was natural at the time and fully in accordance with the strategic approach of Turkey to Europe. Apart from being a very relevant member of the collective defensive system of Europe through the participation in these two organizations since their creation, its present security concerns continue to reflect this approach.

With the complete transference of the tasks of WEU to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) completed in 2009, WEU become officially extinct in 2011. As a consequence of this extinction, Turkey didn't maintain its status

towards Europe in what concerned security aspects, thus technically having been expelled from the EU security structure and so an important part of EU-Turkey security links were broken.

Since then the CSDP missions have been discussed and organized mainly without the participation of Turkey and, when this country was invited, it was with some reserve and only when it was difficult to find the right assets within the availability of the EU State-members.

In the recent years, partially pushed by the freezing of the accession process, Turkey has been redefining its strategic objectives and renovating its Security Strategy. Somehow disappointed with Europe, Turkey is assigning greater priority to its neighbourhood, from the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and Caspian Basin to the Middle East, and stressing and assuring that there is a role to be played there by a major regional power.

Presently a set of major challenges to the accession of Turkey to EU have been pointed and discussed. One recalls that the accession of Turkey to EU would approach the borders with Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan or Chechnya, thus directly involving EU in local crises and conflicts. Therefore the accession of Turkey would not help to reinforce Europe's security but, on the contrary, it would constitute, in this point of view, a direct threat to EU's security.

Apart from the question of security, other questions remain relevant in the accession process of Turkey. Richard Corbett, in an article published in 2008, noted the importance of some of these issues. Restrictions on freedom of speech remain a cause for serious concern and Turkey's legal system does not fully guarantee the freedoms of expression in line with European standards. The treatment of minorities in Turkey was also a concern of the Commission, particularly with respect to Turkey's sizable Kurdish population. Another key issue that needs to be addressed if Turkey is to become a member of the EU is the long running feud with Cyprus. Three years after Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960, inter-communal violence broke out between the island's Greek and Turkish populations, eventually leading in 1974 to a Greek-sponsored coup d'état to seize the government and a Turkish military intervention seven days later in 1974. The relationship between the military and the government in Turkey is very unique amongst European countries and gives rise to further concerns about Turkish membership of the EU (Corbett, 2008). All these issues also have negative effects in the security issue.

But if the most part of the dossiers for the accession process remain to be fully approved and closed, Turkey didn't froze its geopolitics. As Anatolia or Asia Minor, the great Asian peninsula where Turkey mainly stands, is and always has been the natural bridge that links the pivot area of the World-island (defined by Mackinder) to all the other parts, and mainly to Europe, Turkey is decided to take profit of this unique position. Anatolia always played a major role in History, linking peoples and cultures and it is the place where most empires would start expanding and enlarging. Turkey understood this and its grand strategies have

always reflected this awareness.

In October 2010 a new Security Strategy was approved in Turkey by the Turkish National Security Council. The Red Book, as the Strategy is called, is a classified document, but some parts were revealed including the exclusion of some countries, Russia, Greece, Iran and Iraq, from the list of main external threats. The main external threat to Turkey is now international terrorism (Vestnik Kavkaza, 2010). This change shows clearly that Turkey is balancing between East and West and not anymore only dependent on the "good will" of Europe to become a "member of the club". By one side, Greece, the only EU member on the list of threats to Turkey, is not anymore identified as such. This new neighbourhood approach has positive reflections also with Russia, which whom Turkey lives a new relation, with the approval of the passage of the Southstream pipeline through its territorial waters of the Black Sea. This approval puts more pressure from Russia on EU, because it removes "the last major obstacle to proceed with a project that could increase Europe's dependence on Russian natural-gas supplies." (Gronholt-Pedersen, 2011). But if Turkey plays *realpolitik* in such a way in European territory, to the East it gives a wink of the eye to Iraq and Iran, erasing their classification as threats and showing the disposition to act as a regional power.

Turkey, although being a modest producer of energetic resources, is in the neighbourhood of the most important deposits of oil and natural gas. Turkey is in a region with 72% of the world reserves of oil and natural gas (this region includes the Caspian basin, parts of central Asia and the most part of the Middle East). Being the bridge between the highly industrialized world of the West, with one foot in Europe and another in the Middle East where those rich deposits lay, Turkey will be always a major player in the fuel acquisitions by the EU.

In 2009, one year before the approval of the new Security Strategy, Turkey presented its new Strategic Plan for the period 2010-2014 of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. In the presentation note, the minister of energy, Taner Yildiz, referred to the concern of his Ministry with the evaluation of the energy resources of the countries to the East and also with the need to evaluate the geographical characteristics that facilitate the transport of such resources to the Western countries. Attention was also dedicated to projects that could cover the commercial and political dimensions of the involvement of Turkey in such projects (Ministry of Energy, 2009, p. 2). The minister also remarked that Turkey had been the target of several studies that assigned the country the status of energy hub, underlining also that Turkey had become a new and relevant actor concerning multinational projects for pipelines being also relevant in the international energy arena (Ministry of Energy, 2009, p. 2).

The strategic plan defines the energy objectives of Turkey, i.e., to provide diversity of resources attributing high priority to internal resources; to raise the percentage of renewable resources; to increase the energetic efficiency; to fully guarantee the operating conditions of the free market and to provide the rein-

forcement of the investment environment; to provide a set of resources in the area of natural gas and oil; to make the country a distribution hub and energy terminal; to minimize the negative environmental impacts of energy; to increase the contribution of Turkish natural resources to national economy; to foster the efficiency of the use of energy and natural resources; etc.

One of the objectives of the plan concerning the creation of a hub and terminal for energy displays four strategies, mainly envisaging not only the Turkish resources but also taking into due account the privileged strategic location. Firstly, taking advantage of the geographical and geopolitical position, one strategy opens the options for studies that will be carried on under the perspective that Turkey will become a hub and terminal of energy facilitating the transportation from Middle East and Central Asia to the world markets. Secondly, another objective specifies that the Turkish authorities will continue the talks to accelerate the projects and to stabilize the cooperation with partner countries with the objective of renewing the installations of oil and natural gas within the scope of the projects already in agenda concerning pipelines. Thirdly, in order to increase the potential of import and export of electrical energy, another strategy is dedicated to the connections for international transmission that will be established with neighbour countries and at the same time the modernization of the already existing connections. Finally, it was intention of Turkey to assure the synchronization between the Turkish transmission system and the UCTE (Ministry of Energy, 2009, p. 31), but in the meantime EU replaced this system with the ENTSOE2.

Mammadov, an Azeri researcher that has been studying the geopolitics of energy in the Caspian area, referred that during the Clinton administration, the Ambassador Richard Morningstar, special advisor of the USA President to energy diplomacy in the Caspian basin, referred to the energy policy of the USA concerning the Caspian underlining not only the importance of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as a viable means of commercializing the oil from the Caspian to the Mediterranean, but also indicating in a much broader vision that the pipeline would create a robust link between Central Asia, Caucasus and Turkey. This pipeline not only would avoid commercial, environmental and security risks due to the increase of oil transportation through Bosphorus, but would also give guarantees that Turkey would remain a relevant player in the process of development of the energy resources of the Caspian, at the same time playing a stabilizing role in the volatile regions of Caucasus and Central Asia (Mammadov, 2009, p. 57).

Voluntarily or not, Turkey finds itself performing a central role in the great game of the strategy of the energy resources that the international powers play

² UCTE coordinated the operation and development of the electricity transmission network to the global transmission network operated in continental Europe, thus providing a viable platform for all the participants of the internal electricity market and beyond. In July 2009 all the operational tasks were transferred to the European Network of Transmission Systems Operator for Europe (ENTSOE) of EU. Turkey is not part of this network. Cf. www.entsoe.eu/the-association/history/ucte, visited in 15 April 2012.

in the region, namely the USA, Russia and European Union, but where Iran and China, among others, can be also found. It is up to Turkey to assume completely the responsibilities and challenges of that role that – if Turkey can manage it – will assign other arguments and advantages that may weaken the obstacles that the country is facing during the long march to the EU accession.

3. Why the Caspian Sea concerns Europe

In the present days the existing energy routes that depart from the Middle East and central Asia are dire: to access the western markets the tankers have to pass, in their long journeys, through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Sea, where the risks are high and the distances huge. Concerning the itinerary for the resources coming from the Caspian Sea basin - the area expected to be the most desirable in the globe in the near future -, the most natural and practical energy routes are to be traced on land, thus crossing Turkish territories in the less extended length, towards Europe. There is no doubt: in the near future, the conflicts for the possession of the richest deposits of fossil fuel will take place around and in the Caspian basin and neighbourhood.

The rich resources of the basin of the Caspian Sea assign an extremely important role to Turkey, in what concerns EU energy needs. But it seems, because it is not accepted that EU is simply distracted, that EU is not paying attention to the possibilities of the Caspian market for gas, while it is deepening the involvement with projects at its North, reinforcing the connections with Russia, more than with the South.

It seems also, by the other hand that, EU is deliberated creating resistances to the Turkish adhesion process, when Turkey would have the conditions to become the main European entrance for the resources coming from the Caspian. And Europe would get great advantages with big amounts of energy flowing through Asia Minor (Anatolia).

With the global increase of the energy needs the Caspian Basin will become one area of confrontation that the players will use to achieve their geopolitical objectives. Therefore it is very relevant to analyse what resources, in quality and quantity, available in that region. It seems also useful to analyse the way how UE accedes presently to the resources of that region and if it needs Turkey or not to get to them.

In the region that includes the Caspian Basin and goes up to the Persian Gulf, the results of analysis and prospection indicate that there may exist what may be the most important fossil fuel reserves of the world. Those deposits are distributed to the territories of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan, for instances, will be most probably one of the main providers of gas to Turkey and Europe, what may well be happening very soon with the addition of the field of condensate and natural gas to the South Caucasus pipeline (SCP). Anyway, Azerbaijan will have reserves that amount to 849.5 billion cubic meters of gas and estimated oil reserves of 32 billion barrels. This country will be one of

the main sources of gas in the region in the near future (Mammadov, 2009, 77). In the last years about 40 billion USD were invested in Azerbaijan. It is worth noting that the financial reserves of the country amount 20 billion USD and that the public debts is 2.5 billion USD, what shows some vitality in the economy of the country (Mammadov, 2009, 77).

But the Caspian Sea is still a geopolitical issue and a potential origin of conflicts and crises. Like Russia, Iran would have advantages in the shared (i. e. common) use of Caspian, what would give it access to the richest deposits of the bottom of the Sea, mainly situated near the cost lines of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Russia, which sees many advantages in the common use, signed, however, the treaty based in the equidistance line, a treaty that Iran didn't want to subscribe until now, because it reiterated demands access to a portion of the Caspian equivalent to one fifth of the surface.

Kazakhstan occupies the NE cost of the Caspian and, having common borders with China, is situated in a privileged strategic position to become the natural passage of the energetic resources from the Caspian to that emerging power. Together with Turkmenistan, the country has the biggest share of proved reserves of natural gas of the Caspian basin, therefore its importance to Nabucco project. If these countries are not involved, Nabucco will not proceed.

Russia has in the region of the Caspian basin a crucial role, as the war with Georgia clearly demonstrated. The decision of creation of alternate gas routes to EU not passing through Russian territories will have always the attention of Russia, and this country will be always in conditions of dictating its will in the region. Furthermore, when analysing the list of the main providers of gas to Europe, it is a fact that only Russia, among the States with access to the Caspian shores, is in the list. The indicators suggest that, as the main provider of gas to Europe, Russia is inevitable and only if all the other Caspian states act together to constitute a common front of providers to Europe they can end the monopoly of Russia. The situation of oil is not very different in nature but in this case EU has the possibility of diversifying sources from very different regions on the globe.

What seems to happen is some lack of objectivity by Europe in what concerns the resources of Caspian Sea, because what is being observed is the EU balancing more to the North, where it invests in infrastructures, reinforcing its relation with Russia in the area of fossil fuels. Furthermore, it seems that EU wants to create resistances to the accession of Turkey, the country that could become the main European platform for the entrance of fuel resources originated from the Caspian.

Anyway, the bet in Nabucco, apart all the commitments relating to Blue Stream and the project South Stream, will demonstrate, if the project Nabucco succeeds, that EU doesn't foresee to definitely close the file for the creation of alternatives to the gas and oil routes at North. The Nabucco project has the reluctance, not to say the opposition, of Russia and Iran. Both countries disagree the way it is planned to be done the sharing of the system and they are not interested

that Europe has access to a third route of natural gas supply that does not include them in the plans. Russia and Iran would see the pipeline that would cross the Caspian (a vital way for the viability of Nabucco) as mining their chances of providing gas to Europe – Russia via South Stream and Iran via Turkey (Mammadov, 2009, p. 55). Furthermore, the project of a route as an alternative to Russia to provide fossil fuel to Europe will only be viable with the accession of Turkey to the EU, what doesn't seem to be yet in the horizon.

4. Turkey and EU Common interests on energy security

Are there any signs of a Convergence of Energy Policies of Turkey and EU? As we can read in an article written some time ago by Paulo Gorjão, the alliance between EU and Ankara is strategic in the game of production and distribution of oil and natural gas from the East to the West (Gorjão, 2011). And the last developments, and not only a wishful thinking, can be traced in the European Commission own words: "With a view to Turkey's further development as a potential energy hub and given the common challenges it shares with the EU, Turkey and the Commission also decided to enhance their cooperation on a number of important energy issues" (European Commission, 2012).

In the next decades the gas from Central Asia will be a sound and concrete alternative to the Russian gas, thus enabling European Union to reduce its dependency from Moscow. Turkey is already important because the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports oil from the Caspian to the Mediterranean Sea, towards Europe. Nabucco, if it succeeds, will increase this importance. Turkey is becoming a major regional energy transit hub, with supplies from Russia, the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East transported via Turkey westward towards Europe (EIA, 2012).

In accordance with the analysis of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Turkey holds a strategic role in natural gas - between the world's second largest natural gas market, continental Europe, and the substantial gas reserves of the Caspian Basin and the Middle East (EIA, 2012). But, as stated in 2009 by Ceyhun Emre Dogru, a Turkish researcher, in a work named *Security aspects of Turkey-EU relations*, divisions within EU concerning the search for energy in third countries, namely Russia, make difficult the design of a coherent European policy for energy (Dogru, 2009, p. 35).

The option of the southern corridor seems to be the one that would better allow escaping the "strong hug" of Russia in the business of natural gas that EU is so much needed. Additionally this is also the EU's option that best suites the strategic interest of Turkey, be it relating to the region where the country is, where more and more Turkey is considered as a regional power, be it in relation to the Turkish intentions of becoming a member of the "European Club". Presently there are several projects that materialize two main routes to deliver gas from the Caspian to Europe. One of the routes uses Russia as a transit country, through the improvement of the pipeline system of Central Asia, that connects

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia, or through the construction of a costal pipeline in the Caspian Sea, linking Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. The second route is named "Southern Corridor" and will have pipelines crossing Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and going beyond. There are several proposals for last route, be them trans-Caspian options, the Nabucco, the inter-connection Italy-Greece or the trans-Adriatic pipeline (Mammadov, 2009, p. 59).

A few words may be said about the oil supply to Europe from the same areas where natural gas flows to EU. The rationale for the gas routes also applies for oil coming from the Middle East. If the future situation of gas supply has clear variables, as seen above, and where Turkey is assigned the ability to play a relevant role, although not being is not a major oil producer, its role as an increasingly important oil transit country makes it vital to world oil markets, and particularly to European Union.

It may be said that the Turkish energy strategy was designed considering a set of pre-conditions, referring to present and future conditions, where the expectations of accession to EU is not one of the least important. The political, diplomatic and economic manoeuvres of some member-states seem to suggest that they too have that understanding. For this reason and maybe because of not assuming commitments that may lead to inevitable support to the candidacy of Turkey to EU, those states may prefer to fall into a greater danger, the eternal imperial temptation of Russia towards West Europe. But, if in the field of energy, the EU is in fact dependent of Russia then the solution to decompress that pressure will be Turkey.

5. The reinforcement of EU-Turkey links in energy security

Is Turkey a solution for EU's dependency from Russia? As argued above, it seems so. Will the adhesion of Turkey bring an increase in the EU energy security? It also seems so, but, on the other hand, other security problems may arise. Nevertheless EU has still to pursue better energetic solutions for diminishing its dependency, if the Europeans still think they may be able to play a global role.

The Copenhagen criteria do not constitute difficult issues for the accession of Turkey to the EU, but they have been used to constrain the development of the accession process. The political criteria - democratic institutions, rule of law, human rights, minorities protection, the economic criteria - market economy, and the community *acquis* criteria - adoption of EU principles concerning political, economical and monetary union, all these criteria are in fact being step by step incorporated in the Turkish adaptation to EU, although some of the dossiers are far behind the expected development so far.³

³ In 1993, the European Council in Copenhagen defined a set of criteria that were reinforced latter in Madrid in 1995. An acceding State must comply with the following criteria: (i) political - Existing stable institutions that can guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities and their protection; (ii) economical - Existence of a market economy that works efficiently and with capacity to face the market forces and the concurrence of the EU; (iii) community *acquis*

It is worth to note that the European Parliament in March 2012 had underlined the vision of the European Commission of the importance of Turkey to the security and prosperity of the European Union. In a report concerning the progress of Turkey in 2011, the European Commission concluded that Turkey was a key country for the security and prosperity of the EU and that its contribution to the EU in some important areas was effective and constituted "a credible approach to the negotiation process". Also the report encouraged Turkey to continue the reforms of the political criteria, noting that "significant further efforts were needed to guarantee fundamental rights" (European Parliament, 2012).

Also, through this resolution, EU stresses the importance it gives to Turkey in what concerns energy security: (...) Recalls Turkey's central role as the EU energy corridor for Caucasian and Caspian oil and gas resources and its strategic proximity to Iraq and its developing crude oil market." (European Parliament, 2012). Although Nabucco seems a never ending process, the Parliament, commenting the Progress Report, emphasized its strategic role for the energy security of EU, among other strategic pipelines, such as the ITGI (Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy) gas transit corridor. The Parliament, considering the strategic role and potential of Turkey, proposed then the opening of negotiations on chapter 5 - concerning energy, "with a view to furthering the EU-Turkey strategic dialogue on energy (European Parliament, 2012).

In 21 December 2012 there was an update of the text of the European Parliament resolution on the report about Turkey. The updated text continues to stress the important strategic role of Turkey in energy security for Europe, reiterating that negotiations on energy should be open in the accession process (European Parliament, 2012b).

But the Parliament also stresses the strategic importance of Turkey to the EU foreign policy, and especially its neighbourhood policy, underlining the potential of Turkey to help the situation in Syria: "Members support Turkey's firm stance on democratic forces in Syria and recall its important role in the protection of Syrian refugees. They ask the Commission, the Member States and the international community to support Turkey's efforts to cope with the growing humanitarian dimension of the Syrian crisis". (European Parliament, 2012b). This is a clear sign of the useful application of Turkey's abilities and capacities on solving issues on behalf of the EU's external relations. Another phrase on the text clearly demonstrates this: (...) they encourage Turkey to progressively align its foreign policy with that of the EU, with a view to creating valuable synergies and reinforcing the potential for a positive impact. (European Parliament, 2012b).

Nevertheless, in the same resolution the European Parliament called on Turkey to continue its efforts concerning reforms in the areas of political criteria and human rights, therefore giving a sign that these areas were in need of more

- ability to assume the obligations derived from the accession, including the acceptance of the objectives of the political, economic and monetary union.

care.

So, apart from the will to add Turkey external relations capacities to those of EU, as clearly stated above, EU also attributes great importance to Turkey in what concerns its strategy for energy and sees Turkey as able to play – or already playing – a major role in the provision of the so needed oil and gas to Western Europe.

6. Conclusions

The strengthening of links between EU and Turkey plays a major role in the reinforcement of the European energy security, therefore helping EU to better play a major role in the world, more and more ruled by energetic concerns.

Although it is clear that Turkey adhesion would bring EU closer to the main sources of energy of the planet, it would also bring vulnerabilities in its Southeast borders. Furthermore, there are fears that millions of Turks would unbalance the European markets, mainly in commerce and industry areas. Having pretensions of playing a global role as a major power, Europe will not want to let escape the opportunity of becoming relevant in the region to where its Southeast border is being extended and the emergency of Turkey as a regional power cannot be neglected in its already very long accession process.

Bibliography

Corbett, Richard (2008). “The challenge of Turkish accession to the European Union”, in *Global Affairs*, 15 - December - 2007, Issue 6/December-January 2008 [retrieved from <http://www.globalaffairs.es/en/the-challenge-of-turkish-accession-to-the-european-union/>, 3 January 2013].

Dogru, Ceyhun Emre (2009). *Security Aspects of Turkey-EU relations*. Nice: Centre International de Formation Européenne [retrieved from <http://www.ie-ei.eu/bibliotheque/memoires2009/DOGRU.pdf>, 5 January 2012].

Drent, Margriet, and Lennart Landman (2012). Why Europe needs a new European Security Strategy”. *Clingendael Policy Brief* No. 9 July 2012. Netherlands Institute Of International Relations Clingendael: The Hague [retrieved from www.clingendael.nl, 4 January 2012].

EIA - U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012). *Turkey – Country Analysis Brief* [retrieved from <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=TU>, 10 December 2012].

European Parliament (2012). Resolution of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey (2011/2889(RSP)), [Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012->

0116&language=EN, 1 January 2013].

European Commission (2012). *Commission staff working document Turkey, 2012 progress report*, 10.10.2012, Brussels [Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf, 2 January 2013].

European Council (2008). *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08 [Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf, 4 January 2013].

European Commission (2003). *European Security Strategy* [Retrieved from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/against_organised_crime/r00004_en.htm, 4 January 2013].

European Parliament (2012). *Resolution of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey (2011/2889(RSP))* [Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/re/887/887615/887615en.pdf, 12 January 2013].

European Parliament (2012b). *Summary, 2011/2889(RSP) - 29/03/2012 Text adopted by Parliament, single reading (Version 6.10 | Last update 21/12/2012 18:08)* [Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1200795&t=d&l=en>, 1 January 2012].

Gorjão, Paulo (2011). "A Paciência Turca tem limites?" in *Jornal i* [Retrieved from <http://www.ionline.pt/conteudo/130064-a-paciencia-turca-tem-limites>, 21 June 2012].

Gronholt-Pedersen, Jacob (2011). *Turkey Approves Russian Gas Plan*, 29 December 2011 [Retrieved from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204632204577126220469891132.html>, 4 January 2013].

King, Charles (2008). "The Wider Black Sea Region in the Twenty-first Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives", in Hamilton, Daniel, and Gerhard Mangott (Eds.). *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives*. Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations.

Leal, Catarina Mendes (2011). *Magrebe, Islamismo e a relação energética de Portugal*. Lisboa: Tribuna da História.

Mammadov, Ilgar (2009). *Geopolitics of Energy in the Caspian Sea Region – Azerbaijan Challenges*, Master of Art Thesis [Retrieved from repository01.lib.tufts.edu:8080/fedora/get/tufts:UA15.012.075.00005/bdef:TuftsPDF/getPDF, 16 April 2012].

Ministry of Energy and Natural resources, The republic of Turkey (2010). Strategic Plan (2010-2014). [Retrieved from http://www.enerji.gov.tr/yayinlar_raporlar_EN/ETKB_2010_2014_Stratejik_Planı_EN.pdf, 12 April 2012].

Vestnik Kavkaza (2010). Turkish National Security Council approves new security strategy, [Retrieved from <http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/politics/7425.html>, 4 January 2013].